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The health of a population is affected by numerous factors. A widely used model 
that describes the most important determinants of health is the conceptual 
framework that Marc Lalonde presented in 1974. Lalonde, who was the Canadian 
Minister of Health at the time, emphasized that several environmental and 
behavioral forces affect health, in addition to biological risk factors as well as 
access to high-quality healthcare. This broad societal perspective towards health 
was innovative in a time when health was still seen primarily as a biomedical 
construct.
Numerous other reports, studies and policy documents have repeated the 
importance of environmental and behavioral risk factors since 1974, including 
the WHO Alma-Ata declaration in 1978, the Ottawa Charter in 1986, and the 
Helsinki statement in 2013. These reports also stressed how avoidable morbidity 
pushes fiscal pressure onto the healthcare system, which is already facing 
challenges in its fiscal sustainability as a result of successful population ageing 
and medical-technological innovations. During the last decades, healthcare 
expenditure has continuously outpaced economic growth in most OECD 
countries (OECD, 2019a). At the beginning of a pandemic induced global 
recession, the pressure on the healthcare budget is expected to increase further 
still. This not only poses a risk to population health as it can jeopardize access 
to care, but it can also crowd out investment in other determinants of health 
such as education and social protection (Thomson et al., 2009).
At a continuing base, policymakers seek for new ‘approaches’ to maintain the 
fiscal sustainability of healthcare. These policies must, by definition, reduce 
costs, increase efficiency or improve (population) health but they also need to 
generate sufficient public and political support (Jeurissen et al., 2018). After all, 
policies that improve our ability to pay but that are not supported by the general 
public, will not work since chances are high that political decision makers 
prefer not to enact them. Scholars that wish to inform policymakers on the 
fiscal sustainability of healthcare thus need to generate both knowledge on the 
design of policies that may improve the fiscal sustainability of healthcare, as 
well as knowledge on how to get policies implemented.
Implementing policy is far from easy, however, because policymaking is a 
political struggle over values, interests and ideas. Political scientists stress that 
paradoxes underlie even seemingly straightforward policy decisions. Everyone 
is in favor of policy goals such as equity, efficiency and liberty. Stone (2012) 
coined these as ‘motherhood issues’, but Stone also expands that the fight 
begins when people explain what they precisely mean with these broad issues. 
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Disputes will be even larger when the attainment of motherhood issues is 
 operationalized into concrete policies. 
Removing excess administrative costs and improving the food environment 
may be seen as motherhood issues. Few will disagree with these ambitions. 
But healthcare regulators and financers may have a different view on excess 
administrative costs than healthcare professionals. Most people support a 
healthy food environment, but disputes may arise when food policies affect the 
interests of food producers or retailers.
Policy analysis is needed to operationalize ‘reducing paper and sugar’ into 
concrete policies. This requires a thorough analysis of the problems these 
policies ought to address. Hoppe (2010) argues that contemporary democracies 
need to develop a better governance of problems, because policy all too often is 
a sophisticated answer to the wrong problem. Puzzling and powering are 
required for policy answers that are more responsive to the problems perceived 
by citizens and stakeholders. Puzzling refers to the process of developing ideas 
and collecting information to define and resolve public policy problems in a 
context of uncertainty and bounded rationality, enveloping in instruments for 
addressing a public problem. Powering concerns the process of decision-ma-
king, mobilizing political support and bargaining in the context of stakeholders 
whose interests and power are diverse. Scholars that wish to generate knowledge 
on implementing policies for fiscally sustainable healthcare therefore need to 
take into account the views of many different stakeholders, such as the general 
public and all kind of interest groups.
Aim of this dissertation
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze how reducing administrative costs 
and improving population health with junk food taxes, can contribute to fiscally 
sustainable healthcare. This dissertation thus focuses on the puzzling and 
powering of policies rather than their design. Since administrative costs are 
intertwined with almost all functions of the healthcare system, cost reductions 
of such expenses can be hard to track down. This makes it hard to itemize the 
potential cost savings of policies with the potential to reduce administrative 
costs. This dissertation therefore aims to describe the total size of administrative 
costs and explores its components and determinants. The analyses of junk 
food taxes provide insight in their related policy processes, the interaction with 




provide general lessons for policy entrepreneurs with the ambition to successfully 
put prevention policies on the policy agenda. In summary, our studies on 
administrative costs focus more on puzzling whereas our studies on junk food 
taxes focus on powering as well.
These two specific policy strategies are more relevant since ‘reducing 
administrative costs’ and ‘investing in prevention’ are often mentioned in 
contemporary policy debates on the fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems 
in high-income countries. The general public and especially healthcare 
providers often emphasize reducing administrative costs when it comes to 
fiscally sustainable healthcare. The general public and especially public health 
professionals often highlight prevention. Under the wide umbrella of prevention 
policies, junk food taxes (which include popular terms such as ‘sugar taxes’, 
‘soda taxes’ or ‘fat taxes’) have received a recent rapid increase of attention. 
Implementing prevention is therefore operationalized by investigating this 
specific policy innovation.
As with all motherhood issues (Stone, 2012), the fight begins when people are 
asked what they mean with ‘reducing administrative costs’ and ‘investing in 
prevention’, and what specific policies should be adopted to attain these general 
goals. Policies that aim to reduce administrative costs are hampered by the fact 
that the whole construct of administrative costs is not well understood (Larjow, 
2018). Prevention policies are hampered by governance and political issues. 
A compelling approach requires health in all policies, which is notoriously 
difficult from a governance point of view (Storm, 2016). The position of the food 
industry may hamper policies that aim to reduce junk food consumption 
(Marion Nestlé, 2013). As a result, the general public, health care professionals and 
public health experts are often disappointed with suboptimal implementation 
of policies around administration and prevention. On the contrary, the policies 
proposed by health care managers and policymakers to safeguard fiscal 
sustainability, are generally unpopular. Their focus is on containing public health 
budgets within a government term. This compartmentalized and short-term 
focus is not well suited for the operationalization of more popular, but also more 
complex measures around administrative costs and prevention. This deadlock 
may be the main reason why policymakers often have the feeling that they lack 
instruments to control healthcare costs (Jeurissen, 2016; SCP, 2019).
In the following sections this reasoning is substantiated for administrative 
costs first, and for junk food taxes subsequently. The resulting research questions 
that will be addressed are provided immediately after each of these two sections 
14
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for readability purposes. In both sections the settings and context of the studies 
in which the questions are addressed are described.
Part I. Administrative costs in healthcare
Policymakers have traditionally seen healthcare demand-reducing policies like 
co-payments and benefit reductions as go-to options for fiscally sustainable 
healthcare (Stadhouders et al., 2016). These policies can be easily implemented 
from a technical point of view and also seem effective in terms of cost 
control, but they are generally unpopular. For instance, in the Netherlands, 
the mandatory deductible – where people pay the first 385 euros per year for 
secondary and tertiary care out-of-pocket – can simply be increased. This 
would, within the prevailing accounting rules, decrease total health expenditure 
considerably (Jeurissen et al., 2018). Leading up to the 2017 parliamentary 
elections in the Netherlands, however, not a single major Dutch political party 
pleaded to increase the mandatory deductible. Several parties proposed to 
decrease it or remove it altogether (Stemwijzer, 2017). At the point of writing, a 
similar situation was apparent for the 2021 parliamentary elections.
Scholars have therefore shifted their attention towards wasteful spending in 
the delivery of healthcare itself. This is a better alternative because co-payments 
and other traditional cost-containment policies cut both value-added and 
low-value healthcare spending and they can in some cases even increase costs 
further down the line (Ravesteijn et al., 2017). Wasteful spending in healthcare 
can appear in many ways, but a well-known taxonomy was published by 
Berwick & Hackbarth (2012), who identified six categories of waste: over-
treatment, failures in care delivery and care coordination, administrative 
complexity, pricing failures, fraud and abuse. The OECD (2017) translated this 
framework to the healthcare system level, and differentiated between wasteful 
clinical care, operational waste and governance-related waste. The total size of 
wasteful spending should not be underestimated. In the United States, for 
instance, they equate to at least 20% of total healthcare spending (Berwick & 
Hackbarth, 2012). 
Five of the six categories of waste as identified by Berwick & Hackbarth (2012) 
as well as the OECD (2017) classification of clinical and operational waste are 
grounded in the primary process of healthcare delivery. However, the general 
public is not that aware of inefficiencies in the primary process of healthcare 




people are generally positive about the quality of care instead. Dutch people do 
think that healthcare spending is (too) high, but generally blame other (f)actors 
than failures in the primary process of healthcare delivery. Often mentioned 
are competition forces in healthcare, and the power of insurance companies 
and pharmaceutical companies. Bureaucracy, the category of waste that is not 
rooted in the primary process, is another ‘popular’ factor to blame. People link 
bureaucracy to competition and the role of insurance companies, and the 
extensive administrative burden associated with accountability mechanisms 
and documentation and justification of health care delivery. Paradoxically 
enough, however, the introduction of managed competition in the Netherlands 
in 2006 was framed as an attempt to reduce the perceived bureaucracy of the 
former Sickness Fund system (Maarse, 2011).
Not only does the general public think that bureaucracy is an important cost 
driver, healthcare professionals consistently highlight it as one of the greatest 
inefficiencies in their daily practice. An international survey among primary 
care physicians (Osborn et al., 2015) for instance found that ‘frustration with 
administrative burden and insurance hassle’ resonated across many Western 
countries. Primary care physicians reported most often that the amount of 
time their practice spends on administrative issues is a major problem, in 
Switzerland (50%), Germany (52%), the US (54%) and the Netherlands (60%). 
Another study among Dutch primary care physicians in which a time-sampling 
technique was used instead of a survey, found that almost half of their time is 
not or indirectly spent on patient care (Van Hassel, 2020). It is therefore no 
surprise that reducing the administrative burden concerns the main focus of 
the Dutch Het Roer Moet Om (2020) (we must change course) bottom-up 
movement of dissatisfied healthcare professionals. In a recent manifesto that 
was signed by several opinion-leading healthcare practitioners, a legal norm is 
proposed that stipulates healthcare professionals cannot spend more than 20% 
of their time on administrative tasks (Dappere Dokters, 2020). Similar pleas for 
an ‘overhead norm’ were made before, for instance in the influential manifesto 
of Borst & Gaemers (2016) that plead for investment in better quality care in 
Dutch nursing homes. The 2015 decentralization of long-term care in the 
Netherlands also was based on the assumption that organizing care ‘closer to 
home’ would reduce bureaucracy (Tweede Kamer, 2013). Meaning that the 
two major healthcare reforms in the Netherlands of 2006 and 2015 both had 
the reduction of bureaucracy as one of their stated policy goals. In other OECD 
countries similar efforts are taken to tackle inefficiencies in healthcare 
administration by simplifying procedures, optimizing the size of administrative 
bodies and with regulatory changes (OECD, 2017).
16
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In summary, reducing bureaucracy appears to be a popular policy strategy for 
cost containment in healthcare. In this light it is remarkable that it is an under 
researched topic. Th available literature is heavily skewed towards the USA. 
Scholars such as Woolhandler & Himmelstein (1991, 1997) and Cutler et al. (2012) 
have investigated the costs and inefficiency of US healthcare administration 
extensively. Several comparisons of administration in the US and Canadian 
healthcare system exist, too (Pozen & Cutler, 2010; Woolhandler et al., 2003). 
Literature is also skewed towards administrative costs in hospitals, followed by 
the physicians’ perspective. Studies that investigate the multifaceted concept of 
administration in healthcare often lack structured and harmonized reporting 
schemes, and they often loosely use the term ‘administrative costs’ (Larjow, 2018). 
This lack of construct validity forms a major problem because administrative 
costs are baked into the healthcare system, meaning that savings any actor 
realizes by simplifying the administrative burden will only be counted as a 
small gain to society, but more often the saving cannot be tracked down at all 
(Cutler, 2020). This opacity explains why there are few evaluations on whether 
policy goals to reduce administrative costs have been met. It also explains why 
few readily available policies exist that are proven to decrease administrative 
costs.
The opacity around administrative costs in healthcare needs to be tackled first, 
before policies can meaningfully and measurably reduce administrative costs. 
Given this rather fundamental lack of knowledge, in this dissertation the total 
size, important components and determinants of administrative costs are 
investigated. Administrative costs are differentiated on the macro, meso and 
micro levels. The macro level includes the costs of organizations that finance 
and govern healthcare. The meso level includes the overhead costs of healthcare 
service delivery organizations. The micro level includes the time that healthcare 
professionals spend on administrative tasks. Many interrelations exist between 
these different levels of administrative expenses so only by investigating all 
levels can a total systems perspective be drawn.
Readily available data on administrative costs in OECD countries are analyzed 
first, leading to the first of the four questions beneath. Cross-country differences 
are subsequently analyzed in an effort to identify determinants in health system 
characteristics (question two). These two questions omit the meso and micro 
levels, because no periodically collected internationally comparable data exists 
on these levels. Questions three and four therefore provide a more in-depth 
analysis of available data on the macro, meso and micro levels, using the 2015 




responsibility for financing social and medical home care was decentralized to 
municipalities and insurance companies, respectively (Maarse & Jeurissen, 
2016). We opted to investigate this specific reform because reducing bureaucracy 
was a stated reform objective.
The following questions are addressed in part I:
1. How do OECD countries differ in their governance and financing-related 
administrative expenditure in healthcare?
2. How and why do governance and financing-related administrative 
expenditure differ between countries with different types of healthcare 
systems?
3. Can the share of administrative costs in total long-term care spending be 
assessed in the Netherlands?
4. Did the 2015 reform of long-term care in the Netherlands affect the total 
share of administrative costs in long-term care?
Two studies address these questions. The first study addresses questions 1 and 
2 by deploying an international comparison of macro level administrative 
costs, and by comparing clusters of countries with similar types of healthcare 
systems. In addition to this descriptive part, reasons for differences found 
between types of healthcare systems are explored. This includes an analysis 
of whether more competition-oriented financing systems know higher 
administrative costs on the macro level.
The second study addresses questions 3 and 4. An attempt is made to 
longitudinally assess the share (macro, meso and micro levels) of administrative 
costs in total long-term care spending in the Netherlands, to analyze the effects 
of the 2015 reform. Assessing whether this is possible could give oxygen to 
the often-mentioned policy option of ‘capping’ overheads in healthcare. 
Possible reasons for fluctuations over time in the administrative costs of Dutch 
long-term care are explored, too. Further exploration on the determinants of 
administrative costs is provided in a commentary.
18
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Part II.  Improving population health with  
junk food taxes
Prevention is widely recognized for dramatically improving population health 
since the 19th century. This all started with the introduction of sewages and 
other types of health protection in the 19th century (Ferriman, 2007), before 
vaccinations and other types of disease prevention extended the legacy of 
prevention since the second half of the 20th century (Mackenbach et al., 2011; 
Mackenbach, 2020). Currently, health promotion is in the spotlight as lifesty-
le-related risk factors nowadays make up the largest share of the avoidable 
burden of disease. Policies that can effectively promote a healthy lifestyle, such 
as junk food taxes, therefore hold great potential to improve public health (Van 
der Vliet et al., 2020). Moreover, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has 
shown that the re-emergence of infectious diseases as a result of globalization 
proposes a greater danger to people with lifestyle-related diseases such as 
obesity (Kassir, 2020).
Tackling behavioral risk factors is also important for the fiscal sustainability of 
healthcare, because a healthier population is a more productive population that 
consumes less healthcare (RIVM, 2020). The productivity costs associated to 
lifestyle-related risk factors are likely greater than the associated healthcare 
costs, as was for instance shown in a systematic review on the lifetime costs of 
childhood obesity (Hamilton et al., 2018). The OECD has examined the overall 
economic impact and found that obesity reduces GDP by 3.3% in OECD 
countries (OECD, 2019b).
Unhealthy lifestyle also impacts the willingness to pay collectively for health - 
care. Already for many years there is a large majority (92% in 2019) in the 
Netherlands who think that people with a good health should pay as much for 
basic benefit coverage as people with not such a good health. But opinions are 
mixed when it comes to financing use of healthcare services that are the result 
of unhealthy lifestyles. 38% of the population thinks that people with an 
unhealthy lifestyle should pay more for basic benefits coverage (Nivel, 2019). 
Continuing with the example of how healthy lifestyle relates to solidarity in the 
Netherlands, the public sees increasing health expenditure in the context of an 
increasing divide between the ‘haves and the have nots’ (SCP, 2019). The current 
and expected widening of socioeconomic inequalities in health and health 
behavior (CBS, 2019; RIVM, 2018a), therefore forms a threat for the necessary 




Healthy lifestyle and prevention have become more prominent in the public 
and political debate in the Netherlands recently. In 2018, the then Secretary of 
State of the Dutch government Paul Blokhuis reached a ‘Prevention Agreement’ 
with more than 70 organizations: a package of societal goals and policies 
targeting smoking, overweight and obesity, and harmful alcohol use. Ex-ante 
analyses of the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM, 
2018b) indicate that the goals of this agreement may be met for smoking, but the 
policies targeting overweight and alcohol usage appear to carry too little weight.
After the launch of the prevention agreement and in the wake of the COVID-19 
pandemic, health behavior has arguably remained higher on the Dutch political 
agenda than ever before. Many opinion pieces1 were published in which opinion 
leaders in health policy and practice plead for stronger obesity prevention 
policies in particular. The Social and Economic Council published a report 
on the fiscal sustainability of the Dutch healthcare system, in which this 
collaboration of employers, employees and individual experts advocated for a 
long-term and consistent commitment to prevention (SER, 2020). In these 
pieces and reports the silent epidemic of obesity is often singled out, and the 
argument is often made that creeping obesity figures push an unsustainable 
pressure on the healthcare system. 
With public pressure for stronger obesity prevention policies mounting, taxes 
on unhealthy foods and beverages may be an interesting instrument for 
policymakers to consider. Junk food taxes came out first in a recent study of 
Van der Vliet et al. (2020), who ranked public health measures that are not yet 
deployed on a large scale in the Netherlands according to their cost-effectiveness. 
Not only are these taxes supported by expert health economists, stakeholders 
also propose them as the first and foremost policies that should be added to 
the prevention agreement2. The aforementioned manifesto of dissatisfied 
healthcare practitioners for instance singles out this specific policy (Dappere 
Dokters, 2020), but there are many more examples of opinion leaders, politicians 
and healthcare practitioners who plead for junk food taxes. At the point of 
writing, five political parties that are currently in parliament propose pricing 
measures in their party programs for the 2021 elections for the Dutch 
parliament. Two more parties are less explicit by proposing to ‘stimulate the 
food industry’. 
1 See for instance the manifesto ‘leefstijlgeneeskunde: nodig voor fundamentele omslag in de 
gezondheidzorg(kosten)’ https://lifestyle4health.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Manifest-Leefstijl - 
geneeskunde.pdf which was published by several leading Dutch newspapers




Experts, politicians and healthcare practitioners may support junk food taxes, 
but this does not automatically mean that the general public will support them 
nor that a political majority will be in favor. Introducing a junk food tax poses a 
prime example of how operationalizing a motherhood issues into a concrete 
policy discloses all kinds of value and interest disputes, not in the least place 
because it singles out a specific industry with vast commercial interests (Marion 
Nestlé, 2013).
Analysis of the policy process is needed to investigate how junk food taxes can 
be introduced in reality. Such research does not investigate the ideal design of 
a tax from a health economist perspective, but it investigates how to effectively 
get a tax on the policy agenda in a given context. Details in the content of a 
policy, the way in which it is presented and introduced in the policymaking 
process can make a real difference whether a policy will be enacted or not and 
should therefore be investigated (Buse et al., 2012).
Recent research by Eykelenboom et al. (2020) points out that this also true for 
sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes. In a poll among a representative sample 
of the Dutch population, Eykelenboom et al. found that a small majority opposes 
an SSB tax in general. But when tax revenue is earmarked for health initiatives, 
more than half of the population is supportive. It should also not be forgotten 
that any junk food tax, is a tax. This means that budget officials are in the 
position to construct this policy. An important priority of budget officials is to 
deploy a simple and effective tax collection system. A tax that specifically 
targets unhealthy foods complicates the tax system, however. Junk food taxes 
thus suffer from the problem where the health goal of intersectoral health policy 
conflicts with other policy agendas (WHO, 1986).
In summary, prevention in the form of health promotion has reached the 
stadium of being a ‘motherhood issue’, in the Netherlands at least. ‘Investing in 
prevention’ is therefore a popular policy strategy, as is reducing administrative 
costs. But whereas the total size, components and determinants of administrative 
costs are relatively unknown, much more knowledge is available about the 
types of prevention that can improve public health. The interaction between 
better population health through prevention and fiscally sustainable healthcare 
systems is rather complex, however. Question 5 therefore expands on the 
various factors that play a role. The main constraints for effectively adopting 
prevention appear more related to governance issues and the related policy 
processes. Therefore, in this dissertation these elements are addressed by 




which focus on the policy content of junk food taxes (question 6), their policy 
context (question 7) and differences observed in the global spread of SSB taxes 
(question 8), as well as their related policy process (question 9).
The following questions are addressed in part II:
5. How are prevention and fiscally sustainable healthcare related?
6. What specific types of junk food taxes are governments implementing?
7. What patterns can be observed in the policy contexts of junk food taxes?
8. How can differences, observed in the spread of sweetened beverage tax policies 
in the European Union compared with the United States, be explained?
9. What patterns can be observed in the agenda-setting and decision-making 
phases of sweetened beverage tax policies implemented in three US cities, 
and how do these relate to policy context and policy content?  
Question 5 is addressed in a narrative review of the literature. It describes an 
economical, governance and political perspective about the multifaceted 
relationship between better population health through prevention and the 
fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems. In a study that focuses on the policy 
content and context of junk food taxes (questions 6 and 7), case studies of tax 
policies introduced by 13 governments are deployed. Taxes in Denmark, 
Finland, Hungary, France, the United Kingdom, Mexico, South Africa, four 
pacific island countries and two cities in the United States (Berkeley and 
Philadelphia) are investigated. A commentary addresses question 8. It describes 
patterns observed in the spread of SSB taxes -the most often used specification 
of these taxes- in the EU compared to the USA. Answering question 9 delivered 
a study that provides an in-depth analysis and comparison of the policy process 
and actors involved in the agenda-setting and decision-making phases of 
sweetened beverage taxes by three local US governments: Berkeley, Philadelphia 
and Cook County.
Methods and data
Table 1 gives an overview of the data sources, methods and design of each 
study. In part I, chapter 2, statistical analyses were deployed using OECD health 
expenditure data to describe international differences in administrative costs 
on the macro level. OECD health system characteristics data were used to 
explore whether the observed differences can be explained by the healthcare 
financing systems of countries. In chapter 3, Statistics Netherlands health 
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expenditure data and annual reports of several organizations involved in 
governing and financing long-term care, were used to describe the availability 
of longitudinal data on administrative costs in long-term care. A survey and a 
focus group discussion among experts were used to validate findings from this 
data scoping effort, and to explore the determinants of administrative costs in 
long-term care. Further exploration is provided with a commentary on a study 
that investigated registration activities conducted by health professionals 
working in hospital settings (intermezzo 1).
Table 1   Overview of settings, study designs, data sources and outcomes  
of studies included in this dissertation.
Chapter Title Setting Study design Data source Outcomes
Part I. Administrative costs in healthcare.
2 How and why do countries differ in 
their governance and financing-related 
administrative expenditure in health care? 
An analysis of OECD countries by health 
care system typology.
OECD countries, organizations 





OECD health expenditure and health 
system characteristics data.
Comparison of administrative 
costs by country and healthcare 
financing typology.
3 Track and trace of administrative costs in 
the Dutch long-term care system.
The Netherlands, long-term care Data scoping 
study.
Survey and focus group discussion 
among experts, CBS health 
expenditure data, annual reports, 
survey and focus group discussion 
among experts.
Overview of paucities in  
the data on administrative costs  
in long-term care.
Intermezzo 1 Complex governance does increase both 
the real and perceived registration burden. 
The case of the Netherlands.
The Netherlands, hospital care. Commentary on a mixed methods observational study Essay highlighting that reducing 
administrative costs requires a 
holistic approach. 
Part II. Improving population health with junk food taxes.
4 Prevention as a strategy for fiscally 
sustainable healthcare.
N/A Narrative review. (Grey) literature. Relation between prevention 
and fiscal sustainability from an 
economical, governance and 
political perspective.
5 The taxation of unhealthy energy-dense 
foods (EDFs) and sugar-sweetened 
beverages (SSBs): An overview of patterns 
observed in the policy content and policy 
context of 13 case studies.
Berkeley (USA), Denmark, Finland, 
Fiji, France, French Polynesia, 
Hungary, Mexico, Nauru, 




(Grey) literature and expert validation. Patterns in the context and content 
of the policies.
Intermezzo 2 Sugar-sweetened beverage taxation  
in 2017: a commentary on the reasons 
behind their quick spread in the EU 
compared with the USA.
EU and USA Narrative review. (Grey) literature, OECD data on fiscal 
decentralization.
Patterns in the spread of the policy 
in the EU compared to the USA.
6 Six lessons from introducing sweetened 
beverage taxes in Berkeley, Cook County, 
and Philadelphia: a case study comparison 
in agenda setting and decision making.
2 US cities (Berkeley & 




Semi-structured interviews and survey 
responses of stakeholders, online 
newspaper archives.
Patterns in the agenda-setting  





In part II, chapter 4 summarizes the interaction between better population 
health through prevention and the fiscal sustainability of healthcare, with a 
narrative review of the broader literature. Intermezzo 2 presents a commentary 
on a study that described the global spread of SSB taxes in 2017. It used the 
OECD fiscal decentralization database and the broader literature to explore 
reasons for variation found in the spread of SSB taxes in the EU compared with 
the USA. Chapters 5 and 6 present studies that deployed comparative case 
studies with purposely selected cases. Data were collected with an expert- 
Table 1   Overview of settings, study designs, data sources and outcomes  
of studies included in this dissertation.
Chapter Title Setting Study design Data source Outcomes
Part I. Administrative costs in healthcare.
2 How and why do countries differ in 
their governance and financing-related 
administrative expenditure in health care? 
An analysis of OECD countries by health 
care system typology.
OECD countries, organizations 





OECD health expenditure and health 
system characteristics data.
Comparison of administrative 
costs by country and healthcare 
financing typology.
3 Track and trace of administrative costs in 
the Dutch long-term care system.
The Netherlands, long-term care Data scoping 
study.
Survey and focus group discussion 
among experts, CBS health 
expenditure data, annual reports, 
survey and focus group discussion 
among experts.
Overview of paucities in  
the data on administrative costs  
in long-term care.
Intermezzo 1 Complex governance does increase both 
the real and perceived registration burden. 
The case of the Netherlands.
The Netherlands, hospital care. Commentary on a mixed methods observational study Essay highlighting that reducing 
administrative costs requires a 
holistic approach. 
Part II. Improving population health with junk food taxes.
4 Prevention as a strategy for fiscally 
sustainable healthcare.
N/A Narrative review. (Grey) literature. Relation between prevention 
and fiscal sustainability from an 
economical, governance and 
political perspective.
5 The taxation of unhealthy energy-dense 
foods (EDFs) and sugar-sweetened 
beverages (SSBs): An overview of patterns 
observed in the policy content and policy 
context of 13 case studies.
Berkeley (USA), Denmark, Finland, 
Fiji, France, French Polynesia, 
Hungary, Mexico, Nauru, 




(Grey) literature and expert validation. Patterns in the context and content 
of the policies.
Intermezzo 2 Sugar-sweetened beverage taxation  
in 2017: a commentary on the reasons 
behind their quick spread in the EU 
compared with the USA.
EU and USA Narrative review. (Grey) literature, OECD data on fiscal 
decentralization.
Patterns in the spread of the policy 
in the EU compared to the USA.
6 Six lessons from introducing sweetened 
beverage taxes in Berkeley, Cook County, 
and Philadelphia: a case study comparison 
in agenda setting and decision making.
2 US cities (Berkeley & 




Semi-structured interviews and survey 
responses of stakeholders, online 
newspaper archives.
Patterns in the agenda-setting  




validated (grey) literature review in chapter 5, while chapter 6 described findings 
from semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, a survey held among 
stakeholders, and a media analysis using the online archives of newspapers 
that heavily reported on the selected cases. These case studies were structured 
with the Health Policy Triangle of Walt & Gilson (1994). This framework identifies 
policy content, context and process, and the role of actors involved. It concerns 
a highly simplified representation of policy reality where these elements 
constantly interact. Policy content refers to a policy’s general and technical 
characteristics, such as in the case of food taxes how the tax is levied, the tax 
rate and the range of included products. Policy context constitutes important 
situational, structural, contextual and exogenous factors (Leichter, 1979). For 
instance, In the case of food taxes, these factors concern the fiscal need of a 
government, the prevalence of obesity, the prevailing level of public support for 
health promotion, and the influence of trade agreements. The policy process 
concerns the theoretical circle of agenda setting, policy formulation, policy 
adoption, implementation and evaluation. ‘Actors’, finally, concern stakeholders 
with varying levels of interest in an issue and influence in the policymaking 
process (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000).
Outline
This dissertation is divided in eight chapters in total. Chapter 1 (this chapter) 
provides a general introduction. It describes the general aim, research questions, 
and introduces the methods used. After the introduction, this dissertation is 
divided into two parts.
The first part consists of chapters 2 and 3 as well as intermezzo 1. It focuses on 
reducing administrative costs in healthcare. In chapter 2, administrative costs 
on the macro level (spending by organizations governing and financing 
healthcare) are compared across OECD countries and healthcare financing 
system typologies. Reasons for variations found are explored. This includes an 
analysis of whether more competition-oriented financing systems have higher 
administrative costs on the macro level. The study in chapter 3 examines the 
feasibility of calculating the impact of the 2015 long-term care reform in the 
Netherlands on administrative costs on all levels of long-term care. Thus the 
macro level, but also the meso (overhead costs of long-term care delivery 
organizations) and micro levels (administrative tasks deployed by long-term 
care professionals). Intermezzo 1 follows. This intermezzo depicts a commentary 




the issue of administrative costs in healthcare in a more fundamental way and 
therefore wraps up part I.
Part II consists of chapters 4, 5 and 6, and intermezzo 2. It focuses on the 
question whether junk food taxes can contribute to fiscally sustainable 
healthcare. Specifically, in chapter 4 the interaction between better population 
health through prevention and the fiscal sustainability of healthcare is described 
from a macroeconomic, governance and political perspective. Chapters 5 and 
6 and the intermezzo cover the governance and politics of junk food taxes. 
Chapter 5 describes patterns observed in the policy content and context of 
taxes adopted by 13 governments across the globe. Intermezzo 2 follows and 
describes how SSB taxes spread in the EU compared to the USA. Chapter 6 
describes an in-depth analysis of the agenda-setting and policy-formulation 
stages of SSB taxes adopted by three local US governments (Berkeley, Philadelphia, 
Cook County).
Chapter 7, finally, presents a general discussion. This chapter reflects on the 
general aim of this dissertation, analyzing how reducing administrative costs 
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Administrative costs in healthcare
PART I

How and why do countries differ in their 
governance and financing-related 
administrative expenditure in health care?
An analysis of OECD countries by health care 
system typology.
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Administration is vital for health care. Its importance may increase as health 
care systems become more complex, but academic attention has remained 
minimal. We investigated trends in administrative expenditure across OECD 
countries, cross-country spending differences, spending differences between 
health care system typologies, and differences in the scale and scope of 
administrative functions across typologies.
Methods
We used OECD data, which include health system governance and financing- 
related administrative activities by regulators, governance bodies, and insurers 
(macrolevel), but exclude administrative expenditure by health care providers 
(mesolevel and microlevel).
Results
We find that governance and financing-related administrative spending at the 
macrolevel has remained stable over the last decade at slightly over 3% of total 
health spending. Cross-country differences range from 1.3% of health spending 
in Iceland to 8.3% in the United States. Voluntary private health insurance bears 
much higher administrative costs than compulsory schemes in all countries. 
Among compulsory schemes, multiple payers exhibit significantly higher 
administrative spending than single payers. Among single-payer schemes, 
those where entitlements are based on residency have significantly lower 
administrative spending than those with single social health insurance, albeit 
with a small difference.
Discussion
These differences can partially be explained because multi-payer and voluntary 
private health insurance schemes require additional administrative functions 
and enjoy less economies of scale. Studies in hospitals and primary care indicate 
similar differences in administrative costs across health system typologies at 
the mesolevel and microlevel of health care delivery, which warrants more 
research on total administrative costs at all the levels of health systems.
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Introduction
Efficient and effective administration is one of the prerequisites for efficient 
and effective governance, financing, and delivery of health care. Defining 
appropriate benefit packages for publicly financed health care for instance 
requires the efforts of administrative agencies, as do risk-sharing mechanisms 
in any social protection scheme, maintenance of medical guidelines, and the 
contracting and remuneration of health care facilities and professionals.
Indeed, in times of increasing health system complexity due to the introduction 
of new technologies and the rise of heterogeneous forms of multi morbidity, a 
well-run administration with low transaction costs will likely become more 
important. Also, pay-for-performance schemes and more active purchasing 
further complicate health systems, which can increase the administrative 
burden because they require extensive data collection and handling.1
Spending on administrative activities by (specific) governance and financing 
agencies currently takes up around 3% of health spending on average in the 
countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).2 The remaining 97% is spent on health care delivery itself, but this 
encompasses administration of health care providers meaning that total 
administrative costs are in reality much higher than 3%.
Spending scarce resources on administrative functions is, as a rule of thumb, 
unpopular among politicians as it is argued that it has less direct benefit to 
patients compared to spending on health care delivery itself. It is a prime target 
for cuts when health budgets need to be reined in, as evidenced in many 
countries during the recent financial crisis.3 At the same time, we do rely more 
and more on administrative functions such as coordination and data mining 
in modern health systems. Yet international academic attention to the issue 
seems rather limited: The available literature mostly focuses on the excessive 
administrative costs at the macro (governance/financing) and mesolevel and 
microlevel (delivery) of the US health system.4-14 In some studies the multi-payer 
financing system of the United States is compared to the single-payer system of 
Canada, with the United States far exceeding Canada in all administrative 
expenses.8, 13, 14 One study that incorporated a wider scope of industrialised 
countries looked into the administrative costs of hospitals and found that these 
are higher in nations with more market-oriented payment systems.15 Mathauer 
and Nicolle16 found that administrative costs of private health insurance (PHI) 
is about 3 times higher compared to social security schemes in high-income 
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OECD countries using 2001 to 2007 data, with considerable variations both 
across and within countries.
Study aims
We investigated the average longitudinal trend in administrative expenditure 
of OECD countries, cross-country spending differences, spending differences 
between health care system typologies, and differences in the scale and scope 
of administrative functions between typologies.
We only analyse administrative spending of health care governance and 
financing agencies (macrolevel), thus excluding administrative costs borne by 
health care providers (mesolevel and microlevel). The added value of our research 
is that we analysed more recent data from an international data collection based 
on a new accounting framework, the System of Health Accounts (SHA) 2011,17 
which has generally improved international comparability in health spending 
and financing data. We also explore how these outcomes relate to health care 
system typologies using the scheme under Table 1, which in our knowledge 
has not been attempted before.
Methods
Data definitions
We use OECD data on health expenditure and financing,2 the dataset with the 
highest level of detail available at an international level. Submitted data are 
based on the methodology of the SHA 2011,17 which demarcates and classifies 
health expenditure alongside three dimensions: health financing schemes, 
health provision, and the functions of health care. Expenditure on administration 
is one category of the functional dimension and captures these costs borne 
by voluntary PHI, compulsory insurance, and governmental schemes. 
Administrative costs incurred by clinical health care providers are not included 
in this category, but form part of the main function of providers (e.g., inpatient 
care in the case of hospitals) and cannot be extracted from this general category.
We extracted the data under the expenditure classification of the health care 
function (HC) “governance, and health system, and financing administration” 
(HC.7). This category covers expenditure for “governance and health system 
administration” (HC.7.1) and “administration of health financing” (HC.7.2) 
and mainly covers activities related to the formulation and administration 
of government policy, the setting of standards, the regulation, licensing or 
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supervision of providers, and management of fund collection.17 We retrieved 
data on HC.7 for 3 health care financing schemes (HF) separately: “government 
schemes” (HF.1.1), “compulsory contributory health insurance schemes” 
(HF.1.2),* and “voluntary health insurance schemes” (HF.2.1). Appendix 1 
provides a more detailed description what is included under HC.7.1, HC.7.2, 
HF.1.1, HF.1.2, and HF.2.1.
Country inclusion criteria
Table 1 displays the countries that are included in our various analyses. 
The upper part of the table shows which countries are included in our general 
cross-country comparison, and the comparison of government schemes and 
compulsory insurance. The lower part shows the smaller selection of countries 
for our voluntary PHI comparison.
For our general cross-country comparison and the comparison of government/
compulsory schemes, we excluded countries without reported data (Chile and 
Turkey), countries where data refers to 2013 or before (Israel, New Zealand), and 
countries that report under 1% administrative spending, which seems to be a 
reasonable cut-off line to eliminate countries with apparent underestimation 
(which excludes Norway and Finland).
For voluntary PHI we excluded countries without reported data (Chile, Iceland, 
Latvia, Norway, Slovak Republic, and Turkey), countries where voluntary PHI 
spending takes up less than 3% of total health expenditure (Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, and Sweden), and 
countries where data refer to 2013 or before (Israel and New Zealand). Analogous to 
the case of government/compulsory schemes, countries where the administrative 
spending of voluntary PHI is lower than 1% (Poland and Luxembourg) were also 
excluded.
Assigning countries into a health care system typology
Numerous frameworks can be used to categorise countries into health care 
system typologies.18-27 Most of these compare which type of institutions 
regulate, finance, and provide health care. Because we can only compare 
administrative costs on the governance/financing level, we categorise countries 
into health care system typologies separately for government/compulsory 
schemes on the one hand, and voluntary PHI on the other.
We use information collected in the OECD Health System Characteristics 
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coverage typologies. It is noteworthy that in 2 OECD countries the main 
financing schemes for basic benefits are private and voluntary. In Mexico, most 
health spending is still borne out-of-pocket while there also exists voluntary 
PHI for basic benefit coverage.30 In the United States voluntary PHI is a major 
financing scheme for basic benefit coverage.31 The key government/compulsory 
schemes in those countries refer to the Seguro Popular in Mexico and to 
Medicare in the United States. †
We used OECD data on the population percentage that is covered by the four 
forms of voluntary PHI that the OECD identifies to decide, which is the main 
form.32 Table 1 provides the definitions of these four forms.
Data analysis
To analyse longitudinal trends in administrative spending, we calculated 
the share of spending on governance and health system administration (HC.7) 
in total health spending on average across included countries. We chose 2003 
as a starting point because a number of countries chose that year as the first 
year to report health financing data under the SHA 2011 methodology.
To analyse cross-country differences, we summed up the administrative 
spending of HF.1.1, HF.1.2, and HF.2.1 for all included countries separately and 
depicted it as a share of total health spending.
To analyse how typologies of government/compulsory schemes differ, we first 
investigated whether administrative spending increases as the share of 
compulsory insurance (HF.1.2) in total spending of government/compulsory 
schemes (HF.1.1 and HF.1.2) increases. We then performed 2-tailed t test 
assuming equal variance to test for statistical significance between (1) residence- 
based entitlement schemes (HF.1.1) and compulsory insurance (HF.1.2), 
(2) single-payer schemes (both residence-based entitlement and single 
Social Health Insurance (SHI) and multi-payer compulsory insurance, and 
(3) government schemes with residence-based entitlement and single SHI.
We then compared administrative spending of voluntary PHI to that of 
government/compulsory schemes and tested for statistical significance with a 
2-tailed paired t test. We also compared the four forms of voluntary PHI, by 
performing a one-way analysis of variance test. We finally investigated the 
correlation between voluntary PHI administrative spending and the market 
share of voluntary PHI (expressed as the share of HF.2.1 in total health spending).
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On the basis of the results we offer explanations for the observed differences 
in administration costs by comparing the scale and scope of administrative 
functions across typologies. This analysis is derived from the conceptual 
framework proposed by Mathauer and Nicolle,16 plotted against the health 
care system typologies between which we found significant differences in 
administrative spending.
Results
Longitudinal trends in administrative spending
Figure 1 presents the average administrative spending of included countries 
since 2003, as a share of total health spending. Administrative spending has 
remained remarkably stable and in between the range of 3.2% and 3.9% between 
2003 and 2015.
Cross-country administrative spending differences
Figure 2 displays administrative spending of all included countries. It shows 
relatively large cross-country differences, with Iceland spending as little as 1.3% 
and the United States as much as 8.3% of total health spending on administration. 
The OECD average is 3.1%.
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The figure suggests that the share accounted for by voluntary PHI schemes 
in total administrative spending is relatively large, given that these schemes 
often cover a small share of total health spending. It also points to relatively 
large administrative expenditures of compulsory insurance as compared to 
government schemes.
Administrative spending differences between health care 
system typologies
Table 2 provides an overview of the average administrative spending levels of 
the separate health care system typologies. It shows rather large differences.
Government schemes and compulsory insurance
Figure 3 highlights the administrative expenditure of government schemes 
and compulsory insurance. Administrative spending is plotted against the 
share compulsory insurance takes up in total health spending of government 
and compulsory schemes, showing that government schemes in countries 
with residence-based entitlement spend 1.9% on average on administration. 
This is more than double (4%) in countries with compulsory insurance while 
the difference is significant (P < .001).
Figure 2.  Administration at the macrolevel as a share of total health spending 
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Figure 3.  Administration expenditure at the macrolevel of government/compulsory 
schemes related to share of total expenditure of government/compulsory 
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Interestingly, the variation is much larger among the latter group of countries 
and seems to indicate a difference between single-payer systems (both residence- 
based entitlement and single SHI) and multi-payer compulsory insurance. 
While single-payer systems know administrative spending of 2.5%, it is 4.4% 
for multi-payer compulsory insurance. This difference is significant (P < .01). 
Of multi-payer systems, the United States (8.3%), Mexico (7.9%), and Japan (1.3%) 
are notable outliers.
If we compare the 2 types of single payers, we find that schemes based on 
 residence-based entitlement have 1.9% administrative spending on average. 
This is 3.3% for countries with a single SHI. This difference is also significant 
(P < .01). However, several countries with a single SHI (Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovenia) report figures similar or only slightly higher than countries with 
residence-based entitlement. Korea (4.6%) and Luxembourg (5.2%) are notable 
outliers among single SHI systems. Countries with residence-based entitlement, on 
the other hand, show relatively homogeneous administrative spending levels.
Voluntary PHI
Cross-country differences in the administrative spending of voluntary PHI 
are the most substantial (Figure 4). These range from 8.8% in Australia to 
33.1% in Spain. In all countries the administrative spending of voluntary PHI is 
significantly higher than that of government or compulsory insurance schemes.
Figure 4.  Administration at the macrolevel as a share of total health expenditure of 























































Figure 5 shows that these large differences cannot be explained by the primary 
function of voluntary PHI, which means whether the main purpose is providing 
primary, supplementary, complementary, or duplicate coverage. The differences 
between countries where PHI performs a similar function are equally large 
as they are across all included countries, and no significant differences were 
found between these schemes [F (3,12) = .64, P = .603]. The market share of 
voluntary PHI does not appear to have a strong relationship with administrative 
expenditure either with a correlation coefficient of −0.412.
A description of the scope and scale of administrative functions 
across health care system typologies
One possible explanation why administrative costs differ between health care 
systems is that the scope and size of administrative activities that have to be 
performed under these schemes differ. These differences are conceptually 
depicted in Table 3. We elucidate this framework separately for government/
compulsory schemes and voluntary PHI.
Figure 5.  Voluntary PHI administrative expenditure at the macrolevel as a share of  
total voluntary PHI spending, and market share of voluntary PHI (indicated by X, 



























































































































































Supplementary Complementary Duplicate Primary
43
2










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Government schemes and compulsory insurance
Residence-based entitlement and single SHI schemes perform the same services 
with similar resources with regards to pooling, purchasing, and stewardship. 
Differences exist in resource mobilisation: In countries with residence-based 
entitlement, residents are covered automatically, while revenues are usually 
collected through general taxation. Single SHI schemes on the other hand 
need to identify, register, and enrol members.33 Also, collecting and managing 
contributions may require a bigger effort compared to resource collection through 
general taxation mechanisms, which is generally outside the health system.
An important reason why multi-payer schemes have higher administrative 
expenditure than single-payer schemes is that they enjoy less economies of 
scale.34 Enrolment, the collection of contributions, managing exemptions, 
purchasing, claims processing, care coordination, and stewardship functions 
all require a single processing system in single-payer schemes, whereas payers 
in multi-payer schemes generally set these systems up separately. Multi-payer 
schemes also require a risk-equalisation instrument, which exist in Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the Slovak 
Republic, Switzerland, and the United States.29, 35 The maintenance of such an 
instrument is not free of cost, especially in multi-payer schemes with freedom 
of insurer choice where a more sophisticated risk-equalisation approach is 
required to prevent cream skimming.36 Insurers in these “managed competition” 
schemes also compete for customers, which requires product communication, 
marketing, and advertising. Insurers may to a certain extent selectively contract 
health care providers, although single-payer schemes with a purchaser- provider 
split can do so as well. This can add to administrative costs, because contract 
negotiations and claims management require additional data on prices and 
quality. On the other hand, insurers in managed competition schemes may 
have larger incentives to suppress their administrative spending (or shift 
administrative functions to the provider level) because it reflects back in 
premium prices.36 This may in contrast be less the case in multi-payer schemes 
where affiliation is automatic.
Voluntary PHI
Generally, voluntary PHI schemes report much higher administrative spending. 
One reason is that organisations offering PHI are generally for-profit (FP) and 
hence administration costs include operational profits. In contrast, compulsory 
insurance is frequently not-for-profit. Related to this, higher administration 
costs for voluntary health insurance are also based on how administration 
costs are valued for private insurance companies. The SHA recommends that 
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private insurance administrative costs are valued as total premiums earned 
plus premium supplements minus adjusted claims incurred.‡ Hence, the 
increase of technical reserves, for example, also increases the costs. Still, 
administrative spending of voluntary PHI is also high in countries that do not 
adhere to the recommended SHA method of including profits and brokerage 
fees as well as capital gains treated as premium supplements, but which instead 
only report the sum of administrative costs. Belgium, France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands used the latter method according to a survey conducted by the 
OECD in 2013.37 In these countries the administrative spending of voluntary 
PHI also turns out much higher than that for government/compulsory schemes.
This may be due to extra spending on marketing and acquisition, product 
innovation, and agents’ commissions.38 Voluntary health insurance markets 
can be characterised by high degrees of competition leaving little room for 
the sharing of administrative functions and thus duplication of processes for 
resource mobilisation, pooling, purchasing, and stewardship. However, it is 
debatable whether the voluntary PHI market is truly competitive in all included 
countries because high overheads can instead also indicate a lack of competition.
There is reason to assume that differences in accounting play a role in explaining 
why the administrative spending rate of voluntary PHI varies from 8.8% to as 
much as 33.1%, because we cannot explain this functionally. The market share 
of voluntary PHI and the main function that voluntary PHI enacts do not point 
to systemic differences, which may also indicate that country specificities 
differ too much to allow for typology comparison. The market structure does 
not explain the large variation either. Austria for instance has 8 voluntary PHI 
providers, which report relatively high administrative spending at 32.8%.39 
France on the other hand is reported to have 682 PHI providers that spend 21% 
on administration.40 Switzerland and the Netherlands have 54 and 8 voluntary 




We found that the longitudinal trend of administrative spending on the macro - 
level has remained fairly stable. Cross-country differences in administrative 
spending are large. We also found significant differences between health care 
system typologies. This can be partially explained by differences in the scope 
and scale of administrative functions enacted by these typologies.
Limitations
Although these findings are interesting, our analysis is not free of caveats. First 
of all, cross-country data comparability remain a challenge because data are 
not always reported according to the recommendations as part of the annual 
SHA-based health spending data collection. A survey conducted in 2013 among 
national data compilers showed it can be difficult to disentangle spending for 
public health from administrative spending, for example, as budget information 
may not be detailed enough to distinguish between the 2 functions.37 A clear 
identification of health care administration is also challenging for government 
agencies that fulfil health and other functions (e.g., social care). This may lead 
to overestimation or underestimation of administrative spending. On the other 
hand, administrative functions are part of several governmental agencies 
outside SHI, Ministries of Health, and other agencies more logically related to 
health care (e.g., Department of Veteran Affairs in Canada manages health 
costs of war veterans), which may lead to underestimations. Administrative 
spending of PHI can be underestimated as well, when administrative output is 
valued as the sum of administrative costs without including profits, brokerage 
fees, and premium supplements, as recommended in the SHA.
Second, the administrative costs discussed in this article only refer to the direct 
costs related to governance and financing of the health system. One of the 
reasons why health systems with residence-based entitlements report lower 
administrative costs than single-payer SHI schemes can be that some of their 
resource generation takes place outside the health system (e.g., general tax 
collection agency). This means that unlike single SHI funds were revenue 
collection is an integral costs of the funds and thus the health systems, costs of 
revenue collection in the NHS systems are not directly associated with the 
health system.
Third, categorising countries into health care system typologies is always 
somewhat arbitrary. We mitigated this to a certain extent by separately 
categorising countries according to their government/compulsory schemes 
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on the one hand, and their voluntary PHI schemes on the other. Yet in some 
countries both schemes are not separated as strictly in reality because the same 
financing agent can implement them. For instance, in the Netherlands, the same 
insurance companies that provide compulsory coverage for basic benefits also 
provide voluntary supplementary coverage.43 The classification of countries in 
types of voluntary PHI may be especially arbitrary. Voluntary PHI can be 
supplementary, complementary, and duplicate in Slovenia, while the PHI schemes 
also differ internationally with regards to their FP or not-for-profit status.
The fourth, and most important, caveat is that we have only looked into 
administrative spending at the macrolevel. A much complete picture requires 
detailed insight into the administrative efforts deployed by health care institutions 
(mesolevel), health care professionals (microlevel), and even patients.
Drivers and barriers to administrative costs
The observation that administrative costs on the macrolevel have remained 
roughly the same in between the range of 3.2% and 3.9% since 2003 is 
remarkable, because administration is not a popular spending category among 
politicians and the general public and digitalization might have incurred more 
efficiencies in administrative work processes. A number of drivers and barriers 
may influence the share of administrative spending over time. We identify one 
major barrier and 3 major drivers of administrative costs.
The main barrier to containing growth in administrative costs is automation. 
Automation through effective use of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) can drive efficiency in transaction costs and may therefore 
hold more potential for multi-payer schemes as these de facto have more 
transactions because of limited economies of scale and scope. The ICTs have 
already increased administrative efficiency in many economic sectors,44 but it 
appears that the ICT revolution has not yet been forceful enough to drive down 
net administrative costs on the macrolevel of health systems or narrow the gap 
between single- and multi-payer systems.
However, a first driver of administrative costs is also directly related to automation 
and the use of data for efficient coordination and data mining: privacy concerns. 
Over the last decade health systems have been searching for a mode to combine 
the merits of automation through data use while simultaneously safeguarding 
privacy.45 Leadership in data governance seems crucial, which can be more 
difficult to organise in a multi-payer system. Attitudes towards data disclosure 
and sharing may also be more conservative in multi-payer schemes.
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A second driver may be the increasing complexity of health systems. 
Developments in health care demand (ie, multimorbidity) and supply (i.e., new 
medical technologies) increase the number of heterogeneous actors as well as 
the interconnectedness between these actors, which produces a more complex 
health care environment that likely requires more transactions. Political choices 
can also drive administrative complexity. Routine requirements pushed onto 
administrative bodies for risk sharing, compensating mechanisms, exemption 
mitigation, and other kind of reforms, and associated implementation problems 
can further increase the number of transactions.
A third and final element may be the relatively strong growth of voluntary PHI, 
which pushes up the average total share of administration in health spending. 
While spending of compulsory schemes in OECD countries grew by 0.2% 
between 2009 and 2011 and by 0.5% between 2011 and 2013, for PHI it grew by 
1.8% and 2.9%, respectively.46 Globally, PHI spending may even double from 
€1.3 trillion in 2016 to €2.6 trillion in 2025.47 In this perspective experiences in 
the United States to limit administrative costs are interesting. The Affordable 
Care Act stipulates that insurers spend at least 80% to 85% on medical claims 
and quality improvement. If insurers do not meet this minimum they must 
issue rebates to enrolees. Since this rule was introduced in 2011 the share of 
nonmedical overhead costs decreased up to accumulated savings of $3.7 billion 
by 2013.10 In contrast, a law-permitting Canadian PHI to convert to FP 
companies publicly held by shareholders has been linked to a decrease in 
Medical Loss Ratio (MLR).48
The provider level (meso and micro levels)
The stable administrative spending on the macrolevel despite seemingly strong 
drivers of administrative costs could stipulate spill over effects to the mesolevel 
and microlevel. Himmelstein et al.15 compared hospital administrative costs 
across eight nations and found that these were higher in countries with multiple 
payers (France, Germany, the Netherlands, and United States) than in countries 
with an NHS (Canada, England, Scotland, and Wales). The United States had by 
far the highest administrative spending at 25.3%. A similar situation appears to 
exist for primary care. Osborn et al.49 found that 50% to 60% of the primary care 
physicians in countries with multiple payers (Germany, the Netherlands, and 
United States) reported that the amount of time their practice spent on issues 
related to insurance or payment claims was a major problem. This compares to 
9% to 27% in countries with a single payer (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
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Summing up administrative expenditure at the macrolevel, mesolevel, and 
microlevel highlights the importance of the issue. Our figures on the macrolevel 
point out an average administrative spending of 3.1%. For the mesolevel the 
study of Himmelstein et al.15 finds a range of hospital administration 
expenditure from 11.6% to 25.3%. On the microlevel, observational studies 
conducted across different settings in different countries among different 
professionals find that time spent by physicians on documentation ranges 
from 8% to 27%.50-52 On the basis of these figures it is not unrealistic to assume 
that 30% to 40% of all costs of the health care system in OECD countries are 
related to administrative activities.
Of course, this rudimentary calculation is full of methodological imperfections: 
Studies use various methods of demarcation for an issue intrinsically difficult 
to measure, while their coverage does not come near the full range of health 
care delivery institutions and professionals. Yet this guestimate points to the 
real extent of administration in the health care system, and it highlights how 
large the effects may be of potentially adverse mixes of administrative costs 
on the macrolevel, mesolevel, and microlevel and thus the need to investigate 
trends in administrative spending at all levels.
Outlier countries
A striking finding concerns the large cross-country variation in administrative 
spending, and the significant differences between typologies. These results 
also point to several outlier countries. The United States, France, Mexico, and 
Germany spend notably more on administration than other countries. Japan 
holds very low administrative spending for a country with multi-payer 
compulsory insurance. This calls into question the validity of our conceptual 
framework that compares administrative functions across typologies (Table 3). 
We therefore examine these outlier countries in more detail, as well as Korea 
because it has interesting history in terms of administrative costs.
The United States, France, Mexico, and Germany share a relatively fragmented 
health care financing system with a relatively large role of PHI. The United 
States are particularly renowned for the enormous level of fragmentation in 
health financing and the large market of FP PHI.53 Coverage for basic health 
care benefits is provided by either the public Medicare (subdivided into 
Medicare A, B, C, and D) or Medicaid systems, which consist of multiple insurers 
themselves, or privately through hundreds of employer-group insurance 
organisations or insurers offering coverage for individuals. Voluntary PHI thus 
performs a relatively similar role to the public schemes but requires additional 
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functions such as underwriting, the use of brokers, and encapsulating a risk 
premium.31 The US health care insurers also devote considerable efforts to use 
management and quality improvement.9 The litigious environment and 
scrutiny from regulatory bodies can also play a role.
In France, the way in which health care is paid seems most important. Patients 
pay some medical costs upfront before filing 2 reimbursement requests, first 
to the SHI and then to their PHI to cover part of the copayments. Thus, several 
transactions are required for one episode of care.40 The organisation of health 
care coverage also contributes. Because almost the entire population (95.5%) 
has complementary PHI (assurance maladie complémentaire, AMC) to cover 
cost sharing in the multi-payer SHI system (assurance maladie obligatoire, 
AMO),54 there is relatively widespread duplication of administrative activities.
In Mexico distinct health financing systems exist for different sections of the 
population. Informal labour represents almost 58% of total employment, and 
large parts of the population live in rural areas where resources are scarce. 
Collecting premium contributions can be difficult in such circumstances. 
Mexico also displays a significant variation in managerial capacity across 
states, which can indicate certain structural inefficiencies of the public 
administration.30
Administrative expenditure of compulsory health insurance schemes as a 
share of total health spending is highest in Germany. Although the share of 
voluntary PHI is only low (Figure 2), it should be noted that FP PHI for basic 
health care coverage is important in Germany but it is included under 
compulsory insurance, because people who opt out of the SHI system have 
to be enrolled with a PHI since 2009.55 Germany may suffer from limitations 
in economies of scale and scope compared to other multi-payer systems: 
There exist more than a hundred competing public insurers, which have to 
collectively negotiate service packages and prices with providers at the national 
and regional levels as part of their responsibilities within the “self-governing 
bodies.” In most other countries with multiple payers the national ministry of 
health sets the basic benefit package. German insurers have also received more 
freedom to selectively contract with providers in 2000, which may drive up 
transaction costs further.55
Japan, on the other hand, has much lower administrative spending than other 
multi-payer systems. This may be explained because voluntary PHI is of 
marginal importance, and many administrative functions are arranged 
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centrally in the compulsory SHI system. More than 3000 insurers administer 
SHI with affiliation linked to employment status and age, but the scope of the 
basic benefits basket and prices of included services, reimbursement fees of 
providers, and rules for determining premiums are all set by the central 
government. People are enrolled automatically to the insurer according to their 
affiliation, while insurers have no or very little room for individual negotiations 
with providers. Japan on the other hand does need a pooling and distribution 
mechanism for the multitude of insurers.56
For countries with single SHI, Korea exhibits relatively high administration 
costs of its compulsory coverage scheme (Figure 3), although total administrative 
costs are average compared to other countries. This may be because Korea has 
a high proportion of self-employed citizens (23.5% in 2009). Contributions for 
the SHI cannot simply be deducted from the payroll of this group. Monthly 
billing is used instead, which requires considerable administrative efforts.57 
Interesting is that Korea switched from a multi-payer to a single-payer SHI 
during 1998 to 2003, which led to a decrease in administrative costs from 10% 
in 1994 to 3.4% in 2006. This decrease underlines our findings that single SHI 
tends to be cheaper, although the decrease may be partly caused by automation: 
Data handling through the Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service is 
quite sophisticated compared to other insurance organisations.58
The health financing systems of these countries all have peculiarities that can 
explain their outlier position. Fragmentation in the scope of functions that 
payers require and high dependence on PHI is important, while more specific 
elements such as the claims processing structure are also involved. These are 
generally in line with our conceptual framework, but context elements also 
influence the efforts needed to enact certain functions. Hence, we believe that 
these outlier countries do not falsify our conceptual framework in Table 3.
Conclusion
In summary, we found that administrative spending on the macrolevel has 
remained stable over the last decade. Cross-country differences in administrative 
spending are large, ranging from 1.3% in Iceland to 8.3% in the United States. 
We also found that administrative spending is significantly higher in (1) 
voluntary PHI compared to government/compulsory schemes, (2) multi-payer 
compulsory insurance compared to single-payer schemes, and (3) single SHI 
compared to residence-based entitlement schemes, although the difference is 
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small. Differences in the scope and scale of administrative functions enacted 
by these typologies partially explain these findings.
Then it is a legitimate question why not all countries shift to a single-payer 
system? While historical and political reasons are important—such a reform 
can face major societal unrest while the political rewards are usually not reaped 
on the short term—it should also be noted that voluntary PHI or multi-payer 
compulsory insurance can reflect other, legitimate, choices. Multi-payer 
compulsory schemes are for instance credited for increased patient choice and 
driving efficiency further down the line, while voluntary PHI caters for the risk 
averse population that feel underinsured in compulsory coverage. Voluntary 
PHI is sometimes also seen as a method to reach public goals like universal 
health coverage or more efficient service delivery, but our findings suggest it is 
in fact not an effective way to attain such goals: The much higher administrative 
costs can, in all likelihood, not be mitigated by efficiency gains in other areas of 
the health system.
Our study raises a number of methodological issues that deserve follow-up. 
For administrative costs at the provider level (both health care organisations 
and professionals) there currently exists neither a common methodology 
to demarcate these costs on an international level nor a comprehensive 
international data collection or database. Because administrative expenditure 
is much higher on these levels, developing this stream of work would improve 
the common understanding of the components and total size of health care 
administration.
We finally encourage scholars to apply our conceptual framework that describes 
the scale and scope of administrative functions across health care system 
typologies to individual countries. Because outlier countries did not falsify our 
framework, such analyses may reveal how and where individual countries 
stand out internationally in administrative costs.
Endnotes
*  This includes Compulsory Medical Saving Accounts, which, however, play no role in any of the 
included OECD countries.
†  Coverage under the Affordable Care Act is currently still reported under Voluntary Health Insurance 
(HF.2.1) in the United States in data submission under the SHA.
‡  This valuation method follow the standards used in the System of National Accounts measuring 
economic activity for the whole economy to measure GDP.
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Appendix. Supplementary data 
Appendix 1 can be found on https://doi.org/10.1002/hpm.2458 (Hagenaars et al., 
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Track and trace of administrative costs in
the Dutch long-term care system










Practitioners and politicians alike emphasise the wish to reduce administrative 
costs (AC) in Dutch LTC, but a robust empirical body of evidence on the 
components, determinants and value of AC in LTC is absent. Neither has 
the expert consensus of ways to track and trace AC in LTC been sought.
 
Objectives
We investigated whether it is possible to reach consensus on operationalising 
AC in Dutch LTC. Successively we also exploredwhether the Dutch LTC reform 
in 2015 had the intended effect of reducing AC.
Methods
We differentiated between AC for governing and financing LTC (macro), 
overhead costs of LTC delivery organisations (meso) and AC on the level of 
professional care delivery activities (micro). We identified possible data sources 
in grey literature and national accounts. The quality and completeness of 
identified data and potential determinants of AC were validated by experts via a 
survey and focus group discussions.
Findings
We were able to reach agreement on how to track AC in Dutch LTC, but current 
research instruments and data systems are not robust and consistent enough to 
trace differences before and after the 2015 reform.
Limitations
We did not investigate AC experienced by patients and self-selected participating 
experts.
Implications
AC concern a considerable share of total LTC spending, but AC are hidden in 
regular health expenditure statistics. Our study highlights three approaches for 
a more sophisticated and fact-based policy debate on reducing low-value AC; 
definition of AC on macro, meso and micro level of the health care system, 
determining the underlying value/use of activities and focus on interactions of 
AC between system levels.
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Introduction
Politicians and LTC practitioners often emphasise dissatisfaction with the 
‘bureaucracy’, ‘red tape’ or ‘administrative burden’ that they perceive to be 
associated with the organisation and delivery of long-term care. Bureaucracy 
is a serious source of work dissatisfaction among LTC professionals that can 
ultimately even culminate in patient maltreatment (Ulsperger & Knottnerus, 
2007). In the Netherlands, many recent pamphlets from dissatisfied healthcare 
professionals and interest groups advocate reducing the administrative burden by 
‘capping’ either direct overhead costs or the administrative burden of healthcare 
professionals (Borst & Gamers, 2016; Dappere Dokter, 2020). Members of 
parliament tend to periodically recommend an overhead norm too (House of 
Representatives, 2014, 2016, 2019). Reducing bureaucracy is also framed as a 
policy priority by the current Dutch minister of health. The programme (ont)
regel de zorg - (de)regulate care – ought to reduce the administrative burden by 
removing unnecessary administrative requirements in multi-stakeholder 
settings (Ministry of Health, 2019a). 
This latest programme was set up in the wake of a large reform that aimed to 
improve the fiscal sustainability of Dutch LTC. In this reform, the Exceptional 
Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) –an in international comparison relatively 
extensive benefits package of LTC services– was split up in non-residential 
social care and domestic care and support (financed by municipalities), 24/7 
care (financed by regional care offices) and personal care and community 
nursing (financed by medical health insurance companies). The idea behind 
these changes was that the appropriate types of LTC would become more 
integrated with health care delivery. Reducing bureaucracy was another core 
aim of this reform (Text box 1).
Text box 1.  Long-term care reform in the Netherlands in 2015.
The 2015 long-term care reform in the Netherlands focused on de-institutionalisation 
and encompassed a normative reorientation that made non-residential social care 
a provision instead of a right. Municipalities were to finance social care, under the 
assumption that this would reduce bureaucracy as municipalities know the local 
situation better and could therefore make the wants and needs of clients central, 
rather than the rules and customs of LTC delivery organisations and regional care 
offices (Maarse & Jeurissen, 2016; Ministry of Health, 2013).
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Despite all of this attention, there is no academic consensus on a broad set of 
definitions on administrative costs (AC) in healthcare. AC concern an opaque 
construct that can be interpreted in a narrow definition when it solely refers to, 
typically, filling obsolete forms. However, a much wider definition can also be 
adopted which defines AC as all indirect costs associated to healthcare or LTC, 
with many shades of grey in between this narrow and wide definition. 
The literature that is available on AC in healthcare and LTC is heavily skewed 
towards health care, with hardly any study investigating administration in LTC. 
The studies on AC in health care indicate that AC take up a considerable share 
of total spending. Costs borne by organisations that finance and govern 
healthcare alone constitute around 3% of total health expenditure on average in 
OECD countries (Hagenaars et al., 2018). These macro level AC omit the AC of 
healthcare delivery organisations and the administrative activities of healthcare 
professionals (meso and micro levels), and therefore represent an underestimation 
of the total share of AC in healthcare spending. No internationally comparable 
periodical data collections exist on the meso and micro levels but studies 
show that AC may be much higher here. Himmelstein et al. (2014), for instance, 
found that overhead costs of hospitals were approximately 20% and 25% in 
the Netherlands and the USA, respectively. Observational studies conducted 
in different settings find that physicians spend 8% to 27% of their time on 
documentation activities (OECD, 2017a).
Proper data systems and intelligence on the total size, components and 
determinants of AC in LTC are a precondition to formulate and evaluate policies 
aiming to reduce AC. However AC are not easy to demarcate. Furthermore, 
even if a standard set of AC components were available on the macro, meso 
and micro levels, it should be taken into account that not all AC represent waste. 
In fact, many administrative activities are vital for the functioning of the 
LTC system. For instance, pooling information on SARS-CoV-2 infections in 
The Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) was replaced by the Long-Term 
Care Act (WLZ), covering 24/7 care for older persons and persons with a disability 
and long-term mental healthcare. The WLZ remained a responsibility of regional 
care offices. Health insurance companies became responsible for body-related 
personal care and community nursing under the Health Insurance Act (Zvw). All 
other non-residential (social) care, in addition to domestic care and support, 
became part of the Social Support Act 2015 (WMO) to be executed by municipalities 
(Maarse & Jeurissen, 2016; Kroneman et al., 2016).
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nursing homes can be seen as an administrative function but it is vital for 
 evidence-informed decision making during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Also, 
continuity of LTC delivery requires administration of a patient’s status to ensure 
a proper transfer from one caregiver to another. Still, terms like ‘bureaucracy’, 
‘red tape’ or ‘administration’ are generally perceived negatively. This asks for a 
more thorough empirical exploration and operationalization which is the 
objective of this study.
Objective
We have contributed to the gaps in the scholarly literature on AC in LTC by 
investigating whether it is possible to reach consensus on operationalising AC 
in Dutch LTC. We have analysed the completeness and quality of available data 
and validated our operationalisation of AC in Dutch LTC with a group of experts. 
With these analyses we assessed whether it is possible to track the total size, 
components of, drivers of, and barriers for AC in LTC, in addition to tracing 
whether the Dutch LTC reform in 2015 had its intended effect of reducing AC.
Methods
Study scope
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt by a group of experts to 
reach consensus of ways to trace and track AC in LTC in the Netherlands and 
to assess the completeness and quality of available data. This required us first 
to deploy an initial demarcation of AC and LTC. We initiated our study with 
a wide definition that essentially entailed all indirect costs associated with LTC. 
We then analysed more specific definitions used in existing studies and data 
sources.
We demarcated LTC by including those sectors that were part of the 2015 LTC 
reform in the Netherlands. This means that we investigated the AC of providers 
of 24/7 care for older persons and home care (VVT), residential care for people 
with a disability (GHZ) and domestic care and support (RIBW), in addition to the 
costs of organisations that finance and govern these sectors. We excluded AC 
borne by patients, including those who buy and organise their own care with a 
publicly financed personal budget, in addition to AC borne by providers who 





For the macro level explorations, we were able to use the health expenditure 
database of Statistics Netherlands. We analysed what Statistics Netherlands 
currently reports under the internationally recognised function of ‘governance, 
and health system and financing administration’. We then attempted to identify 
governing and financing-related expenditures that could potentially be added 
to this function by investigating two residual categories in the health expenditure 
database of Statistics Netherlands, in addition to the annual budget of the ministry 
of health.
We deployed a snowballing technique in the grey literature for the meso and 
micro levels. Official recent documents in which the ministry of health reports 
to the Dutch parliament about AC in LTC were used (Ministry of Health, 2019a; 
Ministry of Health, 2019b). This identified several reports of consultancy firms, 
research institutes, and interest groups (Berenschot, 2019a & 2019b; De Veer et 
al., 2017; KPMG, 2019; Verest et al., 2019; VvAA, 2019).
Based on the aforementioned data collection we operationalised a construct 
for AC in LTC. This draft construct was validated through a survey and follow-up 
focus group discussions with Dutch experts who collectively covered the different 
areas of expertise on AC at the macro, meso, and micro levels. With these steps 
we aimed to reach consensus on operationalising AC in Dutch LTC.
Table 1.  Taxonomy of administrative costs in long-term care used  
in this study.
Macro Total operational costs of organisations that govern and/or finance LTC, 
such as the ministry of health, social care departments of municipalities, 
regional care offices, relevant autonomous governmental bodies 
(Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen). The total costs of these organisations are 
seen as AC, as none of these organisations directly delivers care.
Meso Overhead costs of providers of 24/7 care for older persons and home care 
(VVT), residential care for people with a disability (GHZ) and domestic 
care and support (RIBW). Encompasses functions such as governance, 
management, communication, secretarial work, policy advice, legal 
advice, financing & administration, ICT, and HR.
Micro Time spend by LTC professionals on tasks other than direct patient care, 
such as clinical and administrative documentation and meetings about 
topics other than patient care.
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Expert validation – survey
A detailed web-based survey was distributed to purposively selected Dutch 
experts in the field of administration in healthcare. See appendix A for the 
complete survey (in Dutch). The objective was to validate and reach consensus 
on our suggested operationalisation of AC in LTC, to weigh the completeness and 
quality of data, and to have experts suggest potential determinants. The sample 
included members of a health statistics expert group that Statistics Netherlands 
consults periodically, along with additional experts from universities, research 
institutes, policymaking institutions, and consultancy firms involved in LTC. 
Non-responders were sent reminder e-mails every two weeks, up to two in 
total. We reached out to 61 experts, 14 of whom 14 completed the survey. See 
Table 2 for respondent characteristics.
The survey was structured in macro, meso, and micro sections and contained 
quantitative and qualitative items. The macro section contained a separate 
module on municipalities because these items required detailed knowledge. 
Respondents could omit sections if they deemed their knowledge to be 
insufficient. In all three sections we first described the results of and definitions 
used by identified data sources, in addition to potential strengths and weaknesses. 
Respondents were then asked to weigh the quality of these data and to identify 
additional data sources. Respondents were finally asked to mention determinants 
of AC. The responses to the survey items delivered descriptive statistics and 
some qualitative information which are presented in appendix B.


































































































































































Policymaking institutions 2 2
7 7 13
University 1 1
Research institutions 3 1
Interest group 2 0
Consultancy firm 0 2
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Expert validation – focus group discussions
After completing the survey, respondents were asked to participate in a focus 
group discussion. We held two web-based meetings of 1.5 hours: one with two 
survey respondents and two research team members, and one with four 
respondents and four research team members. The objective was to refine our 
understanding of how consensus can be reached on the operationalisation 
and measurement of AC in LTC and to explore its determinants. Both meetings 
were structured with slides of survey findings at the macro, meso, and micro 
levels to ensure that all levels were given appropriate attention. Extra attention 
was given to issues with a lack of consensus among respondents. See appendix 
B for the slides that were used (in Dutch).
The setup of the focus group discussions was shared with participants prior 
to the sessions, together with their original individual survey responses. 
The discussions were video recorded after participants consented that the 
recording would be used solely for accurate reporting. Immediately after each 
discussion, the first author drafted a report that highlighted central themes. 
These reports were distributed to participants to triangulate whether these 
were the central themes. The anonymised version of these reports (in Dutch) 
can be found in appendix C. The reports were then discussed several times 
with the whole research team to identify general themes. The first author then 
drafted the findings section on the focus group discussions, which was 
discussed several times by the research team to ensure it adequately represented 
the interpretation of the whole research team. Ample attention was paid to 
select appropriate quotes, to ensure these reflect the identified themes best.
Findings
We present the most important findings for the macro, meso, and micro levels 
separately. In these sections, we present the identified data sources and how 
experts weighed their completeness and validity. These passages also present 
determinants of AC as suggested by respondents. A complete overview of the 
survey findings can be found in appendix B. The findings section concludes 
with themes identified during the focus group discussions. We do not separately 
present these for the macro, meso, and micro levels because of the observed 
overlap in themes across all levels. 
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Macro level – data sources and survey responses
Under the function beleid en beheer, Statistics Netherlands includes organisations 
and activities concordant with the internationally defined SHA function of 
‘governance and health system and financing administration’ (CBS.nl, 2020a; 
OECD, 2017b). Two components make up this function: (1) activities necessary 
for the design, operation, management, and control of healthcare policy; and 
(2) activities necessary for managing the process of healthcare financing. 
Statistics Netherlands operationalises this by including the costs of the 
organisations shown in Text box 2.
With the Statistics Netherlands definition, 2,426 million euros was spent on 
macro level AC in 2018 (excluding costs for supplemental insurance). From 2011 
to 2018, these costs have increased by 185 million euros. These figures cover 
the whole healthcare system. All the included organisations also enact tasks 
unrelated to LTC, except for regional care offices and the CIZ that solely cater for 
LTC. We investigated whether costs of these organisations can be apportioned 
to LTC using their annual reports, but the level of detail is not sufficient for such 
a bottom-up approach. An alternative top-down approach is possible, by 
estimating the share that LTC takes up in the total work of these organisations.1 
In all, 34–36% of the costs of the Ministry of Health were apportioned to LTC, for 
instance, because LTC takes up a bit more than a third of total LTC spending. 
This led to LTC-related macro level AC of 772 million in 2011 and 834 million in 
2018, equating to almost 3% of the total LTC budget in both years.
Text box 2.  Organisations included under macro level administrative costs 
in the health expenditure database of Statistics Netherlands.
- Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (solely personnel costs)
- Statistics Netherlands (CBS), health statistics department
- Health and Youth Care Inspectorate (IGJ)
- National Health Care Institute (ZiNL)
- Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa)
- Body for the Settlement of Healthcare Organisations (College Sanering Zorg-
instellingen)
- Central Administration Office (CAK)
- Care Assessment Agency (CIZ)
- Regional Care Offices
- Healthcare insurance companies (costs for mandatory insurance is reported 
separately from costs for supplemental coverage)
- Municipalities (estimates for youth care, social care-WMO and public health)
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A weak point in this analysis is that the AC of municipalities have to be 
estimated, because municipalities do not report LTC-specific AC. For this 
estimate, Statistics Netherlands assumes that the AC of municipalities increased 
by 4% from 2014 to 2015. However, in reality, the increase may have been larger, 
because the 2015 reform increased the number of financers from 25 healthcare 
offices to almost 400 municipalities. This may have caused a loss in economies 
of scale. Yet, without valid and reliable data on these costs, no conclusion can 
be drawn on the effect of the 2015 reform among municipalities.
A more general disadvantage of this approach is that it does not allow us to see 
specific effects of the 2015 reform, because costs are apportioned generically. 
This is not the case for the AWBZ/WLZ, which mostly concerns the spending of 
regional care offices and the CIZ. Figure 1 shows how this spending category 
increased in relative terms just before 2015, the year of the reform. Although it 
also increased in 2017, during our analysis we discovered two omissions that 
explain this specific hike. First, costs for distributing personal budgets were 
incorrectly not reported under the AWBZ/WLZ financing scheme before 2017. 
Second, the costs of CAK were reported under this scheme, but this should 
have happened, as CAK took over several tasks of the ZiNL that were unrelated 
to LTC in 2017. If we correct for these omissions, costs are still 0.3–0.4 percentage 
points higher after 2015 than they were beforehand. Respondents related this to 
decreasing economies of scope when regional care offices became responsible 
for fewer tasks after the reform.
Figure 2 lists activities that could potentially be seen as macro level AC but are 
currently not reported as such by Statistics Netherlands. There was a lack of 
consensus among respondents as to whether these activities should be 
included. Figure 2 shows that this was especially the case for consulting 
Figure 1.  Costs related to governing and financing AWBZ/WLZ, % of total AWBZ/WLZ 
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services, waiting list mediation, funds related to social care or debt mediation, 
and representation of informal carers. No respondent disagreed that care 
improvement programmes subsidised by the Ministry of Health could be seen 
as AC, but many did not know what to do with this category. Respondents did 
agree that representation activities and research and advice for policy and 
practice were the most important missing activities.
However, adding representation and research activities can cause double 
counts, however, because interest groups and research institutes are to a large 
extent financed by providers, financers and governance institutes (which are 
already part of health expenditure statistics). Longitudinal data of these 
organisation’s spending patterns can nevertheless indicate an effect of the 
2015 reform. Therefore, we investigated the annual reports of the Association of 
Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), Vilans (a research institute focusing on LTC), 
and LTC-related research programmes funded by the Netherlands Organisation 
Figure 2.  Survey respondents’ views on including activities as administrative costs, 
that are currently not reported as such in Dutch national accounts. See appendix A 
for a more detailed description of these activities (in Dutch).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
National programme healthcare innovation
Workforce agenda residential care
National programme care for people with a disability
National programme residential care
National programme palliative care
Representation of informal carers
Funds related to social care; mediation for
debt claims, home care, personal care budgets
Consulting services related to social care
(excl. direct social care delivery)
Umbrella organizations in the field of social care
Other activities in which no direct care takes place
(e.g. first aid courses)
Waiting list mediation
Representation activities for healthcare organizations
(excl. employer organizations)
Consulting services related to healthcare
(excl. direct healthcare delivery)
Yes No Don't know
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for Health Research and Development (ZonMw). Figure 3 shows that the budget 
of the VNG increased prior to the 2015 reform. According to respondents, this 
was caused by the shift of responsibilities towards municipalities in 2015. The 
budgets of Vilans and ZonMw did not show a significant change around 2015. 
The budget of Vilans did increase considerably from 2010 to 2018, and ZonMw 
spending increased considerably in 2019. Respondents indicated that these 
findings were not so much related to the reform. Rather, they should be seen in 
the light of increasing attention towards quality of LTC, as this led to investment 
in health services’ research.
Meso level – data sources and survey responses
We identified two potential data sources. First, large LTC delivery organisations 
are required to report the share of personnel working with patients and in 
support functions in their annual reports (Ministry of Health, 2019b). Statistics 
Netherlands used to report these figures but stopped after identifying several 
inconsistencies (e.g., organisations reported more years of employment than 
the number of employees would allow). Six respondents agreed that these data 
are currently unusable, and one respondent partially agreed. However, most 
respondents indicated that it is, in principle, possible to come up with a valid 
figure.
Figure 3.  Organisational costs of a selection of relevant interest groups and research 
institutes in Dutch long-term care. Source: annual reports of included 



















Zonmw (Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development), spending on LTC-related research
Vilans (LTC-focussed research institute)
VNG (Association of Netherlands Municipalities)
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A second stream of data has been collected with the Berenschot benchmark 
care (2019b) since 2011. LTC delivery organisations complete a voluntary survey 
that defines AC as general administrative functions (e.g., board of directors, 
secretarial support), care management (e.g., LTC managers who spend at least 
half of their time on management), and facility-related functions. Appendix A 
describes this definition scheme in more detail. Figure 4 shows that overhead 
costs in the VVT have remained similar. A slight decrease in costs can be 
observed in the GHZ. The overhead costs of RIBW organisations are more 
volatile.
The face validity of these figures appeared high to us because the definition 
scheme is well thought out. We were less positive about the generalisability. 
Berenschot includes 11% of all GHZ delivery organisations, 6% of VVT, and 29% 
of RIBW organisations. As a share of total expenditure, this equates to 44% of 
total spending on GHZ and 30% of total VVT spending, meaning that larger 
organisations are overrepresented. This is probably especially the case in the 
home care sector, which encompasses many smaller organisations and 
self-employed providers (Kroneman et al., 2016). Also, participation is voluntary 
and costs organisations 4,000–6,000 euros. Though this makes the figures 
reliable, it might introduce a selection bias. Respondents were not explicit about 
Figure 4.  Overhead costs of providers of 24/7 care for older persons and home care (VVT), 
residential care for people with a disability (GHZ), and domestic care and 












the validity of the Berenschot benchmark care. Four respondents indicated that 
they did not know, one partially agreed, and two agreed with our conclusion 
that validity seems high. Respondents did confirm that smaller LTC delivery 
organisations seem underrepresented.
Potential drivers of meso level AC included the 2015 reform that caused a loss in 
economies of scale because auditing requirements by financers were not 
streamlined. Automation and self-management of LTC professionals were 
mentioned as barriers. Respondents mentioned not only that generic austerity 
led to a more critical view of overhead costs, but also that investment in primary 
personnel could decrease the share of overhead costs through a denominator 
effect.
Micro level – data sources and survey responses
For the period around 2015 – when the LTC reform took place in the Netherlands 
– we identified survey-based reports of large consultancy firms (KPMG, 2019; 
and Berenschot, 2019a), representatives of healthcare professionals (VvAA, 
2019), and the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research - Nivel (De 
Veer et al., 2017; Verest et al., 2019). There are large differences in number of 
participants, definitions used, and sectors covered, but a common theme is 
that the self-reported time spent on administration is 8–20 percentage points 
higher than the amount of time LTC professionals find acceptable for 
administrative tasks. The studies that provided the most useful and reliable 
longitudinal data are shown in Figure 5. Interestingly, the Berenschot figures 
show an increase from 2016 to 2019, but this is not the case for the Nivel figures. 
Respondents had no explanation for these opposing results. See appendix A, 
page 4–6, for more detailed results.
The respondents addressed three mean weaknesses in the available data. First, 
apart from one Nivel study (Verest et al., 2019), all surveys solely investigated 
the administrative burden. This could introduce a selection bias when opiniated 
professionals are overrepresented. Most experts agreed with this observation 
(Table 3, column 2). Second, a valid trend series dating back before 2016 is 
absent, making it impossible to see whether the 2015 reform had any effect, 
as there is no baseline measurement. We suggested that a more valid time 
series could be realised by including items on administration in broader 
periodical surveys. Experts reached no consensus on this idea (Table 3, column 
3), because it would not eradicate other methodological problems, such as 
the fact that surveys measure the perceived rather than the real time spent on 
administration. Third, few studies differentiated between administrative tasks 
73
3
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS IN DUTCH LONG-TERM CARE
(a heterogeneous set of activities). Experts agreed that administrative tasks 
should be differentiated more to identify tasks that are wither obsolete or less 
related to care delivery itself (Table 3, column 4). The survey listed an approach 
to differentiate administrative tasks that was published in an OECD report 
(2017a, page 244). Respondents liked how it differentiates financial, organisational 
and clinical documentation but suggested adding communication (e.g., calling 
around for an LTC bed), contract negotiations, and certain types of education.
Respondents highlighted numerous determinants of AC at the micro level. An 
important driver related to the reform was that there was an unclear delegation 
of responsibilities shortly after the reform. Other determinants were either 
unrelated or only indirectly related to the reform, and these included problems 
related to obtaining patients’ medical information, registrations for quality 
monitoring, ineffective ways of organising care delivery, and stricter privacy 
regulations. Often noted too was the repeated negative attention towards the 
topic, which is likely to increase the experienced burden. Potential barriers 
included automation (i.e., electronic patient records), sessions where stake - 
holders together identify obsolete registrations, alternative ways for quality 
monitoring of (e.g., a minimal set of quality indicators) and classifying 
Figure 5.  Self-reported time spent on administrative tasks by professionals working in 
24/7 care for older persons and home care (VVT) and residential care for 
people with a disability (GHZ). Sources: Berenschot (2019a) & Nivel (De Veer  
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healthcare services, flexible care delivery organisations, uniformity in auditing 
by financers, and multi-year contracts.
Themes identified during focus group discussions
We identified three main themes. First, there was consensus that there is a lack 
of consensus over what AC actually are. For the macro level, participants 
highlighted that interest groups and research institutes should be added, but 
participants found it difficult to draw the line where AC at this level should stop. 
Participants mentioned that meso-level AC may be the easiest to demarcate 
and measure of all three levels. This is evidenced by the fact that a considerable 
number of LTC organisations already participate voluntarily in the Berenschot 
benchmark. The most substantial lack of construct validity was apparent at 
the micro level. Participants indicated that terms like ‘administration’ and 
Table 3.  Survey responses to statements as regards the quality of studies 
on self-reported time spent by long-term care professionals on 











































































Most existing survey studies investigating  
the time spent by long-term care professionals on 
administration know a selection bias, because they 
are about administration exclusively.
5 0 - 6 0 2
A valid time series of administration by long-term 
care professionals can be constructed if items are 
added to broader periodical surveys among healthcare 
professionals, thereby omitting selection bias.
- - 1 6 3 2
Surveys among long-term care professionals should 
differentiate components of administrative tasks.
- - 9 3 0 1
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‘quality reporting’ can have a different connotation for regulators, financers 
and managers, as compared to professionals.
Participants offered guidance on methods to improve construct validity. They 
thought that Statistics Netherlands should continue to assign costs in a 
pragmatic way for the macro level, but its decisions should be based more on 
the type of activities instead of the types of organisations, as is the care 
currently. Participants thought it was vital to invest in innovative research 
methods for the micro level, not least because there has been prolonged 
negative attention towards administration among professionals, which makes 
surveys less reliable. Observational studies, in which healthcare professionals 
report what they are doing at random points in time, were suggested. As one 
participant highlighted: ‘I recognise the shaky construct of administration. 
People define and interpret it differently. From my practice-based point of view, 
I think it would be useful to measure it in a different way [than with surveys], 
because professionals have created some sort of fatigue towards surveys’.
A second theme was that administration is a key element of any health system 
and should therefore not be seen as wasteful by definition. One participant 
concluded with the following point: ‘to what extent are the benefits of 
administration investigated and netted? For instance, proper administration of 
medication usage can prevent errors, which can consequently prevent costs. 
This is important when analysing the issue with a total system perspective’. 
Participants stressed that the efficiency of administrative processes should 
receive greater scrutiny and that a lack of feedback on the purpose of registration 
frustrates healthcare professionals. Experts also thought it was important to 
better differentiate administrative tasks that are either useful or inevitable from 
those that are either useless or redundant. Observational studies could generate 
such intelligence in a more reliable way compared to lengthy surveys.
A third and final theme was that AC act like communicating vessels across the 
macro, meso, and micro levels. Examples of how macro level issues impact the 
meso level were mentioned. Regionalisation of healthcare governance can for 
instance require managerial staff to participate in additional networks. On the 
interaction between the meso and micro levels, automation and management 
and leadership styles are important. Participants mentioned that a focus on 
‘lean’ management may decrease meso level AC, but this can have repercussions 
at the micro level if managers still require professionals to keep record of an 
extensive set of indicators. When LTC professionals schedule their own work in 
self-steering teams, the opposite can occur.
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Because of this interaction, participants mentioned that there is no ‘blueprint’ 
or ideal level of AC on one level if the effects on other levels are not recognised. 
One participant stressed that ‘some administrative output may fall into a black 
hole, but in other cases it is crucial for the enactment of the task of external 
organisations. So, not to complicate matters further, but even if we would be able 
to optimise administration amongst professionals, it does not mean the system 
as a whole is perfect’. In line with this comment, participants universally agreed 
that an ‘overhead norm’, as suggested by interest groups and politicians, is a 
bad idea because this can lead to blunt austerity and negative spill-over effects 
at the micro level. Benchmarking overhead costs was seen as useful when it 
helps to reach a better balance between trust and accountability in LTC delivery 
organisations, but not when it leads to a ‘race to the bottom’.
Determinants of AC, including the effects of the 2015 reform, should also be 
seen in the light of this interaction. Participants reported that it took a few years 
to resolve implementation hiccups, which impeded automation and economies 
of scale. Municipalities for instance had different auditing requirements, meaning 
that LTC providers had to comply with multiple auditing systems. However, 
participants emphasised though that a causal explanation of the net effects of 
the reform would be hard even with perfect data, both because of the multitude 
of interacting drivers and barriers and because participants identified most 
determinants through speculation. Participants suggested using experimental 
and qualitative studies for investigating the determinants of administration to 
test their causality.
Discussion
Our objective was twofold: (1) is it possible to reach consensus on operationali-
sing AC in Dutch LTC, and (2) can we evaluate whether the 2015 reform of 
Dutch LTC had the intended effect of reducing AC? We believe that it may be 
possible to reach such consensus. At the macro level, we discovered omissions 
that can help demarcation efforts. Experts agreed that it should be possible to 
gather valid data at the meso level. Micro level AC lack construct validity, but 
valuable ideas to improve data collection exist.
However, the current research instruments and data systems are not robust 
and consistent enough to trace the overall effects of the 2015 reform. A major 
limitation concerns the lack of knowledge of micro-level AC before 2015 and 
the contradictory results in different surveys. Another important missing piece 
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of the puzzle concerns the AC of municipalities. Therefore, we can make no 
clear quantitative statements on the impact of the reform on total AC. However, 
it seems to us that the reform has placed some (temporary) burden at the macro 
level, as we observe a relative increase in the AC of regional care offices. At the 
meso level, available data suggest that AC have remained more or less equal. 
Much more important, but also much more insecure, are the developments at 
the micro level, with studies pointing both to an increase and to a decrease.
Three resulting reflections on reducing AC in LTC
Our study highlights three lessons. First, the magnitude of total AC becomes 
apparent with a total system perspective. However, meso- and micro-level AC 
are ‘hidden’ in regular expenditure statistics, which complicates our under -
standing of the topic in its entirety and our evaluation of political promises of 
reducing AC. More research should be conducted to achieve a more refined 
understanding of AC and, as a result, construct a more sophisticated policy 
debate. A more refined understanding of AC and better data are specifically 
needed at the micro level. We purposively adopted a wide definition to be 
able to analyse definitions used in a wide selection of studies and data sources. 
We discovered that the definitions used are often too generic to enable a 
sophisticated conceptual debate on essential characteristics and how AC can 
be assessed in an empirical way. As an effect, we did not yet reach consensus 
whether care management or clinical documentation should be considered as 
AC, for instance. More refined survey studies and observational studies could 
help this discussion. Van Hassel (2020) investigated the working hours of 
Dutch general practitioners with a real-time measurement tool and found that 
almost half of all activities were not directly related to patient care. It delivered 
sophisticated evidence on a wide variety of administrative tasks conducted by 
general practitioners, of which many related to clinical documentation. 
A similar technique could be deployed among LTC professionals. Specific for 
the Dutch situation, LTC-related AC of municipalities requires attention. It is 
expected that economies of scale were lost, but the current monitoring systems 
do not allow us to test this hypothesis. In-depth investigation of annual budgets 
of a selection of municipalities could be considered.
Second, we need to better differentiate administrative tasks that are either 
useful or inevitable from those that are either less useful or redundant. This is 
realistic because professionals understand that some administration is 
necessary. For instance, a study in Dutch hospitals found that only 36% of 
quality registrations were perceived as useful for everyday practice (Zegers et 
al., 2020). However, we also need to prevent useful administrative tasks from 
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being lost in blunt eradication exercises. Our study did not focus on identifying 
the value of specific administrative functions as we aimed to investigate what 
can be considered AC in the first place. Therefore, our attempt can function as 
a guide where to locate AC, which can be used by researchers interested in 
identifying low-value AC. This might benefit the value for money of future 
research on AC in LTC.
Third, we need to acknowledge and better understand the interaction of AC 
across all levels. Potential determinants of macro-level AC, such as reforms, 
seem to cause many trickle-down effects at the meso and micro levels, and 
vice versa; however, the causality of such determinants is tested rarely. 
Therefore, benchmarking information on, for instance, the meso level should 
be interpreted with caution if the relationship with effects at the macro and 
micro levels is unclear. Qualitative and experimental studies may be appointed 
to better understand the determinants of AC from a total system perspective.
Limitations and strengths
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt by a group of experts 
to reach consensus of ways to trace and track AC in LTC in the Netherlands 
and to assess the completeness and quality of available data. A strength is 
our deployment of two validation rounds (the survey and the focus group 
discussions). This was pivotal because we had to rely on grey literature and 
structured group interaction is an important element of consensus development 
(Murphy et al., 1998). Another strength lies in our attempt to explore the entire 
eco-system of AC in LTC, as opposed to only the macro, meso, or micro level, 
as is the case in most other studies on AC (Larjow, 2018). In our study, we 
self-selected a non-representative sample of 14 participating experts. Not all 
experts considered themselves knowledgeable on all three domains (macro, 
meso, micro); hence 7 out of 14 respondents completed the macro and meso 
sections of the survey. Therefore, the consensus reached as a whole as depicted 
in Figure 2 should be interpreted with caution. A limitation of this study is that 
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Conclusions
We can reach agreement on how to track AC in Dutch LTC but current research 
instruments and data systems are neither robust enough nor consistent enough 
to trace differences before and after the 2015 LTC reform in a valid and reliable 
manner. Through our study, we identified practical and more fundamental 
insights to improve the reporting on AC. An important practical idea is to 
conduct more observational research, to generate objective longitudinal data 
on a heterogenous set of administrative tasks conducted by professionals. 
A more fundamental insight is that AC in all cases need to be viewed from a 
total system perspective, because AC interact heavily across the macro, meso, 
and micro levels. These ideas can help to refine our understanding of the large, 
but hidden, cost category of AC and the interaction of AC across levels of the 
LTC system. A better understanding of the construct of AC can, as a result, lead 
to a more sophisticated and fact-based policy debate on AC. This is important 
because practitioners and politicians are generally negative about AC, which 
carries the risk that important administrative functions are lost in blunt efforts 
to generically reduce AC. The goal should be to reduce low-value AC. This study 
has provided some groundwork to trace low-value AC by attempting to track all 
elements of administration in the LTC system
Endnotes
* We allocated costs as follows. According to the definitions for health care and long term care in 
the system of health accounts, (CBS, 2020b), total costs of long term care (HC3+HCR1) is 34–36% 
(depending on the year) of the total costs of health care plus HCR1 (long term social care), plus the part 
of ‘other goods and services’ (M1(HC)) that is financed by municipalities, minus the costs of voluntary 
health insurance schemes (HF21). This percentage is then applied to the total costs of ‘governance 
and health system and financing administration’ (HC7) minus the part of HC7 that is related to 
voluntary health insurance schemes.
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Appendix. Supplementary data 
Appendix A, B and C can be found on https://journal.ilpnetwork.org (Hagenaars 
et al., Journal of Long-term Care, 2021, Epub ahead of print)
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How complex governance does increase 
both the real and perceived registration burden. 
The case of the Netherlands.
Comment on “Perceived burden due to registrations for quality monitoring 
and improvement in hospitals: a mixed methods study”.
Published in International Journal of Health Policy and Management (2021), 








The burden of registrations for professionals should be more firmly on the 
policy agenda. In a rigorous study Marieke Zegers and colleagues make a 
compelling argument why that should be the case. In Dutch hospitals, the 
average professional spends 52.3 minutes a day on quality registries and 
monitoring instruments. Many more administrative duties exist. Together 
these represent substantial resources and ultimately could become a drag on 
the intrinsic motivation of the care professions. We agree with Zegers et al. that 
we are in need for more operational efficiency. However, the issue at hand is 
very complex and is also intensely connected to the entire healthcare system 
and its different levels. More operational efficiency alone will not solve the 
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Introduction
Marieke Zegers and colleagues (2020) made an excellent contribution to the 
expanding literature of the (rising) administrative burden in healthcare. They 
present an empirical study on the burden of quality monitoring by healthcare 
professionals. Results are sobering. They find a substantial time burden of data 
handling for nurses and physicians (52.3 minutes a day); only 25% of such 
quality measures are primarily registered for quality improvement; 36% of the 
measures were perceived as useful for improving quality of care in everyday 
practice; 57% of quality registrations are primarily used for accountability 
purposes. They find that perceived unreasonable registrations are negatively 
associated with joy in work and also with more distraction from actual time for 
treating patients, although less intrinsically motivated professionals might also 
hold more negative feelings on quality registrations1. Nevertheless, the net 
performative forces of these registrations might actually be negative and not 
positive2. Indeed, the methods of the authors do present few reasons to doubt 
the accuracy of their measurements. 
As policy implications, Zegers et al. (2020) do plea for 1) less quality registrations, 
2) a more limited set of core indicators, and 3) a better use of information and 
communication technologies to reduce these workloads. Taken together, they 
propose for a higher level of operational efficiency in quality data collections, to 
be achieved by investments in administrative support for the registration 
process. However, in recent decades the number of quality and safety 
registrations has only increased. We think that the wickedness of this problem 
asks for more to be done. Besides more operational efficiency in quality 
registries and monitors, we argue that adequate governance of data and 
information is of the utmost importance to tackle the root causes of this 
problem. The complex interactions between the different levels within the 
healthcare system and the lack of routine statistics on the total costs of 
registration on all levels, might enhance the administrative burdens to 
unreasonable levels or the other way around. The more so because this 
administrative burden lacks an explicit price and is buried within the official 
cost statistics. The importance of this governance issue also comes to the fore 
as a result of large diversity in numbers of data custodians, purchasers and 
oversight agencies and their responsibilities. In other words, we feel that 
administrative burdens may not only reflect operational inefficiencies, but also 
failures in governance.  
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Adequate information might improve the public good
Over the past decades, the amount of data has increased tremendously. Due to 
the rapid expansion of ICT technologies, the costs of processing and analyzing 
data has been reduced tremendously. Partly as a result, data requests have gone 
up and spread from administrative departments to the healthcare workforce. 
However, although it has become more convenient to process and analyze 
data, this was not (necessarily) the case for those that had to deliver and fill 
for the increasing number of requests. The more so since the number of 
data-hungry stakeholders also increased due to reforms that articulated the 
purchasing functions and due to the coming of new stakeholders such as 
oversight bodies, patient associations, accreditation organizations, and data 
companies.
 In principle adequate information might contribute to solve for important 
agency problems, including those that relate to the quality and safety of our 
healthcare. Adequate information also holds potential to help increase the 
allocative efficiency of scarce resources, for example through active purchasing 
of high-value care3,4. However, and as stated before, information is not free and 
comes with a price. 
Total indirect and administrative costs are often very high
At the macro-level, multiple purchaser models typically bear higher administrative 
expenses than single purchaser systems because of economies of scale and 
scope. Reasons lay in higher billing and claims expenses that are often absent 
or limited in single purchaser systems, and in confidentiality practices when 
purchasers and providers compete with each other. Among the group of 
multiple- purchaser healthcare systems, the administrative burden bared on 
the level of financers and regulators is around 4% in the Netherlands. This is 
much lower compared to Germany, France and especially the United States, 
according to routinely collected OECD data5. 
 However, such statistics do only partly resemble the total administrative 
burden. Providers do also contain many staff without responsibilities for patient 
treatments. In the US - where administrative expenses have proven to be an 
important determinant for the excessive costs of the total healthcare system - 
hospital administrative costs add up to twenty-five percent of hospital turnover. 
The Netherlands does not come out that well, with almost twenty percent they 
are second in line6. Although this is not the case for the US, in theory such 
comparatively high administrative costs at the provider level might partly be 
compensated by lower administrative costs at the macro-level. Note that, 
however, provider level administrative costs are not measured routinely in 
established accounting frameworks such as the OECD System of Health 
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Accounts. We thus are not able to make such comparison for a substantial 
number of countries.
 So far we have not said anything on the burden of indirect costs that 
professionals themselves have to bear, the focus of the study by Zegers and 
colleagues. The burden of registrations and administrative tasks for 
professionals is not captured in routine cost accounting data either, and often 
omitted by scholars off administrative costs in healthcare7. In the Netherlands, 
general surveys continuously show high administrative burdens that circle 
around two days a week for professionals in hospitals and other providers8. 
These surveys may measure perceived burdens more than actual time spent 
on administrative tasks. However, a new innovative measurement of actual 
time spend by Dutch GP’s also finds that their administrative burden almost 
equals 40% and has increased over the past five years9. To conclude, the total 
sum of all macro-, meso-, and micro-level related indirect costs might actually 
be around half of all healthcare spending. Precise information is lacking and 
often not registered. 
 That is why the fact that Zegers et al. study a substantial amount of the 
total indirect and administrative costs - the burden of quality registries for 
professionals - into more depth is timely. However, such quality registries 
form also part of a broader ecosystem where many interdependencies and 
connections do apply. This holds for all the typical characteristics of a complex 
system. We argue that a ‘solution’ to unnecessary high burdens of professional 
time for quality registries cannot be solved without adequate governance of all 
data and information systems, used within the wider healthcare system. For 
one thing, the Dutch clinical registry landscape is quite scattered and 
un-coordinated as compared with the clinal registry landscape in countries 
like Sweden and Denmark. 
Thoughts about a broader governance of data and information 
for healthcare
Data governance in the Netherlands is complex. Dutch healthcare is governed 
through three systems with different steering mechanisms - curative care 
(competition), long-term care (single purchasing), and social care (devolved to 
municipalities) - that need to co-produce and co-operate among the needs of 
complex patients with co-morbidities. The number of data custodians is among 
the highest in OECD countries10. Some data custodians hold complex and even 
antagonistic relationships, for example insurance companies and hospitals 
each rely on their own data companies. Save prohibitions by privacy legislations, 
the oversight agencies can ask more or less all quality information from the 
providers they deem necessary for fulfilling their tasks, as can insurance 
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companies (purchasers). However, data principals often do not share data with 
each other which adds to the burden of providers and professionals that need to 
provide the same data over and over. To sum up. This complex combination of 
competition that stipulates data as confidential, private provision of care and 
insurance without a public clearinghouse, the necessary compliance to privacy 
regulations which create lots of confusion and hampers sharing of data all 
contributes to a lack of transparency and thus more request for data by individual 
stakeholders. On top, providers create own private databases and registries for 
specific purposes or they may choose to comply to registries of professional 
societies or accreditation bodies. A governance structure that focuses on easy 
access to and sharing of reliable is currently lacking.
 OECD has over the past years produced a series of international reports 
that demonstrate the heterogeneity between countries in the active use of data- 
linkage and optimizing the use of Electronic Health Records, whilst assuring 
data-privacy and data-security. In 2017, OECD provided an official council 
recommendation on health data governance11. Further implementation of 
these health data-governance recommendations and related optimization of 
data linkage practices and secondary data use of Electronic Health Records 
might help pave the way to lowering the presently experience administrative 
burden on macro, meso and micro level of the Dutch health care system. 
 Changing any system with an extensive legacy is difficult, but we do think 
a holistic approach that addresses the issues of lack of adequate governance 
and operational efficiency in Dutch healthcare is necessary. The rigorous study 
by Marieke Zegers et al. provides a strong factual basis for Dutch stakeholders to 
acknowledge the issues at hand. And with the COVID crisis opening up many 
windows of opportunity for positive reforms 12, now may be the time to address 
this important concern in a fundamental way.
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Improving population health 
with junk food taxes
PART II

Prevention as a strategy for fiscally 
sustainable healthcare







• Prevention contributes towards fiscally sustainable healthcare, because 
reducing the lifestyle-related burden of diseases can strengthen the solidarity 
for healthcare financing.
• Prevention can reduce healthcare costs in the short to medium term, however 
long-term effects are uncertain. The cost-effectiveness of prevention in terms 
of health outcomes is generally high.
• Implementing more prevention is complex because problem ownership, 
financial incentives and political windows of opportunities are often absent.
• Occupational health deserves more attention. Populations are ageing and 
chronic disease incidence is increasing, which poses a challenge for the 
labour force with pension ages on the rise. Population health management is a 
promising approach to integrate preventive and curative care in a better way.
97
4
PREVENTION AS A STRATEGY FOR FISCALLY SUSTAINABLE HEALTHCARE
Introduction
Who has been responsible for the largest medical breakthrough since 1840? 
According to readers of the British Medical Journal (BMJ) this was not a doctor 
or biomedical scientist, but a lawyer: Edwin Chadwick. Chadwick successfully 
advocated for sewage and sanitation in 19th century Great Britain. His legacy 
received most votes in a BMJ reader poll in 2008 on medical breakthroughs. 
Second was the discovery of antibiotics and vaccinations (Ferriman, 2007).
Chadwick was not solely altruistically motivated, but as one of the authors of 
the 1834 Poor Act, he wanted to ease the tax burden that the developing welfare 
state was generating. He noticed that open sewage caused breadwinners to die 
from infectious diseases, who left families that had to rely on social security 
arrangements subsequently (Mackenbach, 2007).
Public health challenges have changed dramatically since the 19th century. 
Sanitation, sewage and other forms of health protection are seen as essential 
public services nowadays, and disease prevention has improved population 
health substantially since the second part of the 20th century. The 21st century 
frontier in public health lies in health promotion, focusing more on individuals’ 
behaviour and the design of healthy living environments (CDC, 2011). This 
chapter will therefore mostly discuss this type of prevention.
What has not changed is the economic potential of prevention. This chapter 
describes how prevention can contribute to fiscally sustainable healthcare. The 
first part analyses how improved health through prevention influences the 
sustainability of healthcare funding. The second part analyses barriers and 
opportunities for prevention from a governance and political perspective. We 
use the terminology set out in text box 1, which is based on the textbook Volks-
gezondheid en gezondheidszorg [Public health and healthcare] (Mackenbach & 
Stronks, 2016), and the taxonomy of the (former) Dutch Health Care Insurance 




Does extra longevity help contain healthcare costs?
Healthcare has improved dramatically over the past few decades but has also 
led to higher costs. An important explanation for this is that contemporary 
medical progress has mainly led to a decrease in mortality among the 
chronically ill. Because of this, the prevalence of chronic illness has increased, 
in turn increasing total healthcare costs. This ‘expansion of morbidity’ was 
described by Gruenberg (1977) as the failure of success of modern medicine. 
Postponement of death due to prevention can have a similar effect. This at first 
sight does not make prevention a useful strategy for assuring fiscally sustainable 
healthcare. However, it is uncertain whether morbidity will continue to expand. 
Fries (1980) predicted that several developments, including healthier behaviour, 
Text box 1.  Prevention terminology.
Preventive measures can be defined according to: 1) the type of measure; 2) the 
stage of disease; and 3) the target group. Several actors can implement prevention: 
public institutes (such as local health services); private organizations (such as 
employers); and individuals.
1) The typology, according to a type of measure, distinguishes between:
 -  Health protection: protecting a whole population or risk group against exposure 
to health risks of which an individual has no influence;
 - Disease prevention: early diagnoses and treatment of a specific disease;
 - Health promotion: promotion of healthy lifestyles.
2) The disease-stage typology distinguishes between:
 -  Primary prevention: preventing disease among healthy individuals;
 -  Secondary prevention: early diagnosis of diseases among individuals with risk 
factors;
 -  Tertiary prevention: preventing deterioration of disease among individuals 
with a disease.
3) The typology of the former Dutch Health Insurance Board is used to assess 
when prevention is applicable to the Dutch basic health insurance package. 
This is not the case for universal prevention (whole population) and selective 
prevention (risk groups), for which the central government and municipalities are 
responsible. Insurers are responsible for indicated prevention (individuals with 
risk factors) and care-related prevention (disease deterioration among individuals).
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would ultimately lead to a faster increase in healthy life years as compared to 
the increase in absolute life expectancy, which would mean a ‘compression of 
morbidity’. If prevention has this effect, healthcare expenditure over the life 
course may decrease.
A third theory of the health of the population was proposed by Manton (1982), 
who predicted that mortality reductions would lead to a redistribution of disease 
and disability. Compression of severe morbidity is compensated by expansion 
of less severe morbidity in this scenario which Manton termed ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’. Healthcare expenditure over the life course may remain more 
or less the same in this scenario. It must be noted, however, that changes in 
health and longevity and thus healthcare expenditure are mostly man-made. 
As Mackenbach (2020) put it, ‘human agency’ accounts for both the rise and 
fall of diseases.
As a final point here, fiscally sustainable healthcare is not solely about containing 
a certain level of costs, but also about being able and willing to afford healthcare 
costs. This chapter highlights the influence of prevention on all these aspects.
Macroeconomic effects of ill health and prevention
Short-term effects on healthcare consumption
Unhealthy behaviour causes a considerable part of total health expenditure. 
For instance, the healthcare costs due to smoking, unhealthy food, sedentary 
behaviour, and excessive alcohol consumption in the Dutch context accounts 
for €8.6 billion, which equates to around 10% of total health spending (RIVM, 
2018a). If we add healthcare costs caused by other unhealthy behaviours 
(drug abuse, unhealthy food, unsafe sex) and risk factors such as air pollution, 
it becomes clear that quite a large proportion of health spending could be 
prevented.
Long-term effects on healthcare consumption
A more balanced picture appears when analysing the effects of unhealthy 
behaviour from a lifetime perspective. There appears to be consensus about the 
fact that smokers have lower lifetime healthcare costs compared to non-smokers 
(Polder et al., 2012). Such consensus does not exist for obesity. American studies 
suggest that obese people have higher lifetime costs than non-obese people, 
despite their lower life expectancy (Lakdawalla, Goldman & Shang, 2005). This 
is not the case for the Netherlands (Van Baal et al., 2008). Regardless of this, it 
has been calculated that the elimination of obesity would save net costs for a 
longer time period compared to the elimination of smoking, because smok-
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ing-related diseases are often ‘cheaper’ to treat. This is due to relatively shorter 
illness periods (with lung cancer, for example). Eliminating smoking saves 
costs related to such diseases, but people that do not smoke develop ‘replacing’ 
diseases such as dementia with the effect that lifetime healthcare costs end up 
higher among non-smokers. This effect is less strong for obesity as it often 
causes more expensive chronic illness, such as diabetes and cardiovascular 
diseases (Polder et al., 2012).
From this perspective, prevention does not seem like a useful strategy for 
fiscally sustainable healthcare. Yet there are two points regarding methodology 
that accentuate the uncertainty of long-term effects. Firstly, there have been 
very few studies reviewing the long-term effects of risk factors other than 
smoking and obesity on healthcare consumption. It is, for instance, not 
unrealistic to assume that mental health prevention would lead to lower lifetime 
healthcare costs, seeing as mental health disorders cause little mortality but 
high morbidity. Secondly, the calculations applied to evaluations assume ceteris 
paribus conditions, however, policy, technology and medicines are always 
changing. Costs of smoking could increase, for instance, when new expensive 
lung cancer medicines hit the market (Polder et al., 2017).
Long-term effects on healthcare consumption and risk solidarity
People who live longer pay healthcare premiums and taxes for a longer period 
of time. This is not often considered in studies that assess lifetime healthcare 
costs in relation to risk factors. By taking healthcare contributions into account, 
the magnitude of risk solidarity is revealed, as demonstrated in table 1.
Dutch people with the highest level of education spent on average €1,900 more 
a year on healthcare than they consumed in 2012, whereas those with the 
lowest level of education consumed €1,400 more than they contributed. This 
can be explained by three things. Firstly, the main bulk of health spending 
occurs at the end of life. However, since people with a lower level of education 
generally live for a shorter time period, their average yearly healthcare 
consumption is higher. Secondly, people with a higher level of education live 
longer and therefore pay premiums and taxes for longer too. Thirdly, the 
healthcare contributions of the higher educated were higher in the Netherlands 
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Macroeconomic effects outside the healthcare sector
Table 1 is, however, incomplete because extra longevity due to prevention also has 
economic effects outside of the healthcare sector. For instance, if extra health- 
care contributions are paid out of pension premiums, these are additional costs.
Cost of illness studies aim to investigate these total economic costs and benefits 
for specific illnesses or risk factors. Societal cost-benefit analyses assess total 
economic effects of policy measures. These studies differentiate between 
material and immaterial costs and benefits. Material costs and benefits refer to 
things that impact people’s finances directly, such as pensions and labour 
productivity. Immaterial costs and benefits provide a monetary expression for 
factors like healthy life years or enjoyment. We first examine material costs and 
benefits.
Cost of illness studies have recently been conducted in the Dutch setting for 
smoking and alcohol. The material costs and benefits of smoking are more or 
less similar, at net costs of €2.3 billion a year. Smoking causes absenteeism (€1.4 
billion), reduced productivity (€2.2 billion) and disability (€1 billion). It also 
causes fire damage (€0.2 billion) and the production of tobacco products costs 
€1.7 billion. The reduced longevity due to smoking generates fewer healthcare 
contributions (€1.5 billion) and pension premiums (€1.7 billion), as well as losses 
in productivity (€5 billion). Benefits of smoking include the lower health 
expenditure (€5.1 billion) and lower consumption (€6 billion). Excise and value 
taxes cost smokers €3.4 billion, but these are also counted as benefits for the 
Table 1.  Healthcare consumption and contributions (curative and 
long-term care) in the Netherlands in 2012, lifetime perspective 
as an average of € per year, per level of education expressed 
according to the International Standard Classification of 









Healthcare consumption 3,200 3,200 2,200 2,000
Healthcare contribution 
(Health Insurance Act, 
Exceptional Medical  
Expenses Act)
1,800 2,200 2,900 4,000
Net use 1,400 1,000 -700 -1,900
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government and thus pose a zero-sum game from a societal perspective 
(Polder et al., 2017). Regarding alcohol, net costs were €2.3 to €4.2 billion in 2013. 
Alcohol causes material costs such as labour productivity losses, police 
deployment and traffic accidents (De Wit et al., 2018).
In the United States, many cost-benefit analyses have been conducted for 
obesity measures (McKinnon et al., 2016). Most of these studies do not have a 
perspective as wide as those on smoking and alcohol in the Netherlands, and 
selection bias may influence results. However, the general conclusion points to 
a relatively large effect on productivity. People with obesity are in employment 
less, earn 18% less (than people without obesity in similar functions), report sick 
leave more often, and show 12% reduced productivity due to presenteeism - 
going to work while being ill (Devaux & Sassi, 2015).
The effect of mental health disorders is also very large. People with severe 
mental health issues are three to four times more likely to be unemployed than 
people with mild issues, who in turn are almost twice more likely to be 
unemployed than people without mental health issues (Devaux & Sassi, 2015). 
Among people in employment, illnesses like depression can lead to absenteeism, 
but a larger share of the impact is hidden because many of these people 
continue to work whilst ill, causing lower productivity. American research 
found that 81.1% of total lost productive time among workers in the United 
States with depression is attributed to presenteeism (Stewart et al., 2003).
Productivity
Cost-benefit analyses thus suggest a relationship between health and productivity. 
Robert Fogel (1994) won the Nobel Prize for this conclusion, by finding that 
about 30% of economic growth in the United Kingdom since the industrial 
revolution could be attributed to better food and health. This is important for 
fiscally sustainable healthcare because a more prosperous economy is more 
able to bear collective expenses such as healthcare.
Due to populations ageing it has become more important for working people to 
remain healthy for as long as possible. This is because the share of the workforce 
decreases, placing a heavier demand on workers to maintain public sectors. 
Also, the rise of chronicity combined with the increase in pension ages 
(occurring in many countries) requires more elderly people with chronic 
illnesses to keep working for longer (RIVM, 2018a). Yet certain occupations with 
heavy physical strain and limited self-autonomy impact health in a negative 
way, especially at older ages (Karasek, 1979; Ravesteijn, Van Kippersluis & Van 
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Doorslaer, 2017). This makes occupational health promotion important for 
sustainable employability. As a final point here, we want to stress the importance 
of health on informal economic activities like informal care and babysitting, 
as the value of these activities is not often quantified. 
The value of health
The analyses above have not mentioned perhaps the most important aspect of 
prevention: people value health and are therefore willing to invest in it. Former 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy thought this too when he asked a commission 
chaired by Joseph Stiglitz to come up with a way to better measure economic 
performance. Contrary to traditional methods that focus mostly on economic 
growth, this commission pointed to quality of life as a central pillar, of which 
health is an important aspect. The measurement of (ill) health and its impact on 
quality of life is lagging behind, however, which hinders policy investment 
(Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009).
Despite this, some studies do take immaterial aspects of health into account, 
which brings us to the costs and benefits of the studies on smoking and alcohol 
in the Dutch context mentioned above. For smoking, it seems clear. Whereas 
material costs and benefits are more or less equal, the net yearly costs of 
smoking are around €33 billion when immaterial costs and benefits are also 
part of calculations. €24.3 billion can be attributed to life years lost to smoking 
and €11 billion to losses in quality of life, which is much more than the €4.6 
billion smoking delivers in terms of enjoyment (Polder et al., 2017). The net 
costs of alcohol are much smaller at in between €4.2 and €6.1 billion in 2013. 
These estimates do not include the enjoyment alcohol consumers may 
experience, as it appeared impossible to quantify such benefits (De Wit et al., 
2018). This proves how difficult it is to measure all the costs and benefits of 
unhealthy behaviour.
Cost-effectiveness of prevention
People value their health and are thus willing to pay for it. Prevention is a very 
cost-effective way to achieve better health outcomes, especially compared 
to curative care. The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment keeps track of cost-effectiveness studies regarding prevention 
(RIVM, 2018b). 80% of these studies remained below €50 000 per QALY, and 
60% find less than €20 000 per QALY (Van Gils et al., 2010). Noteworthy 
differences also exist between preventative and curative measures for specific 
illnesses. Measures to prevent smoking, for instance, are about a hundred times 
more cost-effective than lung cancer treatment (RIVM, 2018b).
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These studies do have methodological shortcomings though, because the time 
horizon regarding studies looking into prevention are relatively long compared 
to curative care. They also require larger research populations, but the reach of 
preventative measures is not always easy to predict, which results in a bigger 
error margin (Polder et al., 2012).
Limited solidarity for unhealthy lifestyle
The relationship between health and fiscally sustainable healthcare is complex 
and depends on the perspective of ‘fiscally sustainable’ and the type of 
prevention/risk factor. For lay people it is more straightforward: people don’t 
like to pay healthcare costs for someone else when these have been caused by 
unhealthy lifestyle. About half of Dutch people think smokers and heavy 
drinkers should pay a higher premium. This compares to only 3% for people 
with a lower income, and 5% for people in ill health (NIVEL, 2017). It appears that 
there is much less solidarity when it comes to unhealthy lifestyle as compared 
to income and risk. Although this lay perspective highly reduces the complexity 
of the issue, this perspective is important for fiscally sustainable healthcare as it 
negatively affects willingness to pay.
More prevention as a result of shared responsibilities 
and population health management
Prevention is important for fiscally sustainable healthcare, primarily because it 
can improve population health, which is good for the economy and thus the 
capacity to pay for healthcare. Yet prevention policy is not easy, because many 
stakeholders share responsibilities and in many cases there is no clear ‘owner 
of the problem’. We describe this governance issue regarding ‘Health in All 
Policies’ (HiAP) and the integration of preventative and curative care.
Health in All Policies
HiAP is an approach on health-related rights and obligations, emphasizing the 
consequences of all public policies on health systems and health outcomes. 
HiAP aims to improve the awareness among policymakers that policy on social 
protection, education, environment and housing affect the health system and 
health outcomes, as the Dahlgren-Whitehead model portrays in figure 1.
Healthcare is the only sector in which health is actually the primary objective. 
Health is, at most, a sub-target in other sectors with an influence on public 
health. The financial sector, for instance, does not appear to be important for 
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health, however the recent financial crisis had quite a substantial impact as it 
increased suicide rates, infectious disease outbreaks and traffic casualties in 
several countries. This effect was relatively big in southern Europe where 
governments implemented large austerity measures, but was much smaller in 
countries like Iceland, where social protection schemes were largely maintained 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013).
The large scope of health determinants can be seen as a challenge for good 
public health governance, because the logical ‘problem owner’ of health 
policy—a minister of health—is not responsible in the case of, for example, a 
financial crisis. Furthermore, policymakers in domains like education, social 
protection and housing, are assessed by their performance in these areas 
specifically, and less on their impact on public health or healthcare cost 
containment (Storm, 2016).
There is no quick fix for all these governance issues. The societal cost-benefit 
analyses described above can help to raise awareness among policymakers 
outside of the healthcare realm, as these studies point out the financial impact 
of risk factors separately for each policy domain. What is important in general 
is that different government agencies cooperate on the basis of shared interests. 
From the perspective of fiscally sustainable healthcare, we highlight the 
importance of occupational health. Population ageing and the rise of chronicity 
Figure 1. Dahlgren-Whitehead (1991) model of health determinants.
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reduce the share of the workforce in the total population, which increases the 
importance of a healthy workforce for the economy and the public sector. Also, 
being and staying employed is generally good for health. However, relatively 
little evidence is available on how to promote health in the work place. This calls 
for more research on occupation health promotion.
Population health management
Figure 1 may suggest healthcare’s contribution to health outcomes is marginal. 
This is, in fact, not true: healthcare has actually had the biggest contribution to 
the increase in longevity in life in the last few decades (OECD, 2017). At the 
same time, however, experts find integration of curative and preventative care 
too limited. The recent discussion about positive health, a definition of health 
that ‘emphasizes the ability to adapt and self manage in the face of social, 
physical en emotional challenges’ has fuelled this debate (Huber et al., 2011). 
As the integration of preventative and curative care does have a clear problem 
owner, we highlight barriers and opportunities about this issue in the Dutch 
context.
Problem analysis
The organization and financing of healthcare form important explanatory 
factors for the limited integration of preventative and curative care. Financing 
in most countries is mostly based on healthcare output (volumes), instead of 
health outcomes. Moreover, those that invest in preventative care often do not 
directly reap the benefits due to the fragmented nature in which healthcare, 
including prevention, is financed. This ‘wrong pocket’ problem is also apparent 
in the Netherlands. Figure 2 shows the allocation of responsibilities and 
financing of the different prevention types among Dutch healthcare financers. 
Insurers are responsible for indicated and care-related prevention among 
individuals, municipalities for groups and individuals with increased risks, and 
the central government and municipalities for the general population.
The ‘wrong-pocket’ problem should not necessarily be an issue, as long as re-
sponsibilities are clear and investing parties compensated for according to 
cost-benefit ratios. But this information is often absent, and responsibilities can 
also be vague because it is not always clear beforehand what type of prevention 
is required for a specific risk group. Finally, not all healthcare providers are 
willing to make preventative care part of their work due to normative preferences 
and high workload (Heijink & Struijs, 2015).
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Less parties involved=more prevention?
The problem analysis above suggests that healthcare systems are less inclined 
towards prevention as more parties get involved, because more ‘pockets’ would 
also mean more ‘wrong pockets’. To test this hypothesis we can compare 
the administrative costs of different healthcare system typologies, because 
the amount of administrative expenditures reflects the number of transactions. 
We conducted this comparative analysis and found significantly higher 
administrative costs among voluntary private health insurance (an important 
source of payment in the United States), compared to compulsory social/private 
health insurance (important sources of payment in Germany and the 
Netherlands). Subsequently, countries with a national or regional health service 
(for example, the United Kingdom and Sweden) have significantly lower 
Figure 2.  Allocation of responsibilities and financing of prevention in the Dutch 
healthcare systems. Designed by the RIVM and the Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sport (Heijink & Struijs, 2015).
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administrative expenditure on the financing level than countries with 
compulsory insurance (Hagenaars et al., 2018). This would mean that single 
payer systems are more inclined towards prevention.
Population health management and shared savings
The integration of preventative and curative care nevertheless seems to run 
into similar problems as described for the Netherlands in countries with a 
single payer, because healthcare is mainly financed on the basis of volume 
instead of health outcomes in these countries as well (Heijink & Struijs, 2015). 
The financing of healthcare providers therefore seems more important than 
the organization of healthcare financers. Population-based funding poses the 
strongest incentive for providers to engage in preventative care. It involves 
financers and providers agreeing on a set budget for a set population, mostly 
regionally defined. These agreements can involve ‘shared savings’, which 
means that providers can keep a share of this budget should they provide less 
care than reserved, on the condition that a measurable level of quality of care 
and health outcomes is maintained or improved. This provides an incentive for 
prevention, because a healthier population would have lower healthcare demand.
Since 2010, the Netherlands has carried out experiments with disease-specific 
bundled payments. These have had some success primarily in quality of care: 
coordination of care among diabetic patients has improved, and there are some 
indications that they led to better health outcomes (Struijs et al., 2017). However, 
disease-specific bundled payments do not provide an incentive for primary 
prevention, but they do provide an incentive for more diagnoses. The introduction 
of bundled payments for children with asthma in South Carolina, for instance, 
led to 29.9% more diagnoses, with no effect on health outcomes (Chorniy, 
Currie & Sonchak, 2017).
Bundled payments that cover a wider scope of patients do provide an incentive 
for primary prevention. Such forms of population health management including 
shared savings contracts are very complex, and require long-term commitment 
among financers and providers. Shared savings can also lead to under-provision 
of healthcare services, if there is no adequate monitoring of agreements related 
to quality and accessibility of care. Finally, risk stratification is necessary for 
proper allocation of preventative/curative care services.
Internationally well-known good practices of shared savings all have strong 
governance. Well-known applications of this model include the ‘Accountable 
Care Organizations’ in the United States, and the ‘Integrierte Versorgung 
109
4
PREVENTION AS A STRATEGY FOR FISCALLY SUSTAINABLE HEALTHCARE
Gesundes Kinzigtal’ [Healthy Kinzigtal Integrated Care] project in Germany. 
Below, we describe three interlinked conditions of success witnessed in these 
good practices: intrinsic motivation, clear agreements, and an effective data 
infrastructure (Berwick, Nolan & Whittington, 2008).
Intrinsic motivation
Organizing and financing healthcare for a population requires close and often 
new collaborations, sometimes between otherwise competing organizations. 
This can be difficult when parties are unfamiliar with incentives and legislation 
(in the case of managed competition, for example). It requires strong intrinsic 
motivation among financers and providers in any context. A government can 
stimulate this, by explicitly pointing out population health management as a 
way to improve the integration of preventative and curative care. Good practices 
should be promoted and providing goals can also help, by formulating policies 
that work towards reaching regional population health management targets 
across the whole country within a certain time period. Active monitoring of 
these goals can create awareness among stakeholders, and widely spreading 
the business cases of front-runners can also help.
Clear agreements
Because population health management requires an institutionalized mode of 
collaboration among providers and financers, both parties (or a government) 
can decide to introduce an organization to facilitate this. This is the case in 
Gesundes Kinzigtal, but does not always work. Some decades ago, all Dutch 
provinces had provincial councils for public health, which had the responsibility 
to coordinate all health and care related activities in the region. Due to the 
introduction of managed competition these councils were abolished, but they 
were also not functioning well. However, the call for more integrated care 
provision calls for a renewed governance balance between regional cooperation, 
legislation as well as disincentives for market concentration.
In the Dutch context, it seems necessary that insurers and municipalities come 
to common regional agreements. Regions without a clear health insurance market 
leader may be problematic. Insurers should assign responsibilities for these 
regions, which requires sufficient administrative capacity among insurers. 
This may be an issue, as insurance companies seem to compete between each 
other by reducing their own overhead costs, which have been reduced from 
4.6% in 2006 to 2.9% in 2016 (CBS, 2018). We therefore argue for more functional 
overheads among insurers and municipalities, to ensure that there is sufficient 




Financing population health management with a shared savings structure 
carries the risk of underproduction and can thus reduce access to care, 
when governance is not backed by clear agreements about quality of care and 
health outcomes. In order to prevent this, a thorough and user-friendly data 
infrastructure is required for risk stratification and performance monitoring of 
financers. Experimenting with shared savings can help because the need for 
adequate data will grow as providers and financers share more financial 
responsibility.
The politics of prevention
This chapter first described the relationship between better health outcomes 
due to prevention and sustainability of health financing. Following this, we then 
described the governance issues. This next section highlights the political 
context of prevention.
Political beliefs
Often heard arguments against prevention in the form of health promotion are 
that it impairs freedom of choice, and that it is not up to a government to involve 
itself in the health behaviour of individuals. Political organizations or parties 
with a liberal ideology therefore seem especially reluctant towards prevention.
Mackenbach & McKee (2015) have investigated this quantitatively, and found 
that measures of quality of democracy and government had many positive 
associations with process and outcome indicators of health policy, while 
measures of distribution of power and political representation had few. This 
suggests that prevention policy is not solely a left-wing issue, but related more 
to good governance.
Framing
Political ideologies do of course play a role. Research that we conducted on the 
policy enablers and disablers of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) and 
unhealthy foods suggests that the role of political ideologies is dynamic 
(Hagenaars, Jeurissen & Klazinga, 2017). A remarkable amount of conservative/
liberal governments adopted taxes on these, but voiced different policy 
rationales. Some defended the tax by focussing on health (for example, the 
United Kingdom), while others pointed to the purpose of revenue (for example, 
wages for healthcare professionals in Hungary). However, in some instances it 
was simply announced as a regular tax (for example, in France in 2012).
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Prevention requires policy framing in a way that matches the social norm 
regarding the problem at hand. This social norm is influenced by many factors: 
the burden of disease being just one of them. The case of the United Kingdom 
SSB tax is revealing. The UK has among the highest obesity rates in Europe, but 
until 2016 the conservative-liberal government did not consider a tax regarding 
this because it was believed that this would deteriorate living standards and 
freedom of choice. However, celebrity chef Jamie Oliver advocated for the tax 
as “a matter of parental responsibility for children’s health”. Partly because of 
this policy entrepreneur, popular support for the tax increased, which eventually 
led to its adoption by the same government that was reluctant to implement it 
before (Hagenaars, Jeurissen & Klazinga, 2017).
Social norms regarding healthy behaviour
Health behaviour trends show a mixed picture. Smoking prevalence rates are 
declining in western countries, but trends in alcohol consumption are unclear. 
Obesity seems to be on the rise, and public health experts are increasingly 
identifying ‘new’ risk factors such as stress and sleep disorders. The health 
literacy of most people on the other hand is improving. At the same time, 
however, health inequalities persist. These differences may increase regarding 
smoking and obesity when looking at the Dutch context (RIVM, 2018a), which 
may pose a threat to the solidarity for collective health expenditure, given the 
fact that there is little solidarity for health expenses caused by unhealthy 
lifestyles.
Prevention has also received more political attention in western countries. 
The Netherlands National Health Care Institute, for instance, advocated that 
healthcare professionals should become more competent in delivering 
‘pre-care’ (ZiNL, 2015), and the concept of ‘positive health’ also emphasizes the 
importance of prevention. It is therefore no surprise that the Dutch government 
at the point of writing drafted and adopted a ‘prevention agreement’ after 
negotiations with stakeholders in 2018 (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 
2018).
We consider this a positive development, but in the light of fiscal sustainability 
we would like to point out a hidden threat of prevention. As described in this 
chapter, many determinants of health are not related to healthcare. If these 
social and environmental factors are not taken into account properly, a medical 
focus on prevention could drive unwanted medicalization of problems that are 
fundamentally not medical. This could lead to more supply-driven demand for 
secondary and tertiary prevention and possibly more unnecessary care, instead 




Prevention can be a useful strategy for fiscally sustainable healthcare. It can 
potentially reduce healthcare costs in the short to medium term, but long-term 
effects, however, remain uncertain. Perhaps more important is the fact that 
health is good for wealth. Also, an increase in the burden of diseases caused by 
unhealthy lifestyles could lead to reduced solidarity regarding the collective 
financing of healthcare. But prevention policy is not that easy. There are many 
types of prevention, and for an integrated approach many parties have to be 
involved. Problem ownership is often unclear when it comes to addressing the 
health impact of policies outside of the healthcare realm. This is also the case 
regarding efforts to improve the integration of preventive and curative care, 
where financial incentives are often absent. On the basis of this chapter’s 
analyses, we come to the following policy recommendations:
• Health policy makers should use the increased public and political attention 
on prevention, to raise awareness of the health impact of policies related to 
taxation, social protection, work, housing, education, environment and 
agriculture. Societal cost-benefit analyses can help to convince policymakers 
outside the realm of healthcare.
• Occupational health, in particular, deserves more attention. This is due to the 
fact that more people with chronic illnesses will form part of the labour force, 
as an effect of population ageing, rising pension ages and the increase in 
chronicity. A better knowledge infrastructure regarding this is essential.
• Population health management is a possible solution, to integrate preventative 
and curative care in a better way. Monitoring explicit policy aims may help 
raise common awareness among payers and providers alike.
• An adequate data infrastructure to share benchmarking data on different 
levels is a prerequisite for population health management. Experimenting 
with shared savings can help, because the need for useful data will grow as 
providers and financers share more financial responsibility.
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The taxation of unhealthy energy-dense 
foods (EDFs) and sugar-sweetened beverages 
(SSBs): An overview of patterns observed 
in the policy content and policy context of 
13 case studies








Taxation of energy-dense foods (EDFs) and sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) 
is increasingly of interest as a novel public health and fiscal policy instrument. 
However academic interest in policy determinants has remained limited. We 
address this paucity by comparing the policy content and policy context of 
EDF/SSB taxes witnessed in 13 case studies, of which we assume the tax is 
sufficiently high to induce behavioural change.
The observational and non-randomized studies published on our case studies 
seem to indicate that the EDF/SSB taxes under investigation generally had the 
desired effects on prices and consumption of targeted products. The revenue 
collection of EDF/SSB taxes is minimal yet significant. Administrative practicalities 
in tax levying are important, possibly explaining why a drift towards solely 
taxing SSBs can be noted, as these can be demarcated more easily, with levies 
seemingly increasing in more recent case studies.
Despite the growing body of evidence suggesting that EDF/SSB taxes have the 
potential to improve health, fiscal needs more often seem to lay their policy 
foundation rather than public health advocacy. A remarkable amount of 
conservative/liberal governments have adopted these taxes, although in many 
cases revenues are earmarked for benefits compensating regressive income 
effects. Governments voice diverse policy rationales, ranging from explicitly 




POLICY CONTENT & CONTEXT OF JUNK FOOD TAXES
Introduction
Over the past few years there has been significant growth in political, public 
and academic interest in the taxation of energy-dense foods (EDF) and sug-
ar-sweetened beverages (SSB). A growing body of evidence suggests that such 
fiscal measures have the potential to improve population health [1], [2], [3], [4]. 
Taxation has already been proven effective convincingly for tobacco and 
alcohol [5]. The additional revenues of these taxes may further increase their 
attractiveness for policymakers. Not only can this be useful in times of 
budgetary deficiencies, it can also broaden the financing model of health 
systems. Currently most countries are highly reliant on income taxes, which is 
a barrier for employability because increasing the marginal tax rate means 
increasing personnel costs. The reuse of taxes on unhealthy commodities in 
the fiscal domain of health can contribute to decreasing income tax dependency [6].
More important is that a tax on EDFs and SSBs can correct for the negative 
externalities associated to excess consumption of these products, by increasing 
their prices to their true social costs. It is probable that a case for such a Pigovian 
tax can be made given the relatively low prices of most EDFs and SSBs and their 
impact on health and associated medical costs, but it should be noted that 
quantification of all externalities is still in its infancy. The case for SSBs may be 
stronger since their inflation-adjusted price has gone down over the past 
decades whereas prices of fruits and vegetables have gone up [7], [8].
Profound policy barriers exist for the uptake of EDF and SSB taxation. Apart 
from the fact that consumption taxation is regressive [5], which can cause 
political debate on its own, food taxes also lend themselves to considerable 
ethical scrutiny, as they touch the base of the debate where protection of the 
public becomes restriction of personal freedom [9]. Public support for EDF/SSB 
taxes therefore depends on the normative discussion whether a government 
should only use arguments of health promotion(promoting healthy behaviour) 
or also of health protection (protecting the population against health dangers) 
to legitimize the prevention of obesity and diseases related to excess 
consumption of EDFs/SSBs. In addition, normative preferences also influence 
whether people find the nature of the intervention appropriate. Since EDF/SSB 
taxes are a form of collective prevention, they may be found inappropriate as 
they also affect people who are not at risk for developing obesity or related 
diseases. Furthermore, these taxes interfere with the interests of the food and 
soda industry, who exert strong lobby efforts for policies in favour of their 
interests and are accused to ‘puzzle’ lay people’s nutritional literacy [10]. The
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food industry contributes to framing obesity as merely a matter of personal 
responsibility in addition to portraying a lack of physical activity as the primary 
cause; hence framing strategies that aim to decrease public acceptance for 
policy measures such as EDF/SSB taxes by stating they infringe on personal 
freedom and choice [10], [11]. Another complication concerns the difficulty to 
robustly identify the health effects of EDF/SSB taxes. There exist many 
confounding factors such as substitution to other foods, and external reasons 
for price fluctuation and dietary behaviour.
Furthermore, health effects may only be visible after several years or even 
decades. Available evidence comes mainly from modelling studies which do 
take substitution effects into account, or observational studies of separate 
episodes of the causal chain linking an EDF/SSB tax to health outcomes [12]. Put 
simple, a case for such taxes can be made as the available evidence does point 
to effectiveness, but this evidence is less clear-cut as compared to tobacco and 
alcohol where addiction components are publicly accepted. A final complexity 
is that demand for most foods is not very elastic, which means that industry 
and retailers can shift relatively large parts of price increases onto consumers 
without enduring large consumption decreases. A meta-analyses conducted 
by Green, Cornelsen [13] for instance ranges the elasticity of foods in high- 
income countries from −0,36 to −0,61, with low- and middle income countries 
having higher price elasticity. Consumers seem more responsive to SSBs, with 
price elasticity estimates of soft drinks in the USA for instance ranging between 
−0,79 [14] and −0,86 [15]. Because of relatively inelastic demand experts argue 
that price increases should be tangible in order to generate meaningful 
behavioural effects. A sales tax of 20% or an excise of 1 cent per ounce for SSBs 
are mentioned [16]. However, in the world of policy, compromises must be 
made. Such high levies and price increases may prove unrealistic in many 
policy settings, as policymaking not only develops on the basis of puzzling 
(that is using evidence-based strategies) but also on powering (that is 
influencing people, in particular to control resources) [17].
Study objectives
Taxation of unhealthy EDFs and SSBs has potential both as a public health tool 
but also in the light of health systems’ financial sustainability. Yet profound 
barriers disable its uptake. In the academic literature, attention has mostly been 
focussed on whether EDF/SSB taxes work, with little or no attention being paid 
to the policy determinants. We address this paucity of research by providing 
an overview of patterns observed in the policy content and policy context of 
13 case studies. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the 
policy comparatively from such a wide perspective.
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Methods
In order to present an overview of patterns observed in the policy content and 
policy context of EDF/SSB taxes on the basis of systematically collected data, we 
first identified case studies of which we assume the tax has potential to 
meaningfully impact dietary behaviour using a purposeful sampling strategy. 
We therefore only included cases where the level of taxation is relatively high. 
We then identified a number of possible policy determinants on the basis of the 
policy analysis models of Walt and Gilson [18] and Leichter [19], key publications 
related to EDF/SSB taxation, and research group discussions. Subsequently 
these variables were filled for all cases using scientific literature, government 
publications where applicable, and grey literature where necessary. We finally 
consulted experts on individual case studies to validate our information.
Inclusion rationale
In many countries value added taxes or fiscal import duties apply to standard 
foods and drinks, but only in few countries unhealthy foods encounter 
additional taxation. Where unhealthy foods are targeted specifically, levies are 
often too low to expect meaningful dietary effects since EDFs are relatively 
price inelastic [1]. In this study we include a number of cases of which we 
assume that the fiscal policy under investigation has sufficient potential to 
improve diets, by only including cases that are widely recognized internation-
ally for having tax levies that may according to economic theory be high 
enough to meaningfully impact dietary behaviour. A World Health Organisation 
(WHO) European Region paper [20] on the use of price policies to promote 
healthy diets served as a starting point for our purposeful sampling. It identifies 
four European cases where the WHO assumes the tax has the specific objective 
to influence diet, and where the tax is high enough to acknowledge the potential 
for dietary effects even though the primary purpose is raising revenue. These 
are the tax on saturated fats in Denmark, the tax on sweets, ice cream and soft 
drinks in Finland, the public health product tax in Hungary, and the tax on 
sugar- and artificially sweetened beverages in France. Other widely recognized 
cases concern the soft drink taxes levied in four Pacific countries (Fiji, Samoa, 
Nauru, French Polynesia) [21], the SSB tax of Berkeley, California [22], and the 
tax on sodas and snacks in Mexico [23]. In addition, the recently announced 
SSB tax in the UK (due for implementation in 2018) is included as the proposed 
levy is relatively high and the policy is subject to intense public and political 
scrutiny [24]. The same goes for the tax on sugar- and artificially sweetened 
beverages of Philadelphia (implemented in 2017) [25]. We finally included the 
South African SSB tax (due for implementation in 2017) because it was 
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announced explicitly as an instrument to tackle South Africa’s obesity crisis 
while the proposed levy is relatively high [26], [27]. In total 13 case studies were 
included.
Conceptual framework: exploring the policy determinants of 
EDF/SSB taxes
We use elements of Walt and Gilson’s [18] health policy analysis triangle as a 
framework to categorize policy elements. The health policy triangle is a highly 
simplified representation of policy reality, where a policy’s content, context and 
process interact with each other as well as actors involved. We primarily focus 
on content and context variables. A systematic, comprehensive description of 
policy processes and the role of actors involved requires thorough investigation 
of individual cases and empirical data collection, which is outside the scope of 
this comparative analysis. Fig. 1 emphasizes how we use this model.
We classify context and content elements of EDF/SSB taxes according to the 
categorization presented in Table 1. Our choice of variables was guided on the 
basis of key publications including references [5], [8], [9], [10], [11], [16], [20], [21], 
[22], [23], [28], [29], [30], as well as research group discussions. To our knowledge 
no such framework for comparison hitherto exists. Our approach should 
therefore be seen as a first attempt to systematically explore the policy 
determinants of EDF/SSB taxes.
Figure 1.  Health Policy Analysis Triangle, adapted from original of Walt and Gilson [18]. 
Full circles refer to elements of the policy cases that we analysed 
systematically; dashed circles refer to elements of the policy cases of which 









POLICY CONTENT & CONTEXT OF JUNK FOOD TAXES
Elements describing the policy content (defined here as the substance of a 
policy which details its constituent parts) constitute the policies’ general and 
technical characteristics, and the policy impact. Under general characteristics 
we describe 1) targeted commodities, 2) current status, and 3) the government’s 
stated rationale at the point of introduction. Under technical characteristics we 
1) describe tax rates and mechanisms, and 2) whether revenues are earmarked. 
Under impact we describe 1) the (expected) revenue collected by the tax and 














Impact (Expected) revenue, absolute & as a share of total tax 
revenue
Price pass-through to consumers
Consumption change of targeted commodity




Situational Relevance to governmental fiscal priorities
Prevailing way of framing the problem
Composition of executive government implementing 
the policy
Structural Obesity among adults & overweight among children
Level of socioeconomic inequality (GINI-coefficient)
Share of goods and services taxation, as part of total tax 
revenue
Cultural Room for lobbyists to influence policy (using the 
corruption perception index of Transparency 
International [31])
Public support for healthy lifestyle promotion policy 
(using the Tobacco and Alcohol control scales [32], [33])
International/ 
exogenous
Possibility of precedent effects
Possibility of avoiding tax by cross-border shopping
Influence of trade agreements
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how this compares to total tax revenue, 2) price pass-through to consumers 
and 3) consumption change of the targeted commodities, 4) substitution effects 
and 5) effects on health outcomes.
We used the categorization method of Leichter [19] for context variables (defined 
here as systemic factors that may have an effect on the eventual policy content), 
which identifies situational, structural, cultural and exogenous factors. 
Situational factors encompass the relevance of the tax in the light of the broader 
fiscal situation. This is important because taxation policy is mostly dealt with in 
Ministries of Finance, where fiscal effects are central on the agenda, not 
necessarily public health [6], [21]. The prevailing way of framing the issue is 
another vital situational element, because framing strategies can influence 
popular support in lifestyle-related policies [28]. Under this variable we describe 
elements of the policy process, however we do not assume this makes our 
process analysis complete. The final situational factor concerns the composition 
of the government adopting the policy.
Under structural factors we include obesity rates, to analyse the severity of the 
problem. We do so by comparing obesity rates for adults and children interna-
tionally and, where applicable, nationally. (Inter)national comparison is also 
used to investigate levels of socio-economic inequality. This is important 
because consumption taxes have regressive income effects, which receives 
considerable political attention. The share of goods and services taxation as 
part of total tax revenues is also included, as it indicates taxation traditions. 
Cultural factors constitute the room for lobbyists to influence policy, and 
general public support for health promotion policies. With these variables we 
address population perception. Under exogenous or international variables we 
explore the chance whether cases may have set a precedent. We assume that a 
case is most likely to do so if it receives considerable political, public and media 
attention nationally and globally, while in such cases industry will likely deploy 
strong efforts to block the policy [11]. The ease of buying the taxed product 
across the border is explored as well, because this influences the effectiveness 
of an EDF/SSB tax. Finally, the role of international trade agreements promoting 
free trade is analysed as this can influence policy content [21], [31], [32].
Data collection methodology
The identified variables are presented in Table 1. For policy content, government 
documents (using mostly budget announcements) form the primary sources 
of information for both general and technical characteristics as well as the 
revenue collection variable of policy impact. OECD revenue statistics [33] 
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(excluding the Pacific cases, Berkeley and Philadelphia) describe the share of 
the tax in total government revenues. When a language barrier did not allow us 
to look into government documents, scientific and sometimes grey literature 
was used.
For policy impact, excluding revenue collection, peer-reviewed studies 
evaluating real world effects on price change, consumer behaviour and health 
outcomes formed primary sources of information. If peer-reviewed studies 
were not available, we used grey literature: a report of the Banque de France 
[34], WHO [20], and casual monitoring in the Pacific countries [21].
For policy context, a number of variables allowed us to use (inter)nationally 
comparable quantitative indicators. We use WHO data [35] to compare obesity 
rates among adults for all nations included, and Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention data for the US cities of Berkeley and Philadelphia [36], [37]. For 
children’s obesity rates, we used OECD data [38] to compare nations. Levels of 
income inequality, expressed by GINI-coefficient, were compared internation-
ally using World Bank data [39], with Bloomberg data for Berkeley and 
Philadelphia [40]. OECD data allowed us to compare the actual share of goods 
and services taxation in total tax revenue [33].
We used the corruption perceptions index of Transparency International [41] as 
an indicator of the influence of lobbyists in politics, and the tobacco [42] and 
alcohol [43] control scales as indicators how far European countries’ health 
promotion policies reach [44]. For non-European cases these scales hold no 
data.
Situational and exogenous/international variables did not allow for the use of 
quantitative indicators: short elaborations were written on the basis of 
publications in scientific journals [21], [29], [31], [34], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], 
WHO reports [20], [50], two academic books [11], [22], government budget 
speeches in which the tax was announced [24], [26], [51], [52], and transcripts, 
videos, or government press releases of City Council/Parliament meetings 
during which the issue was debated [53], [54], [55]. Reports of the Banque de 
France [34], National Heart Forum [56], KPMG [57], and two newspaper article 
[58], [59] were used to fill information gaps for France, South Africa, and 
Philadelphia.
Data sources, indicators used, and mapping techniques are described in further 




Given that interpretation of qualitative data can be prone to researcher 
interpretation bias, we consulted experts on individual case studies. This served 
as a factual check of the accuracy and completeness of our information. Experts 
were found for Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary and the United Kingdom 
using the OECD network of health committee delegates. The health committee 
implements OECD’s work on health and consists of policymakers of national 
ministries of health. The lead author of the study of Thow, Quested [21] took up 
this role for the Pacific cases, and those of the studies of Falbe, Thompson [60] 
and Cawley and Frisvold [61] for Berkeley. For Philadelphia local policymakers 
were consulted, and for South Africa we used the open round of the government 
for receiving commentary on its SSB tax. We did not succeed in consulting an 
expert for Mexico. A list of consulted experts can be found in Appendix 3 in 
supplementary material.
Results
The complete results are presented in appendices 1 and 2 in supplementary 
material. We here point out common patterns observed in the policy content 
and policy context of EDF/SSB taxes by describing the differences and 
similarities witnessed in the 13 case studies.
Policy content
Of all unhealthy foods, the taxation of SSBs seems most appropriate and realistic 
from a policymaking perspective, as evidenced by a drift of the most recent 
cases towards solely taxing SSBs. All taxes now target SSBs, with the exception 
of Denmark’s fat tax that has only been in place for one year. In Finland, 
Hungary, Nauru, French Polynesia, and Mexico also specific foods such as 
sweets, ice cream, snacks, condiments and confectionery were taxed, with 
Hungary having the widest scope of products. Finland has slimmed down its 
scope by only letting SSBs remain as from 2017. France and Philadelphia are 
peculiar cases; here artificially sweetened beverages are subject to the same tax 
as SSBs, whereas original policy proposals only included SSBs.
At the point of writing, most taxes were very recently introduced, while they 
were about to be introduced in the UK (2018) and South Africa (2017). Only 
Finland has had a very long tradition of taxing unhealthy foods, with a first 
‘sweets tax’ in 1926. The Pacific cases also have a somewhat longer food tax 
history, with Samoa implementing its first soft drinks tax in 1984 while the 
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others were implemented after 2002. All other cases implemented their taxes 
after 2011; taxing EDF/SSBs can be seen as a relatively new policy instrument.
In some cases, changes were applied after implementation. Denmark’s fat tax 
was quickly abolished, whereas in Finland additional foods were added to the 
scope of the tax from 1926 to 2000, before sweets and ice cream were removed, 
added back, and removed again in 2000, 2010 and 2017 respectively.
Official stated rationales of governments differ, with many but not all explicitly 
referring to it as a health promotion measure. The governments of Denmark, 
Hungary, Nauru, French Polynesia, Berkeley, Mexico, the UK, and South Africa 
officially announced the policy as a health promotion measure. On the other 
hand, the governments of Finland, France, Fiji, Samoa and Philadelphia more 
prominently or solely mention revenue raising as the central aim.
Of all tax mechanisms used, most often there is an excise duty that targets a 
specific product, with inclusion based on composition. Only in Denmark the 
nutrient itself (saturated fats) was targeted, which seems to have contributed to 
its abolishment due to administrative complexities. In the other cases, a specific 
tax rate applies to −for instance- SSBs exceeding a certain amount of sugar per 
litre, or regardless of how much sugar they contain. Crucial seems to be the 
accurate demarcation of product categories and practicability in administering 
tax levying.
The level of taxation is difficult to compare because currencies, the level of 
competition, and purchasing powers differ. Tax levels should therefore ideally 
be adjusted for purchasing power, but this was outside the scope of our study. 
The products subject to taxation themselves differ as well, as does their base 
line tax rate. Still, we can say that some cases exert a stronger tax pressure than 
others. Some of the Pacific cases, as well as Berkeley and especially Philadelphia 
with their SSB taxes of $0.01 and $0.015 per ounce respectively bear relatively 
high tax levels. France has a relatively low tax level with a rate of €0.11 per 1.5 l.
It is interesting that some recent cases (Berkeley, Philadelphia, UK, and South 
Africa) portray relatively high levies. A momentum may have been set for SSB 
taxes encouraging policymakers to use relatively high levies as they draw upon 
the experience of earlier attempts.
Cases also differ when it comes to the earmarking of the raised revenues. Taxes 
are not earmarked in Denmark, Finland, Fiji, Samoa, Nauru, Berkeley, South 
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Africa, and Mexico; French Polynesia, Philadelphia, and the UK do specifically 
earmark revenues for community, health promotion or educational 
programmes; Hungary and France earmark part of the revenues for healthcare. 
It should be noted that a fine line exists with implicitly earmarking revenues. 
Mexico stipulates that it plans to use SSB/EDF revenues for potable water in 
public schools in low income areas and South Africa plans to use revenues for 
health promotion, yet both countries do not explicitly earmark. The same goes 
for Berkeley: an SSB panel of experts which makes recommendations how the 
City should fund programmes to reduce SSB consumption, was announced in 
the same Ordinance as the SSB tax. Revenues are not explicitly linked to this 
panel, because the SSB tax would then have required a supermajority in the 
referendum deciding upon its faith according to Californian tax law [62].
The revenues raised by the taxes as a share of total tax revenue constitutes less 
than 1% in all cases, except for Berkeley (4%) and Philadelphia (1.17%). Of the 
most populated countries (excluding the Pacific countries), Mexico raises most 
revenues at around 0.38% of total tax revenue. Taxation of EDFs and SSBs 
therefore probably only forms a small part of larger taxation reforms that aim to 
decrease income tax rates. Compared with public health expenses, the financial 
flows are substantial. In the case of Mexico, expected revenues of 12 billion 
pesos per year make up for around 37% of total spending on preventive care 
[63].
We found studies investigating the extent to which the EDF/SSB taxes were 
passed on to consumers through higher shelf prices for the cases of France, Fiji, 
Nauru, Mexico and Berkeley. Close to all of the tax was passed onto consumers 
in France and Mexico [34], [64]. Fiji and Nauru showed lower but still significant 
price pass-through [21]. In Berkeley one study, conducted in low income 
neighbourhoods, found similarly high price pass-through effects [65]. A study 
looking into retail outlet data of supermarkets and gasoline stations concludes 
that the tax was fully passed through [66]. However, a study which collected 
data on a wider scope of drink sizes as well as in more neighbourhoods, came 
to a lower overall pass-through estimate of 43.1% [61]. Retailers may be more 
likely to dampen the price effects of taxes by spreading costs to other products 
or by reducing margins on the targeted products if nearby retailers fall under a 
jurisdiction without such a tax, such as in the cases of Berkeley and Philadelphia.
Consumption effects were investigated in a number of cases. Evaluations of the 
Danish case show mixed results on dietary effects, with one study concluding 
that fats consumption decreased by 10–15% [67] whereas a study based on retail 
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outlet data found a 0.9% decrease [68]. Both studies used a non-experimental 
design and econometric analyses to investigate retail outlet data, making it 
difficult to robustly disentangle the tax’ impact from other reasons of price 
changes or aggregate consumption shocks. A study enduring similar 
limitations investigated the Hungarian public health product tax, and found 
that sales of included products decreased by 27%, while also observing product 
reformulation. This study also discovered desirable substitution effects: 
processed foods consumption decreased by 3.4% while it increased by 1.1% for 
unprocessed food, with poorer households being more responsive. Bíró [45] 
therefore concludes that population diet has improved as a result of the public 
health product tax. A recent WHO impact assessment shows that consumption 
of the taxed products has decreased as well in the long term, while this study 
also found that health literacy has improved following the introduction of the 
public health product tax [69]. In France, an SSB sales drop of 3.3% has been 
noted, but we found no methodological details of this finding [56]. In Mexico 
two observational studies were conducted which adjusted for macro-economic 
variables and pre-existing trends. These found that the monthly sales volume 
of taxed beverages decreased by 6.1% [70] and 5.1% [71] on average after policy 
introduction. Moreover, these reductions were considerably higher in lower 
socioeconomic groups with 9% [70] and 10.2% [71] on average. A larger effect 
was found in Berkeley. A study with a non-randomized design that examined 
pre- and posttax changes in SSB consumption in low income areas found a 21% 
decrease in Berkeley, compared to a 4% increase in the comparison cities of 
Oakland and San Francisco that did not implement an SSB tax [60]. A study with 
a similar observational design that did not solely investigate low-income areas 
concludes that the tax was passed through mostly, but not uniformly, to 
consumers. Sales of SSBs fell by 9.6%, compared to an increase in sales of 6.9% 
in comparison cities whereas sales of untaxed beverages in Berkeley rose by 
3.5% [72].
Real world evidence on the effects of the policies in terms of health outcomes 
remains scarce and therefore was not included. This relates to the fact that 
many confounding factors hinder such analyses, making the bulk of these 
studies reliant on modelling.
Thus, the available observational and non-randomized studies that evaluated 
the impact of the taxes in our 13 case studies seem to indicate that consumers 
did seem to change their behaviour: the consumption of targeted products 
decreases, and this effects seems larger among lower socioeconomic groups. 
Also of interest is the observed change in food supply, an often overseen effect 
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of EDF/SSB taxation. Less is known about substitution effects, although Bíró 
[45] hints that these may be beneficial if taxes are well designed. It remains 
difficult to pinpoint precisely the effects on health outcomes due to the scarcity 
of real world evidence.
Policy context
An enabling situational factor seems to be the fiscal need for extra revenue. In 
both Denmark and South Africa the tax formed part of a larger revision of the 
taxation system with the specific aim of expanding the scope of revenue 
sources, in an effort to decrease income taxes. Budgetary deficits also create 
fiscal need, like the recent economic crisis (Hungary), downturns in foreign 
trade (due to World War II and Finnish independence) or import tariff reductions 
following trade liberalization (Fiji and Samoa). Also in French Polynesia, 
Berkeley and Mexico extra resources were required, whereas in Philadelphia 
extra revenue was necessary for certain community and educational 
programmes held as policy priorities of the Mayor. For France and the UK no 
direct fiscal need was found, but there may have been an indirect fiscal need 
given that both countries were under pressure to reduce their budget deficit in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis.
The way in which the policies were framed differs, although similarities also 
exist. Industry consistently points to a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of 
EDF/SSB taxes and therefore seems to pressure governments to not adopt them 
in the first place, but if they pursue to refer to it as a normal taxation instrument 
instead of a health protectionmeasure. The latter occurred in France, where 
Coca-Cola threatened to suspend domestic expansion (which meant a loss of 
potential jobs) if the policy was labelled a public health policy [56].
In other cases the government forcefully described their tax as a public health 
tool while specifically naming and shaming food or soda industry as the culprit 
of the obesity/non-communicable diseases epidemic. This happened in 
Berkeley, the UK, and to some extent Mexico and South Africa. In Berkeley a 
broad coalition of community groups expressed a consistent message in their 
‘Berkeley versus BigSoda’ campaign that preceded the policy’s referendum. 
Their message referred to the ‘soda industry’s inappropriate behaviour’; parallels 
were drawn with the tobacco industry. Opponents of the tax mainly focussed 
on ‘confusing exemptions’ of the tax, and accusations that City Council only 
aimed to raise revenue, instead of using the (more effective) argumentation 
that it restricts personal freedom [11], [73]. In the UK, celebrity chef Jamie Oliver 
was in the centre of the debate as an SSB tax advocate. Oliver consistently 
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accused food industry to ‘damage children’s health’ and advocated for a tax as 
a matter of ‘parental responsibility of the government for children’s health’. UK 
government framing follows similar logic, as the tax is named the ‘soft drinks 
industry levy’ and the government mentions the tax will incentivize industry to 
reformulate their products by reducing sugar amounts. The earmarking of any 
upcoming revenues for community school programmes also follows the frame 
used by Oliver.
Several other cases use a mix of describing the tax as a public health tool as well 
as a source of revenue, with some cases specifically describing how these 
revenues enable popular policies. The tax is thus not universally described as a 
public health instrument. This may be explained because industry has strong 
lobbying capacity and the means to commence law suits [11]. However, research 
shows that exposure to strategies used by the food industry to manipulate food 
choices can generate criticism towards the food and soda industry, and hence 
support for public policy measures. Ortiz et al. [28] have for instance proven this 
by exposing people to strategies how the industry develops foods that exploit 
the biological need for energy (e.g. inclusion of salt and sugar in bread or milk), 
and uses advertisement and cognitive biases (e.g. increased portion sizes) to 
stimulate overconsumption. In the cases where the government described the 
tax specifically as a public health tool, it may have only been able to do so 
because prominent voices in the public debate emphasized these strategies of 
the food/soda industry. In cases where the government did not describe the tax 
as a public health tool, such voices were probably much less present.
The increasing trend of public-private partnerships may also explain why some 
governments did not describe the tax as a health protection measure. It remains 
unclear whether (the threat of) these taxes work constructively, or destructively 
for such partnerships.
A striking finding is that the government implementing the tax in most cases 
consists of liberal or conservative parties. In more comparable cases such as 
Denmark, Finland, France and the UK, parties with a centre/right position in 
the national political spectrum held executive power. Only Fiji, South Africa, 
Berkeley and Philadelphia had a left-wing party in power. This finding is 
notable, because the common view is that health policies in general, and 
lifestyle policies in specific, are more often urged by left-wing parties [44], [74]. 
A logical rationale from a left-wing perspective could be that an EDF/SSB tax 
urges industry to ‘behave better’. However, EDF/SSB taxes can also be explained 
with a more right-wing rationale: the individual is ‘to blame’ for societal costs 
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associated to unhealthy food choices, which supports Pigovian taxation as 
well. In addition, regressive income effects are of less a concern and lowering 
income taxes may be of transcending importance for the right.
We also observe patterns in the structural factors for our 13 cases, yet we cannot 
say these are decisive factors due to the small sample size. Obesity rates are 
higher than global average in all cases. Especially the Pacific countries, Mexico, 
Philadelphia, the UK, the US and South Africa stand out. Berkeley is peculiar as 
the obesity rate of Alameda County (in which Berkeley resides) is only 20%, 
compared to 28.9% USA average.
Given that EDF/SSB taxes are regressive, it is interesting to note that the GINI 
coefficient is relatively high in most cases (meaning that incomes are relatively 
unequal).
The same goes for reliance on excise taxes: its share in total revenue is only 
below OECD average in France and Mexico. Finance departments may have 
more experience with excise tax technicalities and the demarcation of product 
groups if governments are relatively dependent on such taxes, which can aid 
the implementation of an EDF/SSB tax.
Of cultural elements, room for lobbyists as measured by the corruption 
perceptions index does not appear to influence the policy. The tobacco and 
alcohol control scales show that the European countries with an EDF/SSB tax 
also exert relatively big health promotion efforts for tobacco and alcohol. The 
UK came out on top of the tobacco control scale; France and Finland are 
amongst the highest-ranking countries in both scales; Denmark and Hungary 
are in the middle range for both rankings. No data was collected for the 
non-European cases, but Berkeley for instance has relatively high public 
support for health promotion efforts as it is known for national leadership in 
policies such as smoking bans [11].
The precedent that may have been set by our cases differs. The Pacific countries 
represent very small markets where global media attention is limited, so industry 
opposition of large multinationals was negligible. The UK, Berkeley and Philadelphia 
were under bright global media headlights so the stakes for industry were much 
bigger. The SSB taxes have nevertheless been approved in these cases, so they 
may have set a policy precedent. Still, situational factors remain vital for the 
origination of an SSB tax. The Danish fat tax also carried with it the burden of a 
precedent since it was the first in its kind, which impeded the policy.
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The influence of cross-border trade is difficult to measure, but is likely of limited 
concern in large countries like Mexico and South Africa, and isolated countries 
such as the Pacific islands and to some extent the UK. It is more of an issue in 
cases where border crossing requires little effort, like Berkeley and Philadelphia. 
Still, it remains questionable if this is really a matter of concern since EDFs and 
especially SSBs are cheap. Buying these products is often a matter of everyday 
grocery shopping routine, which may be different in products such as cigarettes. 
Inhabitants also have to make travel expenses to shop across the border. 
Nevertheless, the cross-border argument can be important in the public debate. 
In Denmark it was part of the opposition strategy to discourage the tax by virtue 
of endangering Danish jobs [31]. This claim was not substantiated by rigorous 
empirical evidence, however [5].
Trade agreements are also important, but they do not necessarily disable EDFs/
SSBs taxes as long as products are demarcated adequately, and product inclusion 
is solely based on composition and not on its (geographic) origin. EU trade 
agreements for instance forced the Danish fat tax to also include milk and meat, 
which was not part of the original proposal because these are produced 
extensively in Denmark. In Finland EU agreements led to the abolishment of 
the sweets and ice cream tax, as Finland excluded certain domestic products. 
From these experiences and our content analysis it seems that policymakers 
run into less demarcation issues when designing an SSB tax compared to an 
EDF tax.
Discussion
Our analysis of 13 case studies on EDF/SSB tax policy content and context 
determinants has some limitations. First, it requires a systematic literature 
review to evaluate the effectiveness of EDF/SSB taxes in general. This was out of 
scope for our explorative study design that primarily focuses on identifying 
policy patterns in 13 case studies. The impact elements of our policy content 
analysis therefore are limited with respect to external validity. The number of 
observational and non-randomized studies that we included to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the EDF/SSB taxes under investigation also do not cover all 13 
cases.
A second limitation concerns the limited depth of the analyses of policy 
processes and the behaviour of stakeholders involved. For policy analysis these 
elements are vital, we focussed on generic policy processes though to enhance 
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international comparability [75]. Systematic investigation and comparison of 
policy processes including stakeholder analysis is recommended to further 
understand the issue.
A third limitation concerns the lack of an overview of other obesity policies of 
governments. This is covered to a certain extent by the variables ‘prevailing 
way of framing the problem’ and ‘healthy lifestyle promotion policy’, but it 
remains difficult to (inter)nationally compare the multitude of obesity policies 
of governments.
We nevertheless believe the current study pinpoints an interesting development 
in public health policy, first of all because the more robust observational and 
non-randomized studies that were available on our 13 case studies [34], [45], 
[60], [61], [64], [65], [68], [69], [70], [72], [76] seem to indicate that the taxation had 
the desired effects on prices and consumption of targeted products. Less is 
known about substitution effects, but the Hungary case shows that substitution 
to healthier products and product reformulation can occur as well [45].
The proper design of an EDF/SSB tax remains important. Policymakers seem 
hesitant to include a wide scope of products, possibly because of difficulties in 
defining sharp boundaries and administering tax levying. This may explain 
the recent drift towards solely taxing SSBs. Policymakers’ confidence seems to 
grow, since in the most recent cases (Berkeley, UK, Philadelphia) relatively high 
levies apply to SSBs, which in all probability makes these policies more effective 
than earlier attempts.
This suggests that SSB taxes are useful new instruments for the public health 
policy toolbox. However our context analysis shows that these policies do not 
principally envelop following public health advocacy. Fiscal needs quite often 
form their foundation instead.
The fact that fiscal needs dominate may explain one of our more striking 
findings: a conservative or liberal government implemented the EDF/SSB tax in 
most cases, contradicting the view that health taxes are a left-wing preference 
only. This view may have its origin in the question whether an EDF/SSB tax 
provides public protection or restricts personal freedom. Opponents also argue 
that they are ineffective, hurt small businesses, and cause job losses [11], [22]. All 
of these elements ‘skew’ the policy to the left. However, other rationales are also 
at play, such as closing budget loopholes. The revenues raised are often used for 
benefits that compensate for regressive income effects, either by explicitly 
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earmarking revenues for certain benefits or by doing so more implicitly. This 
may be important for possible left-wing support.
Left and right-wing political rationales can be used in specific framing 
strategies: either the industry (left) or individual (right) can be blamed for any 
negative externalities that follow unhealthy food consumption, although in 
practice governments seem hesitant to describe the behaviour of the industry 
and even more so the individual as the reason for their EDF/SSB tax.
It remains somewhat puzzling how EDF/SSB taxation relates to another trend in 
public health policy: public-private partnerships. The threat of a tax can work as 
a lever to make self-regulation work as it provides incentives for industry to 
engage in product reformulation [77]. In such scenario the instrument may be 
supportive for productive public-private partnerships. Yet in the 13 cases that 
we describe, the threat has turned into reality as the policy is already in place 
or announced, suggesting that self-regulation was considered insufficient. 
The question remains whether the instrument jeopardized public-private 
partnerships in these cases.
Conclusions
This study is in our knowledge the first attempt to investigate patterns in the 
policy content and policy context of taxing unhealthy foods and beverages, 
using a cross-country comparative methodology with a wide scope of included 
variables. We recommend scholars to enhance this methodology by adding 
the comparison of policy process and stakeholder behaviour.
Our study shows how this new policy instrument follows diverse policy 
rationales. This implies that it can be embraced by diverse ideologies. However, 
administrative practicalities remain important, which might explain why we 
note a drift towards solely taxing SSBs as these can be demarcated more easily 
compared to EDFs. Policy experiences with SSB taxes seem successful, because 
the observational and non-randomized studies that were available on our cases 
seem to indicate that the SSB tax generally had the desired effects on prices and 
consumption. This may also explain why we note an upward drift of SSB levies 
in recent cases. In SSB taxes the ‘puzzling’ phase seems to be clear, but there still 
are issues on ‘powering’. In EDF taxes both ‘powering’ and ‘puzzling’ remain 
substantial tasks for policymakers. We therefore conclude by advising 
policymakers to aim for an SSB tax initially if a window of opportunity for a 




Appendices 1, 2 and 3 can be found on: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.06.011 
(Hagenaars et al., Health Policy, 2017; 121 (8): 887-894)
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Sugar-sweetened beverage taxation in 2017: 
a commentary on the reasons behind their 
quick spread in the EU compared with the USA
Comment on “Sugar-sweetened beverage taxation: an update on the year 
that was 2017”.








In the final issue of Public Health Nutrition in 2017, Kathryn Backholer and 
colleagues provide a clear overview of the spread of taxes on sugar-sweetened 
beverages (SSB) in 2017, and a useful overview of opposing arguments and their 
counterpoints. Backholer et al. argue that much of the action was concentrated 
in the USA, but in the present commentary we point out that the recent sweep 
of SSB tax policy announcements in the EU seems much more promising. 
Policy makers in EU countries seem to learn from neighbouring countries, 
while political ideologies do not appear to stand in the way. This could have 
international spillover effects as the default tax thresholds of 5 and 8 g sugar/100 
ml, used in EU cases, provide clear incentives for the multinational soda 
industry to reduce sugar levels across the board, although it is not yet clear 
whether the tiered tax designs used in the EU are actually more effective than 
the flat rate tax designs used in the USA. Scholars may contribute to the policy 
momentum by comparing the effectiveness and feasibility of both designs in 
different policy contexts, including lower- and middle-income countries. The 
spread of SSB taxes in the USA will nevertheless most likely be limited so long 
as it remains a local policy and ‘no-go’ for the Republican Party. We explain the 
differences between the EU and USA by comparing the level of fiscal decentral-
ization, the political context and the use of framing strategies.
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In the final issue of Public Health Nutrition in 2017, Kathryn Backholer and 
colleagues provide a clear overview of the global spread of taxation on sug-
ar-sweetened beverages (SSB) for health-related reasons in 2017( 1 ), and a useful 
overview of opposing arguments and their counterpoints( 2 ). Backholer et al. 
argue that much of the SSB tax action was concentrated in the USA, because an 
SSB tax was implemented in six US cities in 2017. In the present commentary 
we point out that SSB taxes in fact spread much more quickly in the EU 
compared with the USA. Backholer et al. also argue that academics can 
accelerate the current policy momentum by robustly evaluating and widely 
disseminating the public health results of SSB taxes. It is also important to better 
understand the policy enablers of SSB taxes. Governance and the attributes of 
the political system often seem more important policy determinants for the 
acceptance of an SSB tax than the potential positive effects on public health. 
This observation helps to explain why in some settings SSB taxes are adopted 
more easily, as well as how they are shaped. Up to now, academic literature has 
been heavily skewed towards measuring the impact of SSB taxes through 
behavioural changes of the consumer instead of enabling issues such as the 
optimal tax design, the administrative and political context, and specific 
implementation strategies( 3 ). In the present commentary we use a narrative 
review to hypothesize how such factors can explain the quick spread of SSB 
taxes that currently seems underway in the EU in comparison to the USA.
EU shows multiple sugar-sweetened beverage 
tax thresholds
Governments in the EU all have a tiered tax mechanism, with taxation 
thresholds of 5 g and/or 8 g sugar per 100 ml. The UK appears to be an influential 
early adaptor. In 2017 Cataluña, Estonia, Ireland and Portugal followed its 
two-tiered ‘soda industry level’ of 18 pence for SSB with 5–8 g sugar/100 ml and 
24 pence for SSB with more than 8 g sugar/100 ml. Estonia also has a lower tax 
rate for SSB with less than 5 g sugar/100 ml. Hungary taxes only SSB with more 
than 8 g sugar/100 ml. Finland charges €0·11 per litre on beverages with less 
than 5 % sugar; beverages that fall above this threshold are charged double( 1 ,4 ). 
France introduced a flat rate of €7.16 per 100 litres for all sugar- and artificially 
sweetened beverages in 2012, but announced a tiered tax in its 2018 budget. 
Beverages with less than 5 g sugar/100 ml are not charged, drinks with 5–8 g 
sugar/100 ml incur the same rate as before, beverages with 8–10 g sugar/100 ml 
will be charged double, and triple when sugar content exceeds 10 g/100 ml( 5 ). 
So France also changed its tax mechanism to follow the UK model.
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Differentiation of tax thresholds on the basis of sugar levels does not occur in 
the USA. The may be because such approaches are more complex to administer, 
which can pose a bigger problem on the level of local government. Berkeley 
was the first US city that adopted a flat rate of $0·01 per ounce (i.e. US fluid 
ounces; 1 US fl. oz = 29·75 ml) for the distribution of SSB in 2015. Neighbouring 
cities San Francisco, Oakland, and Albany imitated the Berkeley experience, as 
did Cook County although the latter has already been abolished. Boulder 
charges $US 0·02 and Seattle charges $US 0·0175 per ounce. Philadelphia 
charges $US 0·015 per ounce also on artificially sweetened beverages.
A clear preference for tiered or flat rate tax designs does not appear to exist 
outside the EU or USA. For instance, a flat rate is used by governments in 
Barbados, Dominica, Mexico, several islands in the Pacific, the Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while a tiered design is used in 
Brunei (threshold of 6 g sugar/100 ml), Chile (threshold of 6·25 g sugar/100 ml) 
and Thailand (thresholds of 6 and 10 g sugar/100 ml)( 1 , 4 , 6 – 8 ). Interestingly, 
the governments of South Africa and Sri Lanka deploy a mechanism where the 
tariff increases with every gram of sugar per 100 ml. Drinks with less than 4 g 
sugar/100 ml are exempted in South Africa; in Sri Lanka all SSB are targeted( 9 , 10 ).
The evidence base does not allow us to draw conclusions on the preferred tax 
design. Flat rate taxes may be easiest to administer and are therefore more 
realistic for governments with limited administrative capacity. They pose the 
incentive to completely remove sugar from beverages, but this may be less 
feasible for certain SSB than reducing sugar content which is stimulated by 
tiered designs. Recent evidence from the UK shows that over 50 % of 
manufacturers reduced the sugar content of beverages in the two years 
between tax announcement and implementation( 11 ). A downside is that tiered 
taxes project the idea that some sugar is fine, especially when drinks that fall 
below a certain sugar level are exempted from taxation (as in the UK). In that 
respect the continuous scale used in Sri Lanka poses the strongest and fairest 
incentive for reformulation, but this design may be most difficult to administer.
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EU shows faster diffusion of sugar-sweetened 
beverage taxes
SSB taxes have thus far been enacted only locally in the USA. Attempts on the 
state and federal level all failed( 12 ). Democratic Party dominance is strongly 
associated with SSB tax uptake, all attempts in Republican jurisdictions thus far 
have failed( 13 ). In contrast, SSB taxes in the EU are adopted by parties all across 
the political spectrum: from the Conservative Party in the UK, to the centre-right 
coalition government in Finland, la Republique en Marche in France and a 
centre-left coalition government in Estonia, up to a Socialist Party minority 
cabinet in Portugal.
US regions with higher obesity prevalence rates are generally associated with 
higher levels of support for the Republican Party( 14 ), thus suggesting the US 
spread of local SSB taxes may not reach those jurisdictions with the highest 
obesity rates. Furthermore, only about 5 million Americans out of a total 327·4 
million lived in jurisdictions with active soda taxes as per 6 April 2018( 15 ). This 
compares with approximately 170 million people in the EU out of a total 511·5 
million( 16 ), with SSB taxes implemented also in countries with relatively high 
obesity rates (Finland, UK, Hungary, Ireland).
So while the USA has some early adaptors, an early majority is beginning to form 
in the EU. One can therefore conclude that at this point in time SSB taxes not 
only spread much more rapidly, but also more effectively in the EU than in the 
USA. This seems mainly to relate to differences in fiscal decentralization, 
politics and framing strategies.
Fiscal decentralization in the USA
The high level of fiscal decentralization in the USA may be a reason why SSB 
taxes do not spread as quickly as in the EU. Table 1 presents figures from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s tax autonomy 
database( 17 ) and includes solely those countries where a share of total 
sub-central government (SCG) tax revenue falls under the highest category of 
tax autonomy. It points out the relatively high level of fiscal decentralization of 
the USA compared with EU countries, with the exception of Spain. Indeed, SSB 
taxes are adopted by SCG precisely in the USA and Spain (Cataluña).
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Table 1   Taxation power of sub-central governments (SCG) in the EU  
and USA. Only the highest level of tax autonomy (category A1)  
is included; countries without SCG taxation with such  
an autonomy level were excluded. Adapted from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development( 17 )
SCG tax revenue, as % 
of total tax revenue
Full discretion on rates and reliefs, 
as % of total tax revenue of the 
SCG
Austria 4.6  
Länder 1.6 33.4
Local 3.1 9.7







Italy 16.5  
Regions 10.6
Local 5.9 28.1
Luxembourg 3.3  
Local 3.3 6.3
Slovak Republic 2.7  
Local 2.7 4.0
Slovenia 10.6  
Local 10.6 15.0






* Local government in the USA has a wide variety of taxing powers
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The USA has a tradition of levying consumption taxes at the SCG level. It 
employs a retail sales tax instead of a value-added tax (VAT) as the principal 
consumption tax, which is imposed at the state and local government level. EU 
countries all deploy VAT nationally. Excises are levied in the USA by the federal 
government but many state and local governments levy excises on top of the 
federal tax. Excise can be levied only once in the EU, because the movement of 
excisable products is subject to a duty-suspension arrangement until products 
are released for free circulation under EU single market policy( 18 ).
EU single market policy has previously impeded the development of other 
taxes on unhealthy foods. The initial exclusion of meat in the Danish fat tax 
was judged as illegal state aid by the EU Commission and the threat of an EU 
lawsuit was a deciding reason why it was repealed only one year after 
implementation( 19 ). The Finnish Government experienced something similar 
when its tax on sweets and ice cream was abolished on 1 January 2017, after the 
EU Commission judged that it discriminated between similar products. SSB tax 
policies did not experience such issues( 4 ). In fact, EU single market policy may 
have even set a ‘soft governance’ framework for how to shape SSB taxes, as 
evidenced by the congruent use of taxation thresholds of 5 and/or 8 g sugar/100 
ml in EU cases.
The reverse may be true in the USA, where higher levels of government can 
restrict or eliminate the policy activity of lower levels of government through 
preemption. Federal preemption of local and state SSB taxation seems unlikely, 
because this may occur only when SCG taxes reduce federal benefits or when 
they interfere with interstate commerce. But SSB consumption does not affect 
any federal programme and SSB excise taxes are administered in the state 
where they are actually sold( 20). State preemption of local SSB taxes seems more 
likely, because local SSB taxes often affect the state budget as states mostly 
charge a general retail sales tax. In other public health areas state preemption 
has counteracted local policy action as well (e.g. food nutrition information), 
making it a significant threat to SSB taxes, also because industry lobbyism is 
more permanent at the state level( 21 ). State coercion is unlikely when SSB taxes 
are approved through referenda, as it poses a democratic calibration that higher 
governments likely will not overrule. Adopting local excise taxes through ballot 
issues is a formal requirement under state law in ten states including California, 
which probably makes the SSB tax policies in these states (Albany, Berkeley, 
Oakland, San Francisco, Boulder) more robust than policies that did not require 
ballot approval (Philadelphia, Cook County and Seattle)( 13 , 22 ). The California 
Governor nevertheless recently adopted a measure that bans new local SSB 
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taxes for the next 12 years, making California the first state that coerces local 
governments not to implement SSB taxes. The measure does not abolish local 
SSB taxes that are already in place. It was apparently adopted in exchange for 
the soda industry to withdraw a ballot measure that would have raised the voter 
threshold to approve local sales tax increases for any product, from a majority to 
a supermajority( 23 ).
Political environment and framing strategies
Governments with diverse ideological backgrounds adopt SSB taxes in the EU, 
but in the USA they have been adopted solely in cities where the Democratic 
Party dominates. A reasonable explanation might be that the USA knows a 
political system with two dominant political parties with very different 
ideological backgrounds, whereas governments in the EU often have a much 
more fragmented political system with more room for coexisting policy frames. 
This is exemplified by the fact that all US cities where an SSB tax was proposed 
knew fierce campaigns, whereas many governments within the EU simply 
announced the tax in their yearly budgets. Attempts in the USA without external 
aid for pro-tax campaigns therefore seem unviable. Local US SSB taxes appear 
to require one dominant policy frame. In all successful ballot issues public 
health effects dominated the debate, and in all successful cases with council 
voting there was a dominant focus on specific benefits or programmes that 
could be financed with the extra revenue (e.g. pre-kindergarten in Philadelphia)
( 13 , 24 ). On the contrary, proponents in the EU mostly employed all arguments 
in favour of SSB taxes: public health effects, extra revenue for the public health 
system or cost savings in health care, and incentives for the soda industry to 
decrease sugar levels. The latter argument is not often used in the USA, which 
makes sense as local taxes pose smaller incentives for multinational soda 
companies to decrease sugar levels.
Conclusion
The recent sweep of SSB tax policy announcements in the EU is promising and 
may continue, because policy makers seem to learn from neighbouring 
countries while political ideologies do not appear to stand in the way. On the 
contrary, in the USA the spread of SSB taxes will most likely be limited as long 
as it remains a local policy and ‘no-go’ for the Republican Party. This is 
disappointing from a public health perspective, but if SSB taxes keep spreading 
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as they do in the EU, this could have international spillover effects for the 
multinational soda industry to reduce sugar levels across the board. Scholars 
may contribute to the policy momentum by continuing to compare the public 
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Six lessons from introducing sweetened 
beverage taxes in Berkeley, Cook County, 
and Philadelphia: A case study comparison 
in agenda setting and decision making









Sweetened beverage (SB) taxes have recently been introduced to prevent obesity 
by several governments, but limited information on related policy adoption 
processes hampers further diffusion. We investigated the agenda-setting and 
decision-making phases of SB tax reforms in Berkeley and Philadelphia (where 
it was successfully adopted), and Cook County (where it was repealed). 
A web-based survey, semi structured stakeholder interviews, and a local media 
coverage analysis were used to collect information. Findings were structured 
and analyzed using the health policy triangle of Buse, Mays and Walt. Six 
general lessons emerged. First, the policy was coupled to existing high-agenda 
items (e.g., financing pre-kindergarten in Philadelphia). Second, policy framing 
had to align prevailing political sentiments, as expressed in media (e.g., ‘Berkeley 
vs. Big Soda’ echoed skepticism of corporate influence in politics). Third, 
existing tax policies and political decision-making rules were important 
(e.g., confusion how the SB tax related to state and federal taxes fueled Cook 
County opposition). Fourth, the tax structure required technical and political 
considerations during policy formulation (e.g., artificially-sweetened beverages 
were included in Philadelphia to counteract arguments that the tax was 
regressive). Fifth, it was important to build an advocacy coalition upfront (e.g., 
the Berkeley coalition was constructed prior to announcing the attempt). Sixth, 
successful advocacy coalitions were locally grounded and influenced local 
media (e.g., the Cook County opposition engaged local retailers).
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Introduction
The evidence base for sweetened beverages (SB) taxes as a cost-effective public 
health policy has accumulated over the last years. A recent meta-analysis of 
real-world effect studies concludes that a 10 % SB tax significantly reduces sales, 
purchases, and intake of SB taxes by about 10 % [1]. Simulation studies suggest 
that SB taxes may reduce the disease burden and healthcare expenditure 
caused by tooth decay and obesity-associated diseases [2,3].
It is therefore a promising development that several governments have adopted 
SB taxes in recent years. About 170 million consumers paid SB taxes in the 
European Union in 2018. In the US, SB tax policy diffusion accelerated on the 
local level in 2016 and 2017, but it has attenuated since 2018 with established 
policies in jurisdictions representing a total of about five million people. Along 
the European Union and US, an SB tax has been introduced in Brunei, Chile, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United 
Arab Emirates, and several islands in the Caribbean and Pacific [4].
That leaves many governments that still do without SB taxes. The spread of SB 
taxes can be accelerated if their policy enablers and disablers are better 
understood. These do not solely consist of elements related to tax design and 
evidence on public health impact, but also relate to the broader policy context 
and factors shaping the policy process including stakeholder behavior. This 
type of policy analysis may be particularly important because SB taxes target a 
specific industry with vast commercial interests [5].
Comparative case studies on the adoption of SB tax policies in different health 
system settings are among the few research designs that can inform such 
policy analyses [6]. Academic literature has so far primarily focused on the 
potential health impacts of SB taxes. Wright et al. [7] conducted a review to 
investigate what type of research has been published on innovative health 
taxes, and found that fifty-one studies, executed between 1990–2016, investigated 
behavior change. In contrast, we could find only two peer-reviewed studies 
that conducted a policy analysis of the adoption of SB taxes. One study 
compared the failed attempt to introduce an SB tax in New York City (NYC) to 
other obesity control measures [8], the other compared the policy process of SB 
taxes on four Pacific islands [9].
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Since the review of Wright et al. [7] additional policy analyses have been 
published [[10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]]. A study on the SB tax policy process in 
Colorado and Kansas [13] was performed. Purtle et al. [11] and Kane and Malik 
15] examined the policy process of the Philadelphia SB tax. Jou et al. [14] focused 
on strategic messaging in unsuccessful local US SB tax attempts. Hagenaars et 
al. [10] compared the policy context and content of 13 cases but did not 
specifically focus on the policy process of adopting SB taxes.
This paper adds to this emerging field of research by investigating the 
agenda-setting and decision-making phases of SB tax adoption of three local 
US governments: Berkeley (California), Cook County (Illinois), and Philadelphia 
(Pennsylvania). Collected information on these case studies is structured and 
analyzed using the health policy triangle of Buse, Mays and Walt [16], which 
focuses on policy content, context, process and actors. A detailed narrative of 
the agenda-setting and decision-making processes in the 3 case studies is 
provided. Our analyses helped us to identify general themes emerging in all 3 
case studies, that are presented as “six lessons learned”.
Methods
In this section we first describe how we selected our case studies. Successively 
our data sources are described: a web-based survey, semi-structured interviews, 
and a local media coverage analysis. It is explained how we drafted narratives 
of all three cases, and the final paragraph provides a short description of the 
applied analytical process for identifying themes.
Sampling justification
We opted to investigate SB taxes in US cities to make cases as comparable as 
possible. We purposefully selected Berkeley, Philadelphia, and Cook County. 
The most important reason why we selected Berkeley and Philadelphia is that 
these were the first US cities to pass an SB tax. We wanted to contrast these 
cases to a city or county that did not pass an SB tax successfully. Several US 
cities attempted SB taxes unsuccessfully [17] and could have been selected, but 
in Cook County an SB tax was passed initially before it was repealed two months 
later. We hypothesized this could deliver a more detailed picture of differences 
between successful and unsuccessful cases. In addition, these cases exhibit 
some important differences in their policy context. This could potentially 
enable us to draw some generalizable lessons [18]. In Berkeley the average level 
of education and income is high. Berkeley is known for adopting health policy 
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primers and has a high level of citizen engagement [5]. In contrast, Philadelphia 
is a relatively poor city with high inequities. Chicago (the biggest city in Cook 
County) also knows high inequities [19].
Survey
A short web-based survey was distributed to purposively selected key 
informants. The sample included actors who were involved in or closely 
followed the realization of one of the three SB taxes, with a wide range of 
professional backgrounds and roles. We reached out to representatives of the 
mayor’s or county president’s office, members of the city council or county 
board, the civil service, public health institutes/advisory boards, locally based 
academics, advocacy/interest groups that supported or opposed the tax, and 
local news reporters. An initial list with potential participants was derived based 
on newspaper articles, and approached by e-mail. Non-responders were sent 
reminder e-mails every two weeks, up to six in total. We called secretarial 
support of non-responders when we were unsure if our invitation was sent to 
the correct e-mail address. A snowballing technique was used to identify 
additional potential informants. In total, we reached out to 95 persons of whom 
21 completed the survey. See Table 1 for respondent characteristics.






Local politicians 2 3
Public administration 2 0
Local public health academics 1 2
Public health advocacy group members  
supportive of tax
2 5
Other advocacy group members supportive of tax 0 3
Advocacy group members opposing the tax 1 0
Local news reporters 0 0
Total Berkeley 1 5
Total Cook County 0 4
Total Philadelphia 7 4
Affiliation, policy standpoint (in the case of local politicians, public administration and local 
academics) and case on which participants reported are not shown to ensure anonymity.
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The survey listed five questions about the agenda-setting and decision- making 
phases of the SB tax policy, as well as on the role of stakeholders during these 
phases (Box 1). A native English speaker, who was not part of the research team, 
carefully completed an initial version of the survey to make sure questions 
would be interpreted adequately.
Interviews
After completing the survey, respondents were asked if they wanted to 
participate in a semi-structured interview to discuss their responses. Thirteen 
of the twenty-one respondents were interviewed from August 2018 to January 
2019 by the lead investigator (LH), in a Skype or telephone interview that lasted 
between 30−60 min. Two participants were interviewed simultaneously, 
resulting in twelve interviews and nearly ten hours of recorded material. 
Interviews were transcribed, and LH drafted a summary report immediately 
after each interview.
Survey and interview data coding
The survey results and interview transcripts were independently coded by LH 
and MJ using Atlas.ti 8.3. LH and MJ used a coding scheme that was compiled 
after discussions with the full research team based on the summary reports, 
and according to the four elements of the health policy triangle (policy content, 
context, process and actors) [16]. See Appendix 1 for the full coding scheme. LH 
Text box 1.  Web-based survey questions.
1) What was your function/role during the development of the soda tax policy?
2) When did you become involved in the debate preceding the decision making?
3) Can you identify three factors, events, publications (research/popular media/
other), or other critical junctures/circumstances that have had a big impact 
during the development of the soda tax policy?
4) What or who do you think have been the most important stakeholders during 
the agenda-setting phase of the development of the soda tax policy in your city?
 (Respondents could refer to a maximum of ten stakeholders and had to assign 
their position regarding the tax (high/medium/low support or opposition, or 
non-mobilized), as well as their perceived level of influence (high/medium/low).
5) Do you think the following categorization of dominant policy frames is correct 
for your city: ‘health frame’ Berkeley, ‘targeted budget frame’ Philadelphia, 
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and MJ subsequently generated tables with occurrences of their respective 
coding results and reviewed code co-occurrences using the Atlas.ti 
co-occurrence table, which provides a visually accessible way to see patterns 
across the dataset. Differences in co-occurrence were discussed by LH and MJ 
by going through a selection of transcripts. This method provided a systematic 
way to discuss interpretation differences.
Local media coverage analysis
We used newspapers for the local media coverage analysis and to triangulate 
findings from the surveys and interviews. Based on participants’ advice and 
local circulation figures, we selected the East Bay Times for Berkeley, 
Philadelphia Inquirer for Philadelphia, and the Chicago Tribune for Cook 
County. Since the latter showed highly divergent results, we also collected 
articles published in the Chicago Sun-Times. We included articles that were 
published from the date when the policy was on the agenda (according to 
survey respondents) until four days after it was adopted (Berkeley and 
Philadelphia), or repealed (Cook County). The search strategy in the newspaper 
databases combined the following words: tax, soda, pop, sweetened beverage, 
ssb, sugar, and sin. Articles that did not discuss issues related to the local SB tax 
were excluded. In total, we included 239 articles (296, when the Sun-Times is 
included).
We assigned the stance towards the tax (positive, neutral, or negative) of all 
included articles. We also assigned the type of article (editorial, column, letter to 
the editor, report). LH and MJ first screened article headings independently, and 
read full texts when the stance was not immediately clear. LH and MJ then 
discussed articles of which their assignments conflicted. The full research 
team discussed and decided upon the stance in six articles on which LH and 
MJ remained unsure.
Drafting narratives
Based on the information collected via the 3 different sources and structured 
according to the four elements of the policy triangle of Buse, Mays and Walt [16], 
we deployed an iterative, cumulative process to identify general themes. The 
transcript coding results and the media coverage results were first discussed 
several times with the whole research team. LH then drafted three narratives. 
These case-specific narratives were structured with the elements of the health 
policy triangle (policy content, context, process and actors) and were discussed 
several times to ensure they adequately represent the interpretation of the 
whole research team. During this process, LH and MJ extensively discussed 
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which quotes to use, to ensure they reflect coding efforts and the media 
coverage analysis. Some minor editing occurred to quotes to assist the reader’s 
understanding and to maintain confidentiality in some cases.
Identifying themes
After completing the three narratives, the research team identified general 
themes using the health policy triangle of Buse, Mays and Walt [16] as an 
analytical guide. We compared how the elements of the health policy triangle 
interacted in each individual case, and how case-specific interactions mirror 
those observed in the other cases. This analysis was split up in two parts. In the 
first part we related the policy content to the prevailing contextual elements. In 
the second part we related the characteristics and behavior of actors involved, 
including the role of local media, to the processes of agenda setting and policy 
formulation. A central element of this part concerned the role of advocacy 
coalitions, which we define as ‘actors who share policy core beliefs and who 
coordinate their actions in a nontrivial manner to influence a policy subsystem’ 
[6]. Although our study was not aimed at theory building, we did streamline the 
description of the advocacy coalitions present in our case studies according to 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework by focusing on the formation, structure 
and stability of coalitions, and their resources, beliefs and strategies.
Findings
The three narratives below describe our three case studies, starting with a short 
timeline. We then describe how the policy context interacted with the policy 
content. Successively, we describe how stakeholders influenced the policy 
process. The narratives are accompanied by quotes that accurately summarize 
the case-specific findings for our general themes. All quotes are presented in 
Table 2.
The findings of our local media coverage analysis are described throughout the 
narratives and summarized in Fig. 1 and Table 3. Appendix 2 provides the full 
list of local journal articles and their assignment as positive, negative or neutral 
towards the SB-tax reform. Coverage in our selection of newspapers was mostly 
positive in Berkeley, mixed in Philadelphia, and negative in Cook County. 
Coverage was intense in its volume and criticism prior to decision making, 
especially before the repeal in Cook County.
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Figure 1.   Volume and stance of included local media articles during the agenda-setting 
and decision-making phases of the sweetened beverage tax policies in 
Berkeley, Cook County and Philadelphia.

































































































Table 2. Quotes that summarize specific general themes.
Lessons Berkeley Cook County Philadelphia
1 Coupling policy to issues 
already on the agenda
“The soda industry just came in [Richmond] and 
slaughtered them, it was not a very pleasant sight. 
It quickly became clear that there needed to be a 
broader constituency base, and we met with parent 
leaders from the public schools who indicated that 
if a portion of the money went to the public schools’ 
program around nutrition, then they would be 
supportive.” 
  Local politician
“It was to fight obesity and to make people 
healthy and to fight diabetes. Except here is 
the problem. We had a budget shortfall of 280 
million dollars for our pensions…This money 
wasn’t going to be canned to go and start 
programs that went into schools and taught 
children how to eat properly…It was strictly 
a source of revenue that was going to go 
pay down legacy debt. So, the hypocrisy was 
smacking right from the get-go.” 
  Local politician
“If it wasn’t dedicated to Pre-K it would’ve never 
passed. I think people are pretty clear about 
that…So you have got to remember that this is 
all happening in the construct of a state-wide 
campaign on Pre-K.” 
  Non-health advocate
2 Aligning policy framing to 
political sentiment
“I think that diabetes is much more...I don’t want to 
say a sexier disease but being overweight is one thing 
but when you start having your leg cut off or your 
foot cut off… I think to a certain degree we tried to 
demonize the soda industry. I think the demonization 
was well deserved by that industry but we probably 
got carried away a few times.” 
  Local politician 
[see under stakeholders-outsiders]
“I think in general people aren’t necessarily 
trustful of the county government to begin 
with…The ‘can the tax coalition’ [a coalition 
of citizens, businesses, and community 
organizations actively opposing the tax] was 
able to really tap into that and say, ‘you know 
they’re taxing you again..” 
  Health advocate
“We very quickly adopted the framework that 
we would not be talking, leading at all with the 
concept of do this because you get healthier… 
[With a health frame] we would have gotten 
nowhere. Nobody in Philly cares about public 
health. This is a very unhealthy city. People 
smoke at higher rates than average in America. 
People are heavier; it is just not the place to talk 
about health.” 
  Non-health advocate
3 Understanding the 
institutions of political 
decision-making and tax 
policy
“[After a member of the steering committee explicitly 
expressed concerns that the tax targeted minority 
groups explicitly]…I think what that did was put it 
on the table so that we could deal with it. That’s 
when we came up with the idea of having an 
advisory committee that would advise the council. 
It wouldn’t be legally binding [otherwise a two-third 
majority would have been needed in the referendum 
according to California state law] but it would be 
stated public policy.” 
  Local politician
“It was these layers and layers of, sort of arcane 
tax law and regulations, and what can be taxed, 
and taxes on taxes and things like that, that 
really caused a lot of confusion…and I think the 
ability of the beverage industry quite honestly 
to exploit the confusion.” 
  Local academic
“I think James Kenney learned the lessons of 
Mayor Nutters proposals in developing and 
keeping his on track. He was a councilmember 
during all that time. He understood all the 
previous proposals, what holes were in them, 
and navigated the water successfully from 
learning from past mistakes.” 
  Health advocate
4 Taking technical & political 
decisions during policy 
formulation
“I applaud Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney 
for introducing a plan to provide universal 
preschool for all of his city’s 4-year olds…But I 
do not support Mayor Kenney’s plan to pay for 
this program with a regressive grocery tax that 
would disproportionately affect low-income 
and>middle-class Americans.” 
  Column by presidential candidate Bernie 
Sanders[26]. This led to the inclusion of diet 
beverages as these are consumed more by 
people with higher incomes.
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Table 2. Quotes that summarize specific general themes.
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  Local politician
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the problem. We had a budget shortfall of 280 
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wasn’t going to be canned to go and start 
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“If it wasn’t dedicated to Pre-K it would’ve never 
passed. I think people are pretty clear about 
that…So you have got to remember that this is 
all happening in the construct of a state-wide 
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“I think that diabetes is much more...I don’t want to 
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demonize the soda industry. I think the demonization 
was well deserved by that industry but we probably 
got carried away a few times.” 
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“I think in general people aren’t necessarily 
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of citizens, businesses, and community 
organizations actively opposing the tax] was 
able to really tap into that and say, ‘you know 
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  Health advocate
“We very quickly adopted the framework that 
we would not be talking, leading at all with the 
concept of do this because you get healthier… 
[With a health frame] we would have gotten 
nowhere. Nobody in Philly cares about public 
health. This is a very unhealthy city. People 
smoke at higher rates than average in America. 
People are heavier; it is just not the place to talk 
about health.” 
  Non-health advocate
3 Understanding the 
institutions of political 
decision-making and tax 
policy
“[After a member of the steering committee explicitly 
expressed concerns that the tax targeted minority 
groups explicitly]…I think what that did was put it 
on the table so that we could deal with it. That’s 
when we came up with the idea of having an 
advisory committee that would advise the council. 
It wouldn’t be legally binding [otherwise a two-third 
majority would have been needed in the referendum 
according to California state law] but it would be 
stated public policy.” 
  Local politician
“It was these layers and layers of, sort of arcane 
tax law and regulations, and what can be taxed, 
and taxes on taxes and things like that, that 
really caused a lot of confusion…and I think the 
ability of the beverage industry quite honestly 
to exploit the confusion.” 
  Local academic
“I think James Kenney learned the lessons of 
Mayor Nutters proposals in developing and 
keeping his on track. He was a councilmember 
during all that time. He understood all the 
previous proposals, what holes were in them, 
and navigated the water successfully from 
learning from past mistakes.” 
  Health advocate
4 Taking technical & political 
decisions during policy 
formulation
“I applaud Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney 
for introducing a plan to provide universal 
preschool for all of his city’s 4-year olds…But I 
do not support Mayor Kenney’s plan to pay for 
this program with a regressive grocery tax that 
would disproportionately affect low-income 
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  Column by presidential candidate Bernie 
Sanders[26]. This led to the inclusion of diet 
beverages as these are consumed more by 




Lessons Berkeley Cook County Philadelphia
5/6 Structure of the advocacy 
coalition
“All that were part [of the advocacy coalition] had a 
really good sense of Berkeley…In any group dynamic, 
you get people who are nuts or whatever. But it all 
seemed to work out, and the most important thing 
is that people worked hard. People who were at the 
table trying to think through the policy, meaning they 
talked to voters…So there were no ‘prima donnas’ and 
for political campaigns to be without prima donnas is 
a rare thing.” 
  Non-health advocate
“It was her policy. She introduced it, and she 
fought for it for quite a long time…Her voice 
carries a lot of weight with the commissioners…
So, when she decided to go ahead, I think she 
brought a lot of people on board just because of 
the relationships that she formed over her years 
in the county.” 
  Local academic
“Philadelphia is a blue-collar community 
historically, and with a really strong union 
presence. And that union presence permeates 
through city council, right?...I don’t know what 
deals were made on a political level, of look you 
vote for the sugar tax, I’ll repave all your streets 
and have trash hauled out every week. I don’t 
know, this is Philly right. But backroom deals 
obviously were made.” 
  Health advocate
“The people of Berkeley are very familiar with 
organizing and the political process…] And I think 
they also feel like their influence on the process is 
higher than in the rest of the country”. 
  Health advocate
5 Building an advocacy 
coalition early
“First when we got started, we had no campaign 
structure to speak of. So, I sponsor an academy 
of young people who are learning to do political 
community organizing. So, they made up the first 
folks to talk to voters…Once the volunteers started 
coming, one and then two and then ten and then 
twenty and it grew. This initial group of young people 
provided the structure and the discipline to get all the 
volunteers focused.” 
  Non-health advocate
We had about eight weeks to work on the 
campaign prior to the vote actually coming up 
in the county board. We did not have the time 
to properly educate the public nor really a lot of 
the commissioners.” 
  Health advocate
“I had our folks get there [Mayor’s budget 
address] and we completely packed the one 
balcony, but I’m staring across the other 
balcony which is empty at this time and I’m 
just thinking, oh, the soda companies and 
the Teamsters are gonna fill up the other side 
and all of a sudden PCCY brings in another 
hundred people and fills in the other balcony. 
We hadn’t really coordinated at that point yet…
That’s when I knew we had a great advocacy 
partner in PCCY.” 
  Non-health advocate
6 Locally grounded advocacy 
coalition
The pro-tax law signs were just everywhere, and it 
was so rare to see any anti-tax lawn signs… They’d 
make their own pro tax signs even, so there’s even 
‘grassroots’ signs on people’s fences and cars…I think 
these homemade signs genuinely reflected people’s 
support for the tax.” 
  Local academic
“The most important part is this. The 
opposition came in massive force from the 
people of Cook County…People were all 
sharing [receipts with the separate payment of 
the product and the tax] on their social media.” 
  Local politician
“We were about very public testimony, very 
public events. Crowd building and making 
visits with lots of constituents, whereas 
that was complemented by sort of that 
inside political game…We weren’t in direct 
communication with the mayor’s office that 
way. So, we kind of had to trust that that was 
happening, knowing they had a good team 
around them that we’re good at this stuff.” 
  Non-health advocate
Stakeholders - outsiders “It was obvious that they [people demonstrating 
against the tax] were paid by the industry. They were 
not part of the community. They had no notion of 
who we were. They [soda industry] plastered the local 
transit stations with big advertisements…They just 
threw money at this thing and people felt offended. 
They felt that they were coming from the outside, 
trying to affect our elections, and it got people angry.” 
  Local politician
“They were able to go into their distribution 
centers and their actual facilities in Cook 
County and rally their workers, and so it was 
employees of Dr. Pepper, Snapple- who also 
live in Cook County who then would come 
forward and say, you know if this tax goes into 
place I’m going to lose my job. And that was in 
the several different rounds of budget hearings 
during the passage and the repeal.” 
  Health advocate
“They [people demonstrating against the tax] 
loaded up council meetings. Now, when I 
went around and checked the license plates of 
people, they were mostly out of state…But their 
guys were all white. And the women we were 
bringing were all Latino and black. And it really 
was very stark in the eyes of councilmembers. 
I mean the council is mostly black, very 
mixed…They ended up being like a giant.” 
  Non-health advocate
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Table 2. Continued.
Lessons Berkeley Cook County Philadelphia
5/6 Structure of the advocacy 
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to properly educate the public nor really a lot of 
the commissioners.” 
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address] and we completely packed the one 
balcony, but I’m staring across the other 
balcony which is empty at this time and I’m 
just thinking, oh, the soda companies and 
the Teamsters are gonna fill up the other side 
and all of a sudden PCCY brings in another 
hundred people and fills in the other balcony. 
We hadn’t really coordinated at that point yet…
That’s when I knew we had a great advocacy 
partner in PCCY.” 
  Non-health advocate
6 Locally grounded advocacy 
coalition
The pro-tax law signs were just everywhere, and it 
was so rare to see any anti-tax lawn signs… They’d 
make their own pro tax signs even, so there’s even 
‘grassroots’ signs on people’s fences and cars…I think 
these homemade signs genuinely reflected people’s 
support for the tax.” 
  Local academic
“The most important part is this. The 
opposition came in massive force from the 
people of Cook County…People were all 
sharing [receipts with the separate payment of 
the product and the tax] on their social media.” 
  Local politician
“We were about very public testimony, very 
public events. Crowd building and making 
visits with lots of constituents, whereas 
that was complemented by sort of that 
inside political game…We weren’t in direct 
communication with the mayor’s office that 
way. So, we kind of had to trust that that was 
happening, knowing they had a good team 
around them that we’re good at this stuff.” 
  Non-health advocate
Stakeholders - outsiders “It was obvious that they [people demonstrating 
against the tax] were paid by the industry. They were 
not part of the community. They had no notion of 
who we were. They [soda industry] plastered the local 
transit stations with big advertisements…They just 
threw money at this thing and people felt offended. 
They felt that they were coming from the outside, 
trying to affect our elections, and it got people angry.” 
  Local politician
“They were able to go into their distribution 
centers and their actual facilities in Cook 
County and rally their workers, and so it was 
employees of Dr. Pepper, Snapple- who also 
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forward and say, you know if this tax goes into 
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  Health advocate
“They [people demonstrating against the tax] 
loaded up council meetings. Now, when I 
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Berkeley
Timeline
Four interviewees indicated that the unsuccessful attempt of nearby Richmond 
in November 2012 was one of the main motivators to attempt an SB tax in 
Berkeley. The Richmond experience immediately highlighted the importance of 
a well-organized advocacy coalition to anticipate on soda industry opposition, 
and the time required for its coalescence. The local policy entrepreneurs (two 
council members) therefore did not immediately put the policy on the political 
agenda but took considerable time to first set up a steering committee with 
broad expertise and community representation (in this paper called ‘advocacy 
coalition’). Both interviewed local politicians indicated that this coalition was 
established around September 2013. The measure was announced by around 
March 2014, leaving plenty of time for campaigning prior to the referendum 
that was held on November 4, 2014, with 76 % voting in favor.
Interactions between policy context and policy content
It appears that the supportive advocacy coalition was very sensitive to the 
issues that worried residents, and actively coupled the SB tax to these issues. 
One local politician mentioned that they realized early that there needed to be 
a broader constituency base. An opportunity arose when federal funds were 
cut for a popular school nutrition program in 2012–2013 [20], which formed a 
basis for the advocacy coalition according to all interviewees and several media 
reports. Other foundational elements were the substantial health inequity and 
social disparity between white, black, and Hispanic residents. These inequities 
were highlighted in a report of the Berkeley public health department. Four 
interviewees indicated this report had impact as it was published during the 
early stages of advocacy coalition development.
The SB tax was not automatically seen as a way to address these health inequities 
by all members of the advocacy coalition, however. Building on the experience 
of Richmond, where the soda industry split the minority communities on the 
narratives of the regressive nature of SB taxes, substantial efforts were made to 
address underlying skepticism of minority groups around the financially 
regressive nature of SB taxes. Four interviewees mentioned how this fear was 
tackled by the proposal of an advisory committee that would guide city council 
on how revenue should be spent. This committee had to include people with a 
background in community nutrition programs, and as councilmembers were 
to select these advisors, it would represent all minority groups [21]. Since the 
advices of this committee were non-legally binding, the SB tax required a 
simple majority. If the tax revenue would be earmarked to specific causes, 
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a two-thirds majority would have been required according to California state 
referenda law. Four respondents indicated that not having to achieve a 
supermajority gave the advocacy coalition the trust that they could win the 
referendum.
Timely poll results then showed that residents trusted city council to use the 
revenue adequately [22]. These results were articulated extensively in media. 
One health advocate and a local academic indicated this public trust in city 
council relates to the local political awareness and community engagement. 
The political awareness of Berkeley residents reflected in policy framing. 
Berkeley has a history of being skeptical of large corporations [5]. The pro-tax 
message ‘Berkeley vs. Big Soda’ therefore resonated well. Equally important was 
the focus on diabetes rather than obesity. Four respondents mentioned this 
decision was well-elaborated and based on the notion that many people believe 
obesity is a personal problem, whereas diabetes relates more closely to ethnic 
disparities and is perceived less as a personal problem.
A one-cent per ounce tax that excludes artificially-sweetened beverages (ASBs) 
logically followed the focus on diabetes. Some products were exempted for ease 
of implementation, but one health advocate indicated they were cautious to 
ensure it covered beverages that upper-class residents consume more often. 
All interviewees emphasized they opted to make distributors of SSBs responsible 
for paying the tax, rather than retailers, in line with the ‘Berkeley vs Big Soda’ 
messaging and local political sentiment.
Stakeholders characteristics and behavior during the policy process
Our observations suggest that the policy context was successfully considered in 
the Berkeley SB tax policy structure and framing efforts. Participants unanimously 
considered the local network of the advocacy coalition as pivotal. This coalition 
consisted of two council members who initiated the measure, leaders of various 
minority groups (African Americans, Hispanics), the school district, the Ecology 
Center (a non-profit community organization), churches, parents aiming 
for the continuation of the school nutrition program, pediatricians, dentists, 
service unions (public employees, nurses, teachers), local nutrition leaders, and 
some grocery store and restaurant owners.
All participants mentioned that these actors mobilized their precincts and 
recruited their networks of volunteers for the campaign. A non-health advocate 
explained that the campaign was disciplined from the start because of modeled 
behavior of community leaders and a well-elaborated first outreach action. 
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Young people who were learning to do political community organizing 
went door-to-door first, with the effect that a positive momentum spread 
exponentially in the local community. Participants unanimously described the 
rapid spread of this grassroots movement. Preachers preached about the 
measure from their pulpit, there were talks about excessive sugar intake on 
schools and during exhibitions, residents placed lawn signs, and campaign 
volunteers reportedly knocked on every door in Berkeley.
The high level of organization of the advocacy coalition evoked this grassroots 
movement, but four interviewees indicated it was an expression of the genuine 
feelings of residents toward the issues the measure addressed, as expressed by 
pro-tax lawn signs that many residents placed near their own homes. Parallel to 
the grassroots efforts, the advocacy coalition effectively formed a political 
coalition, according to both participating local politicians. The entire city 
council and all council candidates endorsed the tax, because the two council 
members that were part of the advocacy coalition were able to explain the 
ethnic health inequities report in an understandable manner to their peer 
politicians.
One health advocate and one academic reported it was not challenging to 
attract positive media coverage because of all the grassroots actions. Newspaper 
articles mainly reported how supportive Berkeley residents were of the tax and 
that Berkeley could be the first US city to pass an SB tax. The ‘irresponsible 
behavior’ of the soda industry was also emphasized. The soda industry did try 
to get local corner stores and individuals to oppose, and all interviewees 
mentioned they were involved in ‘AstroTurf lobbying,’ a term used to describe 
artificial grassroots campaigns created by public relations firms. These actions 
backfired, however, as people had the impression that outsiders were trying to 
affect their elections.
The industry also placed advertisements that pointed out policy loopholes. 
This did not resonate well according to one health advocate, because of a focus 
on “lame” technical issues such as the exemption of certain drinks. By contrast, 
the supportive advocacy coalition was very context-sensitive in the buildup of 
their advocacy coalition, which all interviewees who were part of this coalition 
explained by reference to group dynamics and characteristics of individual 
members. Interviewees also noted that the Bloomberg Foundation supported 




The potential spread of the policy in other jurisdictions was an important final 
point that one local politician and one non-health advocate raised. The 
advocacy coalition believed that an SB tax could pass first in Berkeley to trigger 
a snowball effect. This aim touched upon the pride and political engagement of 
residents and was a cornerstone of the advocacy coalition and the energy 
released in the campaign. This point made one local politician state that the 
campaign was “the most exciting thing I’ve ever done in my life”.
Cook County
Timeline
One local academic and one health advocate mentioned, and several media 
articles reported that the adoption of SB taxes in other US jurisdictions initially 
sparked the idea in Cook County. With the extensive media coverage of the 
policy, a detailed timeline can be constructed. The local policy entrepreneur 
and Cook County board president, Toni Preckwinkle, first brought the proposal 
onto the political agenda around the end of August 2016. By November 10, 2016, 
the county board had to vote whether or not to adopt the measure, garnering 
very little time to build an advocacy coalition. The vote went down 8−8, and for 
the first time in her term, Toni Preckwinkle herself cast the vote enabling the 
measure to pass 9 to 8. Implementation was subsequently planned for July 
2017. By February 2017, an opposition campaign began aiming to repeal the tax. 
The retail association felt there was too little guidance on tax implementation 
and filed a lawsuit in June 2017. This delayed implementation until August 2, 
2017. During this delay, negative media coverage accumulated (Fig. 1). Media 
stories described how people on food assistance could not be charged the tax, 
as this was not allowed under federal sales taxes rules. Media also described that 
the tax had to be passed onto consumers according to state law, which meant it 
had to be demarcated at the register. All this confusion exacerbated an already 
negative public opinion, until the measure was repealed under a 15−1 vote on 
October 11, 2017. Of note, four months thereafter reelections took place.
Interactions between policy context and policy content
All interviewees mentioned there was an urgency to close a budget deficit, 
which explains the rapid course of action prior to initial adoption. However, 
this budget deficit was not an issue that the general public found valuable, and 
the original policy framing centered around childhood obesity was quickly 
perceived disingenuous by both opponents and the few (health) organizations 
that supported the tax because it also included ASBs. Combined with the tight 
timeframe, this made gaining support on the health narrative almost impossible.
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Later in the process a principal (stated) aim was that the tax would prevent 
layoffs in the public sector due to the budget deficit. Although this did generate 
support among public sector unions, it was heavily criticized in the media. 
Several editorials, columns and letters were published that portrayed the tax as 
‘another cash grab’, suggesting the county should just ‘tighten its belt’. These 
articles articulated an existing public distrust in the county government. One 
health advocate mentioned this distrust stems back to the fact that Cook County 
historically knows high county taxes.
Stakeholders characteristics and behavior during the policy process
Our observations suggest that the structure and policy framing of the Cook 
County SB tax did not sufficiently account for the policy context. This oversight 
is evident in the absence of an organized advocacy coalition, followed by 
skillful efforts of local opposition to generate locally grounded resistance.
Two health advocates and one academic indicated that supportive organizations 
like the American Heart Association and the Illinois Public Health Institute had 
already been working on SB tax proposals on the state level for years. It seems 
that these organizations had limited access to core policymakers, as these 
interviewees pointed out that these organizations were only approached by 
supportive commissioners after the measure had already been discussed in 
county board. Despite these circumstances, the policy did pass initially. All 
interviewees mentioned this related to Toni Preckwinkle and the weight of her 
voice among commissioners.
In summary, all interviewees stated that the pro-tax coalition was not able to 
recover from their false start because of mixed framing approaches, a general 
public distrust in government, and the lack of shared policy ownership. 
By contrast, all interviewees stressed how the opposing advocacy coalition 
conducted a well-orchestrated repeal campaign, by reaching out to media 
outlets that extensively covered the history of high county taxes, the confusing 
tax structure, the potential of cross-border shopping, and the effects on local 
retailers, local soda industry workers, distributors and restaurant owners. This 
negative coverage fueled opposition and was part of the reason why chapters 
of the Teamsters union and the local chamber of commerce decided to oppose. 
This local opposition among interest groups eventually lead to popular 
opposition too. People for instance were sharing their receipts with the separate 
payment of the product and the SB tax on social media, which went viral 
according to one local politician.
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Outside actors were also involved. Two health advocates and one academic 
indicated that the soda industry bought advertisements with anti-tax messaging 
on stores, television, and other media outlets, and financially supported local 
opposition. Industry also mobilized their workers successfully, who worked 
and lived in Cook County and pointed out they would lose their job if the tax 
went into place.
There were also outside actors who supported the tax. According to a local 
politician, the Obama administration supported the measure, as were prominent 
philanthropists with donations for the campaign and advertisements. The 
Bloomberg Foundation was most notable, but in several media outlets their 
involvement was negatively portrayed, labeling it an outside billionaire 
becoming involved in local politics.
Philadelphia
Timeline
Unlike Berkeley and Cook County, Philadelphia experienced failed SB tax 
attempts prior to the successful attempt in 2016. Former Mayor Michael Nutter 
attempted in 2010 and 2011, and mainly focused on the positive health impact 
the tax ought to have [15]. The idea of an SB tax reappeared around the summer 
of 2015 when mayoral candidate James Kenney conceptualized the tax as a 
revenue source for investment in pre-kindergarten and public recreation sites. 
All interviewees and five survey respondents highlighted these issues were 
high on the agenda, due to an ongoing statewide pre-kindergarten campaign, 
and the persistent lack of funding for public recreation sites. Two non-health 
advocates mentioned that interest groups assured Kenney they would support 
any revenue source if it was earmarked for these issues. However, from our 
media analysis we learned that the idea of an SB tax was not articulated publicly 
until several months later. During this period, James Kenney won the mayoral 
elections and was installed in office on January 4, 2016. He appointed the 
former NYC health commissioner, Thomas Farley, who experienced the failed 
SB tax when Michael Bloomberg was mayor of NYC in 2009. The tax proposal 
leaked to the press on February 28, 2016, one week prior to its official 
announcement in the budget address of Mayor Kenney. After three months 
of campaigning with increased positive publicity towards the voting day, 
the measure was approved 13−4 on June 16, 2016.
Interactions between policy context and policy content
Participants unanimously considered the use of revenue for popular issues a 
key enabler. This was both genuine as well as strategic messaging. The structure 
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of the tax logically followed policy framing with the inclusion of ASBs to make 
it less health-focused and less regressive, as people with higher incomes drink 
more diet sodas. The well-thought-out policy content was aided by previous 
experiences. One health advocate and one non-health advocate highlighted 
that the Berkeley case (by then in place for a year) gave them credibility in the 
revenue estimates of the tax. This was important given the focus on the 
investments that the tax would enable.
The failed attempts of Mayor Nutter and NYC Mayor Bloomberg also provided 
the insight that a health frame would be ineffective, according to one non-health 
advocate. Health arguments were used, however, but the supportive advocacy 
coalition carefully orchestrated it did not come across as the leading imperative. 
For this reason, the role of the health commissioner was downplayed, and 
nonpolitical health professionals only occasionally articulated health arguments 
to counteract industry arguments.
Stakeholders characteristics and behavior during the policy process
Our observations suggest that the policy context was successfully considered 
in the Philadelphia SB tax structure and policy framing. A remarkable finding 
that we draw from the four interviews was that the ‘inside game’ of political 
coalition building between the mayor’s office, unions, and lobbyists, was quite 
separate from the buildup of grassroots support. Communication between the 
mayor’s office and advocacy groups for pre-kindergarten and public recreation 
was limited. Yet, this did not indicate a lack of mutual trust. One non-health 
advocate described how they did public testimony and public advocacy events, 
while they simply trusted that the mayor’s office was doing a good job at the 
‘inside political game’.
This level of trust may have to do with the leadership style of Mayor Kenney and 
his associates. One non-health advocate mentioned that Kenney was a popular 
councilmember prior to becoming mayor, with good relationships in both the 
council and among the unions. All interviewees and two survey respondents 
indicated that the mayor, the health commissioner, and the policymakers from 
the revenue and communications departments effectively formed a political 
coalition.
The ‘outside game’ of building grassroots support brought about many atypical 
actors, organized in the Bloomberg-funded ‘Philadelphians for a Fair Future’ 
coalition. One health advocate, two non-health advocates, and two civil 
servants mentioned Public Citizens for Children and Youth (PCCY) and the 
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Parks Alliance were most instrumental, because these groups mobilized most 
constituents to public testimonies. Also involved were Friends of the Free 
Library, the Food Trust, schools, civil service, teachers, and building trades 
unions, and more typical groups like the American Heart Association. However, 
the coordination among these actors was clumsy at first. One non-health 
advocate described that this coalition had not communicated they would 
demonstrate in support of the tax at its first public hearing in city council. When 
this advocate arrived though with ‘his people’, he was positively surprised to 
find far more supportive demonstrators.
Opposing advocacy efforts were stark too according to all interviewees. The 
opposition included the soda industry, distributors, some restaurants, bars and 
grocery stores, and unions, most notably the Teamsters. Opponents packed 
council meetings and public testimonies, but with participants that did not 
represent the constituency. One non-health advocate mentioned that this 
made opposition come over as “a giant”. This image was exaggerated by some 
actions of the soda industry. One non-health advocate mentioned that the 
American Beverage Association called random people to convince them the 
tax was a bad idea, to then put these people through to the office of 
councilmembers. The effect was that councilmembers became annoyed with 
a barrage of phone calls of confused residents. This advocate also stressed that 
industry lobbyists entered the private chambers of councilmembers, while 
others were waiting their turn. These actions backfired because councilmembers 
don’t want to have the perception that industry interests are more important 
than constituents.
Other outside actors included the then Democratic presidential candidate 
Bernie Sanders, who wrote a critical piece on the SB tax for its regressive nature 
[24]. The inclusion of ASBs mitigated this, according to a civil servant who 
responded to our survey. Two health advocates and one non-health advocate 
stressed that the Bloomberg Foundation was also involved, with advertisements 
to counteract the soda industry campaign, funding of the Philadelphians for a 
Fair Future coalition, and experience from the NYC SB tax failure.
Six general lessons
The three narratives above point out similar interactions between policy 
context, content, process, and actors. From these interactions in the 3 case 
studies, we draw six general themes that are framed as “six general lessons” to 
enhance actionability of the findings. The first three relate mostly to the 
interaction between policy context and content. The other three relate to the 
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characteristics and behavior of actors involved during agenda setting and 
policy formulation. Quotes that accurately summarize these lessons are 
provided in Table 2.
First, it was important to couple the SB tax policy content to existing issues that 
were already high on the agenda. These issues were context-specific and not 
necessarily related to public health. In Berkeley, the SB tax policy was 
successfully coupled to the loss of revenue for a popular school nutrition 
program, and ethnic health disparities (highlighted by an impactful report). In 
Philadelphia, the tax was successfully coupled to the need for revenue for 
pre-kindergarten and public recreation centers, issues that were already on the 
agenda for years. In Cook County, the SB tax was adopted initially to fix a 
pressing budget shortfall.
Second, policy framing must be in accordance with the prevailing local political 
sentiment, as expressed in media. Berkeley has a history of skepticism of 
corporate influence in local politics, which was echoed in the ‘Berkeley vs. Big 
Soda’ campaign message and media coverage. The perceived disingenuous-
ness of obesity framing fueled an already present public distrust in the Cook 
County government, which was heavily articulated in media coverage. By 
contrast, a health frame was carefully avoided in Philadelphia, as this would 
have been perceived as nanny-state policy.
Third, existing structures of tax policies and political decision-making rules 
formed important policy constraints. Confusion how the SB tax related to state 
and federal taxes fueled opposition among local retailers and media in Cook 
County, whereas state legislation on local tax referenda were carefully taken 
into account in Berkeley.
Fourth, the tax structure required not just technical but also political decisions 
and flexibility during policy formulation, to ensure the tax structure remained 
consistent with policy framing and to act upon events. For instance, ASBs were 
added to the original proposal in Philadelphia, to counteract arguments that 
solely targeting SSBs is regressive, as people with higher incomes drink more 
diet sodas. In Berkeley, the tax excluded ASBs and was levied at the level of 
distributors, in line with the focus on diabetes and ‘bad behavior’ of the soda 
industry. The supportive advocacy coalition emphasized these elements of 
their proposal when the soda industry plastered the local transit stations with 
big advertisements, which offended residents. By contrast, policy framing 
initially focused on childhood obesity in Cook County, but this was perceived 
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disingenuous because ASBs remained part of the proposal to raise sufficient 
revenue for the budget shortfall.
Fifth, building an advocacy coalition had to occur upfront in the policy process. 
This took time. In Berkeley, considerable time was reserved to generate support 
among community leaders and politicians, prior to public announcement. In 
Philadelphia, support was generated among councilmembers, unions, and 
special interest groups during this stage. Philadelphia also had the experience 
of two failed attempts. By contrast, supportive interest groups were informed 
after the tax proposal was already discussed in the Cook County board.
Sixth, the advocacy coalition had to be locally grounded and able to influence 
local media. This was especially pronounced in Berkeley, where the advocacy 
coalition consisted of community leaders who successfully activated their 
precincts. The Philadelphia advocacy coalition represented the constituency of 
city councilmembers accurately. In contrast, the Cook County opposition 
successfully engaged local retailers and media. The effectiveness of outside 
actors that normally do not participate in local policy processes was variable. 
When their role was overt, a negative image emerged that hindered the 
attainment of their desired outcome, as was exemplified by the soda industry 
involvement in Berkeley and Philadelphia, and the Bloomberg Foundation 
experience in Cook County.
Discussion
The six lessons present the overall findings of our analysis. We first mirror these 
lessons to findings of other SB tax policy analyses. We then reflect on how our 
lessons relate to an established theory of the policy process (Multiple Streams 
Framework). We conclude by discussing the strengths and limitations of our 
study.
Reflection on other SB tax policy analyses
Our case study of the Cook Country SB tax is, to our knowledge, the first 
empirical policy analysis of this case. Policy analyses of the Berkeley and 
Philadelphia cases do exist. Analyses of the Philadelphia case also highlight the 
importance of policy coupling to nonpublic health agenda items, political en-
trepreneurism, and applying political decisions to the technical tax design 
[11,15]. Our finding that the focus on ‘bad behavior’ of the soda industry appealed 
in Berkeley echoes a previous analysis of social media, campaign materials, 
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and local news coverage [25]. The comparative design of our study, and our in 
depth description of the characteristics and behavior of actors involved can be 
seen as our main addition to the literature on the Berkeley and Philadelphia 
cases.
Mosier [13] compared the passage of a soft drinks and sweets tax in 2010 in 
Colorado, to the rejection of an SSB tax proposal in Kansas in the same year. 
Both bills were proposed primarily for revenue purposes, but budget purposes 
were more strongly emphasized in Colorado than in Kansas. According to 
Mosier, this opened the potential for linkage of health and revenue in Kansas, 
subsequently leading to more elevated conflict in this case. Our findings also 
suggest that a clear and explicit way of policy framing is required. Mosier’s also 
found it was important to carefully take into account existing tax policies in the 
design of the SB tax. The latter was also noted in a comparative analysis of the 
SB tax policy process in four Pacific countries [9].
Our findings are not entirely consistent with policy analyses of other local US 
SB taxes. Jou et al. [14] explored the use of strategic messaging in the failed 
attempts of El Monte and Richmond, California, and found that reinvesting tax 
revenue into health-related programs holds potential, as does linking SB 
consumption to obesity and diabetes. Our findings indicate that revenue can 
also be earmarked to non-health issues (Philadelphia), and that a health focus 
was not necessarily successful. Health was not leading in Philadelphia, the 
focus on obesity was perceived disingenuous in Cook County, and in Berkeley 
the focus was on diabetes, not on obesity. Important anti-tax messages in El 
Monte and Richmond centered around negative economic effects on 
businesses and government restriction of personal choice. These arguments 
were also important in our cases, but we would emphasize the importance of 
negative effects on local businesses, since we found that both supportive and 
opposed advocacy coalitions can be successful if they are locally grounded 
(lesson six). Jou et al. finally point out the importance of clearly structuring the 
measure, incorporating cultural sensitivity, and providing education on the 
health effects of SSBs. These factors are consistent with our findings.
Paarlberg et al. [17] conclude that Democratic Party dominance, external 
financial support for pro-tax advocates, and a political message appropriate to 
the process are necessary conditions for local US SB taxes. The Democratic 
Party indeed dominates in our three cases. External financial support was 
important: the Bloomberg Foundation was involved in all three cases. Having a 
message appropriate to the policy process was important indeed, but we would 
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extend this by highlighting the importance of coupling the policy to issues that 
are already high on the agenda.
Reflection based on the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF)
To explore the replicability of our findings we compare our lessons to the MSF. 
We do not test this theory, nor was it part of our data collection and analysis. We 
only use it to see whether our findings fit this empirically grounded theory of 
the policy process. The MSF emphasizes timing in the creation of a window of 
opportunity for both agenda setting and decision making. A window becomes 
more likely if a persistent policy entrepreneur with access to core policymakers 
promotes agenda change, and when the problem, policy, and political streams 
are ready for coupling. In the problem stream conditions emerge, which deviate 
from policymakers’ or citizens’ ideal states. In the policy stream, policy 
communities work out alternatives to these problems and conditions until a 
limited number of viable policy alternatives emerges. The political stream is 
located at the level of the decision system. Bargaining and powering dominate, 
as majorities are sought here [6].
It appears that the Berkeley advocacy coalition created an agenda window 
primarily in the problem stream, by coupling their policy to a focusing event 
(the loss of revenue for the school nutrition program) and a change of indicators 
(health inequities published in the public health status report). An agenda 
window also opened in the problem stream in Cook County (the budget deficit), 
but another problem (lack of trust in the county government) was coupled 
to the political stream (reelections were coming up) subsequently, leading to 
an agenda window for the repeal effort. In Philadelphia, the installation of a 
new mayor (politics stream) after years of campaigning for pre-kindergarten 
(problem stream) created a window for an SB tax. By that time there was already 
an established policy stream, since the former Mayor attempted to approve an 
SB tax twice. On the basis of this reflection we conclude that creativity was 
required in the process of coupling the policy and politics stream to the problem 
stream. The events and changes of indicators that made this coupling possible 
were highly context specific.
Limitations and strengths
The main strength of our analysis concerns its empirical basis of web-based 
survey responses, semi-structured stakeholder interviews and a local media 
coverage analysis. We found the health policy triangle from Buse, Mays and 
Walt [16] useful to structure case studies and to derive themes. We do not 
provide, nor strived for an in-depth analysis of our data with other established 
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theories of the policy process. Our six lessons are nevertheless consistent with 
previous policy analyses of local US SB taxes. We are unsure whether this also 
applies to cases outside the US, where SB taxes are mostly adopted by national 
governments. A study that compared how SB taxes spread across US cities to 
EU countries for instance found that policy framing seems less focused in the 
EU, whereas it is very focused in the US. Political ideologies also seemed to 
interfere less with the coalition governments of EU countries [4].
An important limitation to our findings is the presence of possible sample bias, 
since most interview participants supported the SB tax. Potentially due to the 
politically sensitive nature of the topic or personal dissatisfaction with policy 
outcome, opponents were underrepresented. The perspectives of the participants 
may therefore not represent the views of all stakeholders, and strategies 
deployed by opponents may be underrepresented. We therefore recommend 
further research on the interaction between local advocacy coalitions and 
outside actors.
Another important consideration is the small sample size of completed surveys 
and interviews. We nevertheless did experience thematic saturation for all 
three cases, possibly because of the precise scope of the topic and triangulation 
with our media coverage analysis.
Conclusions
Our analysis lead to six general lessons for policy entrepreneurs with the 
ambition to successfully put an SB tax on the agenda. These lessons were 
derived by analyzing the interactions between the policy context, content, 
process and stakeholder behavior in three case studies. Although more research 
is needed to explore the theoretical generalizability of our findings, the six 
lessons on introducing sweetened beverage taxes in Berkeley, Cook County, 
and Philadelphia by looking at their respective agenda-setting and decision- 




Appendices 1 and 2 can be found on: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2020. 
06.002 (Hagenaars et al., Health Policy; 124(9):932-942) 
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The objective of this dissertation was to provide insights into how reducing 
administrative costs (AC) in healthcare and improving population health with 
junk food taxes can contribute to fiscally sustainable healthcare. These two 
policy strategies may seem unrelated at first sight but reducing administration 
and investing in prevention with junk food tax policies are both often promoted 
by health care workers and the public health community in policy debates as 
solutions towards realizing fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems. Moreover, 
the support for reducing paper and sugar has also increased among the general 
public in recent years, as was shown in chapter 1.
The scientific literature on fiscal sustainability focuses less on “reducing paper 
and sugar” and more on introducing incentives such as co-payments, 
competition and enforcing efficient healthcare delivery (Stadhouders et al., 
2019). In the literature suggested approaches towards rationing healthcare 
demand and reorganising healthcare financing and delivery and the associated 
policy measures, are generally less popular amongst health care workers, public 
health professionals, policy makers and the general public. Also, these proposed 
incentives are usually based on a short- rather than a long-term perspective. 
This relates to the fact that the problem of fiscally unsustainable healthcare is 
mostly managed and framed within the time window of a government term 
(on average four years). However, fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems is 
in fact more a longer-term problem. We assume that healthcare will not be 
sustainable in the coming decades, while currently it is sustainable in the sense 
that governments are able to pay for these outlays. Reducing sugar and reducing 
paper are strategies that seem more effective over the longer term. 
The problem owners of fiscal sustainability are ministries of health, which are 
mostly occupied with quality, accessibility and affordability of healthcare 
services, in collaboration with ministries of finance. Most of the scientific 
literature on fiscal sustainability of health care is grounded in health economics 
and public finance and has focused mostly on the design of policies within 
existing institutional arrangements rather than the implementation of policies 
that require intersectoral collaboration (in the case of prevention) or a more 
holistic view towards data governance and operational efficiency (in the case of 
AC) (OECD, 2015; Schakel, 2020; Strom, 2016).
Consequently, health care workers and the public health community are often 
dissatisfied with policies aiming to improve fiscal sustainability, because their 
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perceived problems (excess paper and sugar) remain unsolved by policy 
initiatives that focus on rationing healthcare demand and reorganising 
healthcare financing and delivery. This contradicts the broad support for 
reducing paper and sugar. Stone (2012) calls abstractly formulated issues for 
which such broad support exists ‘motherhood issues’. Stone highlights, 
however, that operationalising any motherhood issue into concrete policy 
reveals all kinds of disputes in values, interests and ideas. Successful 
implementation of policies that address AC and prevention, requires knowledge 
on their related puzzling and powering processes, according to Hoppe (2010).
This final chapter summarizes the main findings of this dissertation. Study 
findings for both central themes, “paper” and “sugar” are interpreted and 
compared by using Hoppe’s theory as a guide, and the findings are discussed 
in the context of their validity and generalisability. Research and policy 
implications are discussed before a concluding reflection is presented.
Summary of main findings
Part I. Administrative costs of the healthcare system
The first and main limitation of the analysis of policies that aim to reduce AC is 
that no consensus has been reached among professionals, managers, 
policymakers and financers on the definition of AC. An aim of this dissertation 
was to clarify this construct by exploring the total size, components and 
determinants of AC in the healthcare system. Part of the analysis were (1) an 
international comparison and (2) an investigation of a recent reform in Dutch 
long-term care (LTC). AC was differentiated between (1) costs of organisations 
governing and financing healthcare (macro level), (2) AC of healthcare delivery 
organisations (meso level) and (3) administrative tasks deployed by healthcare 
professionals (micro level).
1.  How do OECD countries differ in their governance and financing-related 
administrative expenditure in healthcare?
Data on the macro level on AC in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries (chapter 2) show that these costs have remained 
stable at slightly over 3% of total health spending over the last decade. Large 
differences exist across countries, with Iceland reporting spending as little as 
1.3% in 2015. The Netherlands ranks above the OECD average at approximately 
4%, and the Unites States reports spending as much as 8.3% of its healthcare 




differences should be interpreted with caution, because data are not always 
reported according to the recommendations that are part of the internationally 
harmonised System of Health Accounts. 
2.  How and why do governance and financing-related administrative 
expenditure differ between countries with different types of healthcare 
systems?
To explain the large international differences in macro level AC, the influence of 
countries’ healthcare financing system was explored (chapter 2). This analysis 
shows that voluntary private health insurance schemes bear much higher AC 
than compulsory schemes. Among the compulsory schemes, multiple-payer 
schemes exhibit significantly higher administrative spending than single-payer 
schemes. Among single payers, those schemes where entitlement is based on 
residency have significantly lower administrative spending than for those with 
social health insurance, although the difference is small. These differences can 
be explained because multi-payer and voluntary health insurance schemes 
require additional administrative functions and have lower economies of scale. 
Product communication is, for instance, required, but this is not the case when 
entitlement is based on residency. A loss in economies of scale is apparent, for 
instance, in purchasing and contracting care.
The aforementioned two questions provided insights into macro level AC but 
omit the level of providers, where AC are much higher but hidden in general 
healthcare spending statistics. Therefore, the construct was analysed with a whole- 
system perspective by assessing a case study of the 2015 Dutch LTC reform.
3.  Can the share of administrative costs in total long-term care spending be 
assessed in the Netherlands?
The current research instruments and data systems are not robust and 
consistent enough to trace these costs longitudinally across the entire system 
of LTC (chapter 3). On the macro level, many more activities may be considered 
as AC than are currently reported in the national accounts. Experts agreed that 
the costs of research on LTC service delivery and costs related to representation 
activities should be included. Experts did not reach a consensus on other 
potential additional categories of macro level AC. A major limitation concerns 
the lack of data on LTC-related AC incurred by municipalities. The most major 
limitation concerns the micro level. Several studies have asked LTC professionals 
to report how much time they spend on administrative tasks, but these studies 
are generally not peer-reviewed, a valid time series is absent, and experts 
expressed doubts regarding data validity.
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Despite the conclusion that current research instruments and data are 
insufficient, operationalising AC in the whole LTC sector may be possible 
nonetheless. This assessment stems from the finding that many ideas exist 
to improve research practice and that experts generally agreed with the differentia-
tion of costs on the macro, meso and micro levels (chapter 3). Some limitations 
were discovered in the data Statistics Netherlands collects on the macro level in 
the national accounts, showing that construct validity and data collection can 
improve on this level. A valid means of measuring meso level costs in Dutch LTC 
is already in place, but smaller LTC delivery organisations are currently under-
represented in the available data. Experts have suggested using observational 
techniques to measure micro level AC. Qualitative and experimental designs 
may be necessary to better understand the determinants of micro and meso 
level AC. 
4.  Did the 2015 reform of long-term care in the Netherlands affect the total 
share of administrative costs in long-term care?
Despite the lack of consistent and robust data, the available data does not, 
however, hint at a significant decrease in AC. This observation is remarkable 
because reducing AC was a stated aim of the 2015 LTC reform. Yet, even with 
perfect and timely data, assessing the specific impact of the 2015 LTC reform is 
difficult. Many more potential determinants of AC were identified but there is 
also a lack of detailed empirical knowledge on their specific impact. Heavy 
interaction of AC occurs among the macro, meso and micro levels. The variety 
and lack of empirical evidence of potential spillover effects across these levels 
mean that tracking the overall effect of a single reform is currently impossible.
The heavy interaction of AC on the different levels of the healthcare system also 
means that AC concern a complex issue. It is therefore argued that the common 
strategy of increasing operational efficiency in AC will be insufficient, if it is not 
part of a more holistic approach towards improving the governance of data and 
information for healthcare (intermezzo 1).
Part II:  Introducing junk food taxes as a case study on 
implementing public health policy
Better health leads to lower healthcare costs. This phenomenon may seem 
obvious, but in reality, the relation between population health and fiscally 
sustainable healthcare is multifaceted. These aspects are described in response 
to research question 5 and then the practice of implementing prevention 




5.  How are prevention and fiscally sustainable healthcare related?
In a narrative review of the literature (chapter 4), the many types of prevention 
are described. Not all types of prevention reduce healthcare costs, because the 
cost-effectiveness can be unclear. The financing of prevention can be 
troublesome when potential savings occur in other actors than those investing 
(the wrong pocket problem) or when savings are realised years later, making it 
unattractive for investors and politicians if responsibilities are not assigned 
clearly. Prevention of certain risk factors can even increase net lifetime 
healthcare costs; the latter may be the case for smoking, but it is, for example, 
less plausible for mental health. Additionally, cost of illness projection studies 
are always uncertain because of rapid medical-technological development.
In addition to the impact of prevention on healthcare expenditure, health as a 
key driver of productivity should be considered. This increases the ability to pay 
for healthcare. Prevention can also increase the willingness to pay. Individuals 
dislike paying for others’ lifestyle-related healthcare costs; thus, the solidarity 
for healthcare financing improves if the lifestyle-related burden of disease is 
reduced. Additionally, individuals value their health, meaning that cost-effective 
prevention measures are fiscally sustainable by definition.
Thus, the question then is why policymakers do not adopt more prevention 
policies. This multifaceted topic is investigated in-depth with case studies on 
junk food tax policies. 
6. What specific types of junk food taxes are governments implementing?
Junk food taxes are often suggested for curtailing the global increase in obesity. 
Cost-effectiveness studies have proved that such taxes are worthwhile and 
may even be amongst the most cost-effective and impactful prevention policies 
not yet deployed in the Netherlands (Van der Vliet et al., 2020). However, for any 
policy to be considered by governments, its implementation should be 
technically feasible. In the case of junk food taxes, this means tax offices should 
be able to levy ‘ junk foods’ among producers, distributors, retailers or consumers 
in an effective way. This may appear simple, but the investigation of 13 case 
studies (chapter 5) shows that most governments are unable to demarcate a 
broader scope of products than sweetened beverages. At the point of writing 
chapter 5, only in Hungary, Mexico, Nauru and French Polynesia were products 
other than sweetened beverages included. In Denmark, a ‘fat tax’ was 
implemented in 2012, but was abolished 1 year later because of implementation 
problems and subsequently diminishing political support. The taxes under 
investigation generally had the desired effects of reducing consumption or 
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product reformulation, and the taxes were often earmarked officially or 
unofficially for investment in other issues high on the agenda at the time of the 
policy announcement. In France, for instance, the policy was introduced to 
collect revenue for healthcare wages and investment in agriculture (Le Bodo et 
al., 2020).
7. What patterns can be observed in the policy contexts of junk food taxes?
The ‘puzzling’ process may be ongoing for the taxation of most junk foods 
because improving the understanding of how to demarcate healthy from 
unhealthy is necessary. ‘Powering’—the process of decision-making, mobilising 
political support and bargaining—is now the main challenge for sweetened 
beverage tax policies, because this product category can be demarcated. 
Intelligence on factors involved in the policy context and their related policy 
processes is necessary for policy entrepreneurs who wish to spread sweetened 
beverage taxes across jurisdictions. The investigation of 13 case studies 
(chapter 5) shows that fiscal needs often lay their policy foundation rather than 
public health-focused advocacy. A remarkable amount of conservative-liberal 
governments have adopted these taxes, and governments deploy diverse rationales, 
ranging from explicitly describing the tax as a public health instrument to 
solely explicating revenue raising.
8.  How can differences, observed in the spread of sweetened beverage tax policies 
in the European Union compared with the United States, be explained?
In addition to the patterns observed in the policy context of 13 junk food tax 
case studies, a different spread of sweetened beverage tax policies in the EU 
and the United States was discovered (intermezzo 2). Policymakers in EU 
countries learn from neighbouring countries and EU governments that adopted 
sweetened beverage taxes consist of various political colors. In the United 
States, consumption taxes are traditionally introduced by local governments. In 
a commentary on intermezzo 2, Pomeranz and Pertschuk (2019) explain that 
state legislatures can pre-empt local taxes when they conflict with state sales 
taxes, which is the case in Arizona, California and Michigan. At the point of 
writing, no Republican-led local US government had adopted a sweetened 
beverage tax. As a net result, on 6 April 2018, 5 million individuals in the United 
States resided in a jurisdiction with an active sweetened beverage tax, and for 
the EU, approximately 170 million. Moreover, the local US governments have 
solely used flat-rate tax designs, and in the EU, to stimulate product reformulation, 
governments have mostly used tiered designs with multiple tax levels dependent 




9.  What patterns can be observed in the agenda-setting and decision-mak-
ing phases of sweetened beverage tax policies implemented in three US 
cities, and how do these relate to policy context and policy content?
Research questions 6—8 provide insights into the policy content and context of 
junk food taxes, but findings on their related policy processes remained 
superficial. Therefore, in-depth case studies were conducted on the 
agenda-setting and decision-making phases of sweetened beverage taxes 
implemented in Berkeley, Philadelphia and Cook Country (chapter 6). These 
studies show that it was important to couple the sweetened beverage tax with 
issues that already had public support and that policy framing had to align with 
the prevailing political sentiment, such as that expressed in media. The tax 
structure required technical as well as political considerations, and existing tax 
and decision-making rules had to be considered meticulously. A supportive 
advocacy coalition was necessary and had to be built upfront in the 
policymaking process. It had to be locally grounded and able to influence local 
media.
Reducing paper requires still more puzzling, 
reducing sugar mainly requires powering
Reducing the negative consequences of paper and sugar improves the fiscal 
sustainability of healthcare systems. However, the problems of excess paper 
and sugar have not been addressed extensively by scholars and policymakers 
interested in fiscally sustainable healthcare, despite the apparent support for 
ameliorating both problems among health care workers, the public health 
community and the general public. This mismatch is in line with Hoppe’s 
(2010) approach to public policymaking. Hoppe argues that contemporary 
democracies must improve their governance of problems, because policy is all 
too often a sophisticated answer to the wrong problem. Puzzling and powering 
are required for the implementation of policy answers that are more responsive 
to the problems perceived by health care workers, the public health community 
and the general public. Puzzling refers to developing ideas and collecting 
information to define and resolve public policy problems in a context of 
uncertainty and bounded rationality, entailing instruments for addressing a 
public problem. Powering concerns the process of decision-making, mobilising 
political support and bargaining in the context of stakeholders whose interests 
and power are diverse.
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The construct of prevention seems to be better “understood” compared to the 
construct of AC in healthcare systems. Prevention is not an easy construct 
either, but over the last decades a thorough evidence base has been generated 
about the avoidable burden of disease, determinants of health and associated 
prevention policy levers (Rose, 1992; Mackenbach et al., 2011; Mackenbach & 
Stronks, 2016). Therefore, many puzzling activities have already been executed 
for prevention. Elements of puzzling remain important, but powering is 
necessary to capitalise on the strong evidence base for prevention. Prevention 
policy entrepreneurs must realise that successful powering requires a thorough 
understanding of the process of creating context-sensitive policy content. The 
finding that junk food tax policies can address public problems other than 
public health problems alone may inspire scholars and policymakers to be 
more creative in the coupling of their pet policies to resolve public problems. 
This strategy has been proven successful in public health, for instance, in the 
well-known case of sanitation. Policy entrepreneur Edwin Chadwick advocated 
for sewage and sanitation in the 19th century because it would prevent 
unsustainable pressure on the novice British welfare system, not merely 
because of arguments for public health (Mackenbach, 2007). Broadening the 
scope of problems that prevention policies can address enables the entrance of 
additional prevention advocates, which can be decisive in the powering process 
of prevention policy.
It is interesting to note that some elements of the populist political style can be 
observed in the soda tax case studies (chapters 5 and 6). Supporters of soda tax 
policies tend to successfully pit ‘everyday’ people against the ‘establishment’ in 
the form of multinational soda companies. The problems caused by excess 
sugar consumption are often dramatised, for instance, by alluding to the impact 
of diabetes, and the solution – raising the prices of sodas – is simplified. With 
the distinction between everyday people and the establishment, the 
dramatisation of the problem and the simplification of solutions, three 
important elements of the populist political style are present (Lasco & Curato, 
2019). A similar rhetoric can be observed in AC. Populist discontent expressed 
by health care workers pits ‘everyday health care workers’ against ‘managerial 
elites’ – payers and regulators – who complicate everyday work with top-down 
campaigns to improve efficiency and quality metrics (Breen, 2018). The 
resulting administrative burden is dramatised and solutions are simplified, for 




However, as opposed to prevention, policymakers and practitioners interested 
in AC cannot rely on decades of research on the components of AC, its 
determinants and associated policy levers. Therefore, apparently simple 
solutions such as overhead norms are not yet viable, for example because it is 
hard to put an explicit price to the stakeholders that add to administrative 
burden or because reducing overhead costs of a healthcare delivery organisation 
(meso level) may increase the administrative burden of health care professionals 
(micro level). This compares to soda taxes that can from a technical point of 
view be implemented more easily. In order to reduce AC, the emphasis should 
first be on the puzzling process of generating ideas and information on the 
construct of AC and on policies that can effectively reduce AC. This dissertation 
identifies some strands for this puzzling process. Building empirical knowledge 
on the components and determinants of AC seems important, which requires 
better data-driven monitoring systems on the macro, meso and especially 
micro level. With better monitoring, hypotheses on the determinants of AC and 
the interaction of AC across the macro, meso and micro levels can be tested. 
When such aspects are understood better, more policies can be identified that 
effectively reduce total AC. Only by then is it useful to take the subsequent step 
of generating knowledge on the powering process of decision-making, 
mobilizing political support and bargaining for the successful implementation 
of the identified evidence-based policies. If the powering process precedes the 
puzzling process or if the puzzling process is bypassed altogether, chances are 
that valuable types of AC may be lost. To put it differently: the baby may be 
thrown out with the bathwater if policy processes that aim to reduce paper 
focus too little on puzzling.
Methodological considerations
The research methods used in this dissertation were guided by the nature of 
the research questions. Where these were conceptual, descriptive or explorative, 
the appropriate mix of quantitative and qualitative methods was sought, 
striving to achieve the appropriate balance between depth and breadth. 
Therefore, a wide variety of data sources was used, including harmonised 
international databases on health expenditure and health system characteris-
tics, national accounts and organisations’ annual reports, surveys and focus 
group discussions among experts, (grey) literature, newspaper archives, and 
surveys and interviews among stakeholders. The interdisciplinary character of 
this dissertation and the mixed-methods approach can be seen as strengths.
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In the remainder of this section, the conceptual frameworks and research 
designs used in this dissertation are critically discussed, in addition to the ge-
neralisability and validity of the findings.
Conceptual frameworks used
A strength of this dissertation is the attempt to systematically capture opaque 
constructs. The stream of work on AC aimed to describe the total size of AC, in 
addition exploring its components and determinants. Analysing the 
determinants of implementing sweetened beverage taxes also systematically 
captured the broad concept of ‘implementing prevention’. Established 
conceptual frameworks were used for these clarification exercises. The diffe-
rentiation of AC on the macro, meso and micro levels stems from how Rothgang 
(2010) conceptualises a healthcare system, with regulation and financing 
(macro level) as well as service provision (meso and micro levels) depicting the 
pillars of any healthcare system. The exploration into whether the type of 
healthcare financing system is relevant at the macro level used the established 
framework of healthcare systems by Wendt et al. (2009) as its basis. Wendt et al. 
identify three ideal types of healthcare financing: state, societal and private. 
These equate to government schemes, mandatory health insurance and 
voluntary health insurance in the scheme used in chapter 2, respectively. 
Investigating AC in accordance with these established frameworks identified 
potential determinants of AC, as well as omissions in the robustness and 
consistency of available data.
The studies on junk food taxes were structured with the Health Policy Triangle 
of Buse, Mays and Walt (2012), who refined this framework first published by 
Walt (1994). The Health Policy Triangle highlights patterns in the complex 
interaction between policy context, process, content and stakeholders, instead 
of identifying causal relationships between individual elements of a policy. Its 
strength lies in its descriptive completeness, because elements of the triangle 
are based on other frameworks. Leichter (1979) categorises context into 
situational, structural, cultural and exogenous factors, as was done in the 
analysis of the junk food policy context in 13 case studies. For the analysis of 
stakeholders, the approach of Varvasovszky & Brugha (2000) was used, which 
is an update of Reich’s (1994) guide for the political mapping of health policy. 
The policy process, as conceptualised in the policy cycle, guided the in-depth 
analysis of the sweetened beverage taxes in Berkeley, Philadelphia and Cook 
County. The findings of this study were discussed using Kingdon’s (2010) 
model, an established model for explaining why certain policies are enacted, 




was depicted as a set of characteristics that define the technical characteristics 
of a policy and how it is framed. In summary, the extensive use of established 
conceptualisations of health policy helped to describe a rather complete 
overview of the case studies that were investigated.
Generalisability
The systematic attempt to capture opaque concepts may be limited by the same 
limitation that it aimed to address, because the definitions used can be 
interpreted differently than was intended. Public finance scholars may, for 
instance, disagree that prevention improves the fiscal sustainability of 
healthcare, because some types of prevention increase healthcare spending. 
This impedes the generalisability of some findings. The generalisability of the 
stream of work on AC in Dutch LTC is also limited because LTC differs 
enormously across countries (OECD, 2019).
The following can be said about the generalisability of this dissertation’s policy 
analyses on junk food taxes. Although cases were investigated worldwide, the 
EU—US comparison shows that the policy spreads differently across and within 
nations. This different spread can be explained because of differences in the 
policy context of the cases that were investigated in chapter 5 and 6. In other 
words, the policy content of junk food tax attempts is very much related to the 
policy context, or, to put it differently, junk food tax policy attempts require 
context-sensitive policy content. Therefore, the case-specific findings from the 
case studies on Berkeley, Philadelphia and Cook County cannot be generalised, 
but the more generic lessons may be generalisable. For instance, the importance 
of coupling the soda tax in Philadelphia to improving access to kindergarten is 
a case-specific finding that should not be generalised, but the generic lesson 
can be drawn that it is important to couple soda tax policies to other problems 
than public health.
There are two reasons why the generic lessons of the soda tax case studies in 
this dissertation may be generalisable. First, according to Yin (2014), comparing 
cases with contrasting findings but for anticipable reasons enables case study 
comparators to theoretically replicate findings (Yin, 2014). The three local US 
soda tax cases exhibit the following important differences. Berkeley enacted a 
tax successfully with policy framing focusing on ‘bad behaviour’ of the soda 
industry and equity concerns regarding diabetes in minority groups. 
Philadelphia enacted a tax successfully as well but did not focus on health at all. 
Cook County’s attempt to enact a tax was unsuccessful. These findings could 
be traced to differences in the policy context and actors involved, including the 
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prevailing public sentiment and the organisation of the supportive advocacy 
coalition. Second, in a broader review of sugar tax policy analyses (Hagenaars 
et al., 2021), studies conducted in other settings confirm the importance of 
generating context-sensitive policy content as well as several of the generic 
lessons drawn in this dissertation. It was important to couple the policy to other 
problems than public health in many cases, as shown in chapter 5. Other soda 
tax policy analysts also found that it was important to take public sentiment 
into account, as expressed by media. For instance, this played a role in the UK, 
where the ‘soft drinks industry levy’ has been linked to consistent media 
coverage that charactised sugar consumption as an industry-driven problem 
(Buckton et al., 2019). Case studies conducted in other settings also show that a 
supportive advocacy coalition needs to be built upfront, and that it needs to 
understand the local policy context thoroughly. For instance, in the case of the 
Mexican soda tax, a high level of organization, cooperation, planning and 
effort of the supportive coalition was required (James et al. 2020), which closely 
resembles lessons five and six of chapter six. In summary, the generic lessons 
that are drawn in the soda tax case studies of this dissertation may apply to 
other contexts as well, but the case-specific findings should not be generalised.
Validity
The studies on AC revealed that AC remain to a large extent ‘hidden’ in health 
expenditure statistics. Exploring micro and meso level AC was a core element 
of the study on AC in Dutch LTC, but in this study it was discovered that some 
activities that can potentially be considered as macro level AC are not reported 
as such. Thus, the international comparison of macro level AC should be 
interpreted with caution because statisticians delivering national accounts data 
may report data differently. International differences could, however, be 
logically explained on the basis of differences in health financing systems, 
indicating reasonable face validity.
The validity of the stream of work on prevention is more robust. The analysis of 
the relationship between prevention and fiscally sustainable healthcare did not 
stem from a systematic literature review, but it does include all the base literature. 
A strength in the studies on junk food tax policies was that the findings were 
triangulated extensively with the media analysis on the Berkeley, Philadelphia 





Implications for research and policy
Based on the aforementioned findings, topics for future research and policy 
efforts are suggested. These are not presented separately because most research 
implications are also relevant for policymakers, and vice versa. Implications 
that stem directly from the empirical findings of this dissertation are presented 
separately from implications for policy and research that are more generic.
Reducing administrative costs
There is a lack of a scientific community interested in AC in healthcare, but 
knowledge is available because administrative tasks constitute a considerable 
share of any health professional’s work. Scholars should translate the available 
practice-based knowledge into a stronger evidence base for policymakers and 
practitioners. This task first requires that consensus be reached on the definition 
of AC, in the entire healthcare system. With an improved common under -
standing of this construct and its measurement as a common denominator, 
the findings suggest the following for researchers and policymakers.
- As our analysis in chapter 2 illustrates, AC may constitute 30% to 40% of total 
health spending. Although not all AC can be equated to waste, this mere 
estimate necessitates a more consistent and innovative monitoring and 
investigation of the components and determinants of low-value AC, in 
addition to the rapid growth of research on low-value care of recent years.
- There are many hypotheses on how macro, meso and micro AC interact 
(chapter 3). This interaction should be acknowledged broadly by policymakers 
and practitioners. This also means that reducing AC on one level does not 
mean that total AC will decrease. Thus, ‘capping’ AC or introducing an 
overhead norm on one level is not sensible when monitoring systems do not 
allow tracking the effects on total AC.
- The precise interactions that are at play remain mostly untested, however. 
Scholars should therefore investigate the interaction of AC across the macro, 
meso, and micro levels in experimental settings.
- Generating more empirical evidence on the interaction of AC across levels of 
the healthcare system will generate intelligence on how to organize the 
appropriate administrative tasks in the appropriate place in the healthcare 
system. For instance, Zegers et al. (2020) advocate for higher meso level AC in 
hospital settings under the assumption that this will reduce micro level AC. 
However, currently, it is not well understood when investing in AC on one 
level substitutes AC on another level, when it is complementary, and when it 




- Other implications related to the interaction of AC on the different levels 
concern the effects of healthcare reforms. As shown in chapter 2, introducing 
competition increases macro level AC but the more important question is 
how this reflects on the meso and micro levels. Decentralisation of Dutch 
LTC may have increased macro level costs because of a loss of economies of 
scale on the purchaser side, and LTC providers have probably felt the 
repercussions of duplication of financers (chapter 3). Policymakers should 
consider these trickle-down effects of reforms, and scholars must improve 
monitoring systems such that the full effects of reforms can be evaluated.
Additional generic suggestions for reducing AC.
- Intermezzo 1 describes that policymakers and practitioners mostly focus on 
improving the operational efficiency of specific administrative burdens on 
the provider level. This alone will not solve the problem. AC form part of a 
broader ecosystem where many interdependencies are at play. In the 
Netherlands, for example, many data custodians exist, and incentives for 
sharing and rationing data requests are generally absent. This phenomenon 
has created a complex system where improving operational efficiency on the 
micro level alone does not eliminate the root causes of operational 
inefficiency. Thus, improving data governance seems to be a prerequisite.
- The many institutions that are involved in the governance and financing of 
Dutch healthcare need data to fulfil their tasks, but often there are no 
incentives for sharing data nor are these institutions bounded in the volume 
of data requests (intermezzo 1). Deploying pricing policies could be considered 
to mitigate this. Currently, AC, especially on the micro level, are hidden in 
general statistics. Thus, regulators, financers or managers demanding 
excessive registrations are not confronted directly with the associated costs 
of their data requests. Institutionalising true pricing schemes of AC can 
circumvent such practices. A similar argument is for food prices to represent 
their true societal costs (Mozaffarian, 2014). Such a true pricing scheme, 
again, requires thorough monitoring of AC on all levels.
- Many potential drivers of AC exist; of those, an overt focus on preventing 
failures is important. According to Peeters (2015), home care providers can 
enter a vicious cycle if an incident leads to increased pressure on a government 
to strengthen control. When home care organisations translate increased 
reporting demands strictly, the reporting burden increases further, increasing 
the risk of failures. The vicious circle continues if new incidents occur, 
culminating in new reporting demands and so forth. Policymakers and 
practitioners should consider that mitigating risks can sometimes require 




administrative processes for risk control causes the same problems that they 
aim to address.
Strengthening prevention
Prevention has gained interest among the general public and important 
stakeholders in the last few years. Public pressure for stronger prevention 
policies may increase further because of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which 
has shown that a more resilient population health can withstand health crises 
more easily but also that strong interaction exists between health and wealth 
and thus the fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems. Furthermore, there is a 
strong evidence base on avoidable risk factors, and in general terms it is quite 
well understood which prevention policies are effective. The question therefore 
is how to implement prevention policies. On the basis of the case studies on 
junk food taxes, the following considerations address these implementation 
problems.
- Despite the current momentum for prevention, operationalising any popular 
issue into concrete policies always mobilises opponents whose interests are 
jeopardised. Chapter 6 shows that soda tax supporters can effectively 
counteract their opponents when organised well. Thus, advocacy coalitions 
must be constructed early in the policymaking process. They must thoroughly 
understand the local policy context and agree on the specific policy content 
they are advocating for, before the policy is on the political agenda. Scholars 
can help policy entrepreneurs by studying the stakeholder dynamics of 
successful and unsuccessful prevention policy attempts.
- Powering is more important than puzzling in prevention, but the specific 
policy content of prevention measures must still be planned meticulously. 
Chapter 5 and 6 and intermezzo 2 show that many problems must be 
considered before a junk food tax policy can be implemented. Most notably, 
a scheme that demarcates healthier from unhealthier foods is absent (Marion 
Nestlé, 2013). Even when a product group can be demarcated, as is the case 
for sweetened beverages, policy entrepreneurs must consider the existing 
local tax policies and decision-making rules for the exact structure of the tax 
(e.g., whether it can be earmarked). 
- It is important to acknowledge that these implementation challenges will be 
different and difficult in any prevention measure because of the intersectoral 
character of prevention measures (Hagenaars et al., 2020). Scholars should 
therefore be more precise in the specific policy content of the prevention 
measures that they suggest policymakers to implement.
- Considering the intersectoral character of prevention policies, it must also 
be realised that health rhetoric will not always be productive for the 
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implementation of prevention policies. The junk food tax policies that were 
investigated in this dissertation were often coupled to other problems than to 
problems of public health alone. This may be true for other prevention policies 
that require the participation of stakeholders not directly related to the public 
health and healthcare sector. Employment and social security policymakers 
are, for instance, not primarily occupied with public health. Chapter 4 
illustrates that prevention may benefit such policy areas too, for example, 
by improving productivity and labour participation. Prevention policy 
entrepreneurs should therefore expand the scope of public problems that 
prevention measures can address in policy framing. Scholars can help by 
investigating the stated problems addressed in other case studies on the 
adoption of successful prevention policies.
Additional generic suggestions for prevention, obtained by examining the 
window of opportunity of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.
- The pandemic highlights the interrelation between the health and wealth 
of the population. Therefore, it may further increase public pressure for 
prevention policies such as sugar taxes. The impact on public sentiment 
should be considered, however, because enacting a sugar tax on the rhetoric 
of easing the impact of the pandemic can also be interpreted as blaming 
individuals with (self-induced) poor health. Such a perception and focus on 
individual behaviour is inaccurate in the context of the abundant evidence 
on the influence of the obesogenic environment. However, the volatility of 
public debate must be considered. Advocating for a sugar tax in the wake of 
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic should therefore be accompanied by adjacent 
policies and should focus on correcting the food environment, not individual 
health behaviour.
- Another major public problem will be the public debt that governments are 
incurring to pay for their response to the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and the 
consequent economic downturn. Fiscal need caused by the previous 
economic crisis was a main driver of many sugar tax cases investigated in 
this dissertation. The current fiscal need of governments provides a new 





The aim of this dissertation was to analyse how reducing paper and sugar can 
contribute to fiscally sustainable healthcare systems. Although it can be 
concluded that reducing paper and sugar will improve the fiscal sustainability, 
there remains much to learn about implementing policies that can achieve 
these goals. This dissertation contributed to this field by finding that AC 
constitute a much higher percentage of total health spending than general 
health expenditure statistics suggest and by observing that AC interact heavily 
across levels of the healthcare system. The current lack of construct validity 
and adequate monitoring should be resolved to identify policies that can 
overcome the root causes of low-value AC and to understand the trickle-down 
effects of healthcare reforms. 
An important contribution to the already strong evidence that supports 
prevention is that prevention policies can also resolve other problems than 
public health alone. This benefit can strengthen new advocacy coalitions, 
benefiting well-thought-out prevention policy content that aligns with existing 
institutional arrangements. Creating context-sensitive prevention policy content 
is complicated, however, even in the case of the apparently simple junk food 
tax policy.
In summary, this dissertation has shown that it is a worthwhile but also very 
complex undertaking to operationalise the popular goals of reducing paper and 
sugar in concrete policies. Policymakers, practitioners and scholars should 
embrace this complexity for incremental progress towards a health system 
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Fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems is under increasing pressure due to 
population ageing, medical-technological progress, the rise of chronic illnesses 
and the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. This does not only pose an economic problem, 
but it also threatens population health by reducing (future) access to healthcare 
services and reduced investment opportunities in other sectors that impact 
health outcomes, such as education or social security.
Policies are needed for the fiscal sustainability of healthcare systems. These 
policies must bend the curve of healthcare expenditure, or they must improve 
the willingness and ability to pay. These policies must also be implementable. 
The latter requires political and public support. There appears to exist a lot of 
support for reducing ‘paper and sugar’. Reducing “paper” relates to the reduction 
of bureaucracy in health care. Reducing “sugar” relates to tackling behavioural 
risk factors such as sugar use, through prevention. Policy documents and 
election programs of political parties highlight reduction of bureaucracy in 
health care and reduction of sugar use as a means of prevention both as 
solutions for fiscal sustainability (chapter 1). However, as soon as these generally 
formulated policy goals are operationalized into specific policies, all kinds 
of problems and conflicts of interest are likely to hinder further policy 
implementation.
According to scholars in the policy sciences, puzzling and powering are 
necessary activities to create effective policies (Hoppe, 2010). Puzzling refers to 
the process of developing ideas and collecting information to define and 
resolve public policy problems in a context of uncertainty and bounded 
rationality, enveloping in instruments for addressing a public problem. 
Powering concerns the process of decision-making, mobilizing political 
support and bargaining in the context of stakeholders whose interests and 
power are diverse. The powering and puzzling aspects of ‘reducing paper and 
sugar’ are investigated in this dissertation.
Part 1: ‘Reducing bureaucracy’ requires more puzzling
Part 1 focuses on the puzzling aspects of reducing bureaucracy, because 
the construct itself is still rather vague. A thorough monitoring system of 
administrative costs in the entire healthcare system is currently absent, which 
means that potential cost savings cannot be traced adequately. Puzzling 
activities are needed to better understand the components and determinants of 




In this dissertation, administrative costs are differentiated on the level of 
organizations involved in the governance and financing of healthcare (macro), 
overhead costs of healthcare delivery organizations (meso) and time spent by 
healthcare professionals on administrative tasks (micro). Internationally 
comparable, routinely collected statistics are only available on the macro level. 
The analyses of these data are presented in chapter 2, in which the following 
research questions are discussed:
1. How do OECD countries differ in their governance and financing-related 
administrative expenditure in healthcare? 
2. How and why do governance and financing-related administrative 
expenditure differ between countries with different types of healthcare 
systems? 
Macro level administrative costs have remained stable at slightly over 3% of total 
health spending over the last decade in Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries. Large differences exist across countries, 
with Iceland reporting spending as little as 1.3% in 2015. The Netherlands ranks 
above the OECD average at approximately 4%, and the Unites States reports 
spending as much as 8.3% of its healthcare budget on regulating and financing 
healthcare alone. 
These cross-country differences should be interpreted with caution, because 
data are not always reported according to the recommendations that are part of 
the internationally harmonised System of Health Accounts. International 
differences can nevertheless be explained on the basis of the types of healthcare 
systems. The analysis shows that voluntary private health insurance schemes 
bear much higher administrative costs than compulsory schemes. Among the 
compulsory schemes, multiple-payer schemes exhibit significantly higher 
administrative spending than single-payer schemes. These differences can be 
explained because multi-payer and voluntary health insurance schemes 
require additional administrative functions, and typically face lower economies 
of scale. 
Chapter 2 addresses administrative costs on the macro level, but these costs are 
actually much higher in healthcare delivery organizations (meso level) and 
among healthcare professionals (micro level). Therefore, in chapter 3, a study is 
presented in which administrative costs are investigated on all three levels in 
the Dutch long-term care system. A large reform took place in this sector in 
2015 and reducing bureaucracy was one of the explicit aims. The following 
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research questions were investigated through a survey and focus group 
discussions with experts:
3. Can the share of administrative costs in total long-term care spending be 
assessed in the Netherlands?
4. Did the 2015 reform of long-term care in the Netherlands affect the total 
share of administrative costs in long-term care? 
The current research instruments and data systems are not robust and 
consistent enough to trace administrative costs longitudinally across the entire 
system of long-term care (chapter 3). Consequently, the effects of the 2015 
reform cannot be investigated properly. The available data does not, however, 
hint at a significant decrease in administrative costs. On the macro level, many 
more activities may be considered as administration than are currently reported 
in the national accounts. They concern for instance costs of research on LTC 
service delivery and costs related to representation activities. A major limitation 
concerns the lack of data on long-term care related administrative costs 
incurred by municipalities. These may have increased as a consequence of the 
decentralization of tasks from 25 healthcare offices to almost 400 municipalities. 
Data is collected on the meso level, but it appears that results may not be 
representative for smaller long-term care delivery organizations. On the micro 
level, several survey studies have been deployed among long-term care 
professionals, but these studies are generally not peer-reviewed, a valid time 
series is absent, and experts expressed doubts regarding data validity.
Despite the conclusion that current research instruments and data are 
insufficient, improving data collection may be possible nonetheless. Many 
ideas exist to improve research practice and monitoring, and consensus was 
reached among experts that it is important to analyse the issue from a systems 
perspective. This systems perspective is required because there exists heavy 
interaction between administrative costs on the macro, meso and micro levels. 
For instance, when a healthcare delivery organization cuts back on employees 
who generate duty rosters, nurses are likely to have to schedule their work 
themselves. In this example, meso level administrative costs decrease but 
micro costs increase. The variety and lack of empirical evidence of potential 
spill over effects across these levels mean that tracking the overall effect of a 
single reform is currently impossible.
The heavy interaction of administrative costs on the different levels of the 
healthcare system also means that we are dealing with a complex issue. 
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Therefore, in intermezzo 1 it is argued that the common strategy of increasing 
operational efficiency of administration in healthcare delivery will be 
insufficient, if it is not part of a more holistic approach towards improving the 
governance of data and information for healthcare. Rationing the number of 
data custodians and improving incentives for sharing and rationing data 
requests are elements of concern for better data governance.
Part 2:  ‘more prevention’ requires knowledge about 
the policy context and the policy process; some puzzling 
but especially more powering is needed
Policymakers have rediscovered the importance of prevention in recent years. 
In the Netherlands, for instance, the third Rutte cabinet reached a ‘prevention 
agreement’ in 2018 with various organizations: a package of societal goals and 
policies targeting smoking, overweight and harmful alcohol use. Policy discourse 
around prevention often stresses that prevention will reduce healthcare 
expenditure. The relation between prevention and fiscally sustainable healthcare 
systems is complex, however. Therefore, chapter 4 discusses the following 
research question:
5. How are prevention and fiscally sustainable healthcare related? 
Not all types of prevention reduce healthcare costs. Prevention of certain risk 
factors can even increase net lifetime healthcare costs. This may for instance 
be the case for smoking. Prevention is nevertheless important for fiscally 
sustainable healthcare systems. It is plausible for many risk factors that 
prevention leads to lower healthcare costs, on the short term but also over a 
lifetime. More importantly, health as a key driver of productivity should be 
considered. Most importantly, however, is the intrinsic value of good health 
itself.
Thus, the question then is why policymakers do not adopt more prevention 
policies. Aspects related to politics and practical implementation issues might 
explain why the implementation of prevention policies often falls short with 
their theoretical potential. This multifaceted topic is investigated in-depth with 
case studies on junk food tax policies. This specific policy measure is 
investigated because cost-effectiveness studies highlight that these taxes can 
lead to large health gains for low costs. The analyses are structured with the 
health policy triangle of Buse, Mays and Walt (2012). This conceptual framework 
identifies a policy’s content, relevant contextual factors and the process of 
agenda-setting up to policy formulation, adoption, implementation and 
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evaluation. Actors with different interests and power positions influence these 
three aspects. Chapter 5 focuses on policy content with the following research 
question:
6. What specific types of junk food taxes are governments implementing? 
To answer this question, 13 tax policy cases were purposely sampled. Subsequently, 
the (grey) literature that was published on these cases was reviewed, and findings 
were validated by local experts. The junk food tax cases of the governments 
of Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, the UK, Fiji, Samoa, Nauru, French 
Polynesia, Mexico, South-Africa and Berkeley and Philadelphia in the USA 
were included. Most governments were unable to demarcate a broader scope of 
products than sweetened beverages. At the point of writing, only in Hungary, 
Mexico, Nauru and French Polynesia were products other than sweetened 
beverages included. In Denmark, a ‘fat tax’ was implemented in 2012, but it 
was abolished one year later because of implementation problems, which 
deteriorated public support for the tax. This illustrates how important it is to 
consider the practical implementation challenges of junk food taxes. When the 
13 taxes under investigation were announced, governments often emphasized 
the purpose of tax revenue. Parallel to the announcement of the UK sugar 
industry level, for instance, the ministry of finance announced that part of the 
revenue would be used for sports in primary schools. In most cases, tax revenue 
was not officially earmarked for health purposes, probably because of fiscal 
rules.
Chapter 5 also addresses relevant contextual factors with the following research 
question: 
7. What patterns can be observed in the policy contexts of junk food taxes?
Fiscal needs often laid the policy foundation for the 13 included junk food taxes 
rather than public health-focused advocacy. The specific reasons why there 
was fiscal need were diverse. For instance, the Nauru government lost revenue 
because a phosphate mine collapsed. In France, there was a need to reduce the 
tax burden on farmers and a sweetened beverage tax was suggested to elevate 
the resulting budget deficit. Relatively large differences can be observed in the 
stated policy aims of governments. Another finding was that a remarkable 
number of conservative-liberal governments have adopted these taxes.
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Shortly after the publication of the article on which chapter 5 is based, several 
other governments adopted sweetened beverages taxes. Remarkable differences 
could be observed in the spread of the policies in the European Union compared 
with the United States, which were analysed with the following research question: 
8.  How can differences, observed in the spread of sweetened beverage  
tax policies in the European Union compared with the United States,  
be explained? 
Whereas sweetened beverage taxes are introduced by national governments in 
the EU, in the United States, only some local governments have introduced 
such taxes. As a net result, only 5 million individuals in the United States reside 
in a jurisdiction with a sweetened beverage tax, and for the EU, approximately 
170 million. In intermezzo 2, the argument is made that the EU single market 
policy may act as a soft governance framework for sweetened beverage taxes. 
Almost all EU countries with a beverage tax deploy a tax structure similar to the 
British sugar industry levy (which was announced long before the Brexit 
referendum). In this model, beverages with a higher sugar content are subjected 
to a higher tariff, to incentivize producers to reduce sugar content. On the 
contrary, in the United States, local governments only deploy one tariff, 
irrespective of sugar content. Another difference is that EU governments that 
adopted sweetened beverage taxes consist of various political colours, whereas 
no Republican-led local government had adopted a tax. 
Research questions 6—8 provide insights into the policy content and policy 
context of junk food taxes, but findings on their related policy processes 
remained superficial. Therefore, in chapter 6, the following research question is 
addressed:
9. What patterns can be observed in the agenda-setting and decision- 
making phases of sweetened beverage tax policies implemented in three 
US cities, and how do these relate to policy context and policy content? 
To investigate the policy process of sweetened beverage taxes, a comparative 
case study was deployed of the sweetened beverage taxes of Berkeley, 
Philadelphia and Cook County. Three local cases in the United States were 
selected because document analyses and interviews could be conducted in the 
English language. Berkeley and Philadelphia were selected because these two 
cities were the first to introduce a beverage tax, which was still in place at the 
point of writing. On the contrary, in Cook County, the beverage tax was 
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abolished two months after it was implemented. This meant successful cases 
could be compared to a less successful attempt. Data was collected with a 
survey and interviews among stakeholders involved in the policy process, and 
a media coverage analysis.
Six lessons were drawn. First, the policy was in all three cases coupled to issues 
which already had public support. These issues were not necessarily related to 
public health. For instance, in Philadelphia, tax revenue was used for pre- 
kindergarten, because the lack of funding for pre-kindergarten was already on 
the agenda for years. Second, policy framing had to align political sentiment, 
such as that expressed in media. The ‘Berkeley versus Big Soda’ campaign 
message for instance reflected an existing local scepticism towards the 
influence of big corporations in politics. Third, existing tax and decision-mak-
ing rules had to be considered meticulously. This went wrong in Cook County, 
where confusion regarding tax implementation diminished public support. 
Fourth, the tax structure required technical as well as political considerations. 
In Philadelphia, artificially sweetened beverages were included after criticism 
that the tax targeted people with lower incomes, under the assumption that 
people with higher incomes consume more artificially sweetened beverages. 
Fifth, a supportive advocacy coalition was necessary and had to be built upfront 
in the policymaking process. This went well in Berkeley, but supporters in Cook 
County were unorganized when the tax proposal was announced. Sixth, 
the advocacy coalition had to be locally grounded and able to influence local 
media. The Cook County opposition for instance mobilized local retailers to 
demonstrate against the tax which diminished public support.
Conclusions and implications
The aim of this dissertation was to analyse how reducing paper and sugar 
can contribute to fiscally sustainable healthcare systems. The puzzling and 
powering aspects that are needed for this were investigated. The studies on 
‘reducing paper’ have shown that many puzzling activities are still needed to 
better understand the construct of administrative costs. The issue should in 
any case be approached from a systems perspective because of the interactions 
of administrative costs between the macro, meso and micro levels. The current 
lack of empirical evidence on these interactions makes it difficult to analyse the 
effects of reforms. Healthcare system types do appear to play a role, because 
international differences in administrative costs on the macro level can largely 
be explained by differences in the type of healthcare systems.
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More consistent and innovative monitoring of administrative costs is required 
to generate intelligence on how to organize the appropriate administrative 
tasks in the appropriate place. Better monitoring is required especially on the 
level of healthcare professionals. Improving data governance is a prerequisite 
for achieving this.
This dissertation shows that ‘more prevention’ will probably benefit the fiscal 
sustainability of healthcare systems, but not only by reducing healthcare 
expenditure. Productivity gains and the intrinsic value of health are also 
important. Thus, the question is why policymakers do not adopt more 
prevention policies. The junk food tax policies of this dissertation suggest that 
some puzzling is still necessary to adopt taxes targeting other foods than 
sweetened beverages alone. However, powering is currently the main challenge 
for sweetened beverage tax policies. 
The junk food tax policy analyses of this dissertation suggest that prevention 
policy entrepreneurs must organize a supportive advocacy coalition upfront in 
the policymaking process. A proper organization is necessary because of the 
complexity of prevention policies, which are made in many different policy 
arenas due to their intersectoral character. This also means that the specific 
challenges of prevention policies can vary. Scholars should therefore be more 
precise in the specific policy content of the prevention measures that they 
suggest policymakers to implement.
Considering the intersectoral character of prevention policies, it must also be 
realised that only health rhetoric will not always be enough for policy adoption. 
This dissertation provided a clear example of this as the junk food tax policies 
were often coupled to other problems than public health alone. Similar strategies 
can be deployed for other prevention policies, that require the participation of 
stakeholders outside the scope of the public health and healthcare sector.
Some parallels can be drawn between administrative costs and prevention as 
policy issues. A lack of consensus exists as to what administrative costs are. 
Prevention is not an easy construct either, but over the last decades the scientific 
community has generated a thorough evidence base about the determinants of 
health and associated prevention policy levers. On the other hand, there exists 
a lack of a scientific community interested in administrative costs in healthcare. 
The total size of administrative costs necessitates more research on low-value 
administration, in addition to the rapid recent growth of research on low-value 
care. Institutionalizing true pricing schemes on administrative costs appears 
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to be an important point on the horizon. Currently, organizations demanding 
excessive registrations are not confronted with the associated costs of their 
data requests. A similar argument is for food prices to represent their true 
societal costs on the basis of the ‘polluter pays’ principle.
The scientific literature on fiscal sustainability focuses less on “reducing paper 
and sugar” and more on rationing healthcare and reorganising healthcare 
financing and delivery. This makes sense because the associated policy 
measures are more directly linked to fiscal sustainability and can generally also 
reduce costs in the shorter term. However, these policy measures are unpopular. 
‘Reducing paper and sugar’ are popular but this dissertation has shown that it is 
a complex undertaking to operationalise these goals in concrete policies. 
Policymakers, practitioners and scholars should embrace this complexity for 





De betaalbaarheid van gezondheidszorgsystemen is de voorbije decennia 
onder toenemende druk komen te staan door vergrijzing, medisch-technolo-
gische ontwikkelingen en de toename van chronische aandoeningen. De door 
de coronapandemie veroorzaakte recessie zal dit probleem naar verwachting 
verergeren. Onbetaalbare zorg bedreigt de volksgezondheid wanneer het de 
toegang tot zorg vermindert en wanneer het investeringen verdringt in andere 
sectoren die de volksgezondheid bevorderen.
Beleid is nodig om de zorg betaalbaar te houden. Dit beleid moet de zorgkosten 
verlagen of bijdragen aan de bereidheid om zorg te betalen. Het beleid moet 
echter ook ingevoerd kunnen worden. Daarvoor is draagvlak nodig. Uit vrijwel 
alle verkiezingsprogramma’s, manifesten, en pamfletten over gezondheid en 
zorg blijkt dat er veel draagvlak is voor ‘minder bureaucratie en meer preventie’ 
(hoofstuk 1). Zowel ‘minder bureaucratie’ als ‘meer preventie’ zijn algemeen 
geformuleerde doelen waar niemand het mee oneens lijkt te zijn, maar zodra 
dergelijke doelen in concreet beleid worden omgezet, komen allerlei problemen 
en belangentegenstellingen boven water die implementatie belemmeren.
Puzzling en powering zijn nodig om die problemen en belangenstegenstellingen 
te overwinnen in het beleidsproces (Hoppe, 2010). Onder puzzling wordt het 
proces verstaan waarin ideeën worden ontwikkeld en informatie wordt 
verzameld om een publiek beleidsprobleem te begrijpen en op te lossen. 
Gedurende dit gepuzzel is er sprake van een onzekere context en is de 
rationaliteit begrensd door de continue druk op beleidsprocessen. Onder 
powering wordt het proces verstaan waarin politieke besluiten worden 
genomen, politiek draagvlak wordt gecreëerd en waarin onderhandeld wordt 
met actoren met verschillende machtsposities en belangen. In dit proefschrift 
worden de puzzling en powering aspecten van ‘minder bureaucratie en meer 
preventie’ onderzocht.
Deel 1: ‘minder bureaucratie’ vergt meer gepuzzel
Deel 1 van dit proefschrift richt zich op puzzling aspecten omdat administratie-
ve kosten verweven zijn in vrijwel alle functies van een gezondheids-
zorgsysteem en het een betrekkelijk vaag construct is. Het is nog niet goed 
mogelijk om de powering aspecten van bewezen effectief beleid te onderzoeken, 
omdat er nog geen helder beeld is van de componenten en determinanten van 
administratieve kosten en potentiële besparingen kunnen door een gebrek aan 
adequate monitoring nog niet goed getraceerd worden.
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In dit proefschrift wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen administratieve kosten 
op het niveau van organisaties die betrokken zijn bij het bestuur en de 
financiering van zorg (macro), overheadkosten van zorginstellingen (meso) en 
de tijd die zorgprofessionals kwijt zijn aan administratieve taken (micro). Enkel 
op het macro niveau worden openbaar beschikbare en internationaal 
vergelijkbare statistieken verzameld. De analyse van deze data wordt 
gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 2 aan de hand van de volgende twee vragen:
1. Hoe verschillen de bestuur en financiering gerelateerde administratieve 
kosten van gezondheidszorgsystemen in OESO landen?
2. Hoe en waarom verschillen bestuur en financiering gerelateerde admini-
stratieve kosten tussen OESO landen met verschillende typen gezond-
heidszorgsystemen?
De administratieve kosten op macro niveau zijn in het laatste decennium 
stabiel gebleven. Gemiddelde geven OESO landen iets meer dan 3% van de 
totale zorguitgaven uit aan administratieve kosten op macro niveau, maar er 
zijn grote internationale verschillen. IJsland komt op slechts 1,3% uit terwijl de 
VS 8,3% van de totale zorguitgaven aan administratieve kosten op macro niveau 
uitgeeft. Nederland komt uit op ongeveer 4%. Dat is hoger dan het OESO 
gemiddelde.
Enige voorzichtigheid is geboden bij de interpretatie van deze cijfers, omdat 
gegevens niet altijd conform de aanbevelingen van het internationaal gehar-
moniseerde System of Health Accounts worden aangeleverd. Wel kunnen de 
internationale verschillen logisch verklaard worden op basis van de wijze 
waarop landen zorg financieren. Voor alle landen geldt dat de administratieve 
kosten van vrijwillige private verzekeringen (de aanvullende verzekering in 
Nederland) hoger liggen dan die van verplichte (volks)verzekeringen en 
belasting gefinancierde systemen. Binnen de verplichte financieringsarrange-
menten, blijkt dat landen met meerdere financiers (zoals zorgverzekeraars in 
het kader van de Zorgverzekeringswet in Nederland) hogere administratieve 
kosten hebben dan landen met één volksverzekering of een belasting 
gefinancierd systeem. Deze verschillen kunnen in ieder geval deels verklaard 
worden doordat er in vrijwillige verzekeringssystemen meer transacties 
plaatsvinden, en omdat een systeem met meerdere financiers minder schaal-




Hoofdstuk 2 gaat enkel over het macro niveau, terwijl de overheadkosten van 
zorginstellingen (meso niveau) en de administratieve taken die zorgprofessio-
nals uitvoeren (micro niveau) hoger zijn. Daarom wordt in hoofdstuk 3 
onderzoek gepresenteerd naar administratieve kosten op het macro, meso en 
micro niveau in de langdurige zorg in Nederland. Er is naar deze sector gekeken 
omdat in 2015 een grote hervorming plaats vond in de Nederlandse langdurige 
zorg die onder andere tot doel had om de bureaucratie te verminderen. Met een 
vragenlijstonderzoek en focusgroep discussies onder experts zijn de volgende 
vragen onderzocht:
3. Kunnen de totale administratieve kosten in de Nederlandse langdurige 
zorg in kaart gebracht worden?
4. Had de hervorming langdurige zorg in Nederland in 2015 een effect op de 
totale administratieve kosten in de langdurige zorg?
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt geconcludeerd dat de huidige onderzoeksinstrumenten 
en de beschikbare monitoring onvoldoende robuust en consistent zijn om 
de administratieve kosten op macro, meso en micro niveau longitudinaal 
betekenisvol en betrouwbaar te volgen. Hierdoor kunnen de effecten van de 
hervorming in 2015 niet goed onderzocht worden, maar tegelijkertijd zijn er 
geen aanwijzingen dat de administratieve kosten zijn gedaald. Op het macro 
niveau blijkt dat diverse activiteiten die als beheerskosten bestempeld kunnen 
worden, ontbreken in de officiële statistieken die het CBS verzamelt. Het gaat 
dan bijvoorbeeld om onderzoek naar langdurige zorg of om belangenvertegen-
woordiging. Daarnaast is er geen goed zicht op de gerelateerde beheerskosten 
van gemeenten, terwijl deze (mogelijk) zijn gestegen door de overheveling van 
taken van 25 zorgkantoren naar bijna 400 gemeenten. Op het meso niveau 
worden valide gegevens verzameld, maar deze zijn niet representatief voor 
kleinere zorginstellingen. Op het micro niveau zijn diverse vragenlijstonder-
zoeken uitgevoerd, maar deze verschillen sterk in opzet en een tijdserie die 
terug gaat tot voor 2016 ontbreekt. Tevens meten deze vragenlijsten vooral de 
ervaren administratieve lasten en daarmee niet zozeer de feitelijke administra-
tieve kosten.
Ondanks het huidige gebrek aan robuuste en consistente monitoring van 
 administratieve kosten, is in de focusgroepen consensus bereikt over hoe dit 
verbeterd kan worden en werden veel goede ideeën gegenereerd om de 
beschikbare data te verbeteren. Tevens werd in de focusgroepen benadrukt dat 
administratieve kosten op de macro, meso en micro niveaus waarschijnlijk als 
communicerende vaten werken. Wanneer een zorginstelling bijvoorbeeld 
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bezuinigt op personeel dat roosters verzorgt, zullen verpleegkundigen deze 
taak zelf moeten uitvoeren. In dit voorbeeld dalen dus de meso kosten, maar 
stijgen de micro kosten. Door de vele interacties zal het ook met perfecte 
gegevens over de macro, meso en micro kosten moeilijk blijven om de effecten 
van hervormingen te onderzoeken, omdat er betrekkelijk weinig wetenschap-
pelijke kennis is over hoe op welk niveau welke administratieve kosten het 
beste gemaakt kunnen worden.
Deel 1 wordt afgesloten met een commentaar op een studie van Zegers et al. 
(2020) naar administratieve lasten ervaren door zorgprofessionals werkzaam in 
Nederlandse ziekenhuizen. In Intermezzo 1 wordt beargumenteerd dat er meer 
operationele efficiëntie nodig is, maar de complexiteit van de data governance 
vergt ook meer aandacht. In Nederland beheren veel verschillende organisaties 
een deel van de benodigde gegevens en er zijn betrekkelijk weinig prikkels om 
gegevens uit te wisselen. Een integrale benadering is nodig die zich zowel op 
deze achterliggende oorzaken van administratieve lastendruk richt als op de 
operationele efficiëntie op de werkvloer. Een dergelijke benadering is in 
Nederland niet gemakkelijk door de historie van een complexe en versnipperde 
data governance, maar wel nodig omdat gemakkelijke oplossingen voor 
complexe problemen niet bestaan.
Deel 2: ‘meer preventie’ vergt kennis over de beleidscontext 
en het beleidsproces
Het belang van preventie is de laatste jaren herontdekt. Zo bereikte het 
Nederlandse kabinet Rutte III in 2018 met verschillende maatschappelijk 
betrokken partijen een preventieakkoord: een pakket maatregelen gericht op 
het terugdringen van roken, overgewicht en problematisch drinken. Vaak 
wordt aangehaald dat preventie de zorgkosten verlaagt. De relatie tussen 
preventie en betaalbaarheid is echter complex. Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de 
volgende vraag:
5. Hoe hangen preventie en betaalbare zorg met elkaar samen?
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt beschreven dat preventie niet altijd de zorgkosten verlaagt. 
Uitstel van zorgkosten leidt namelijk niet altijd tot afstel van zorgkosten. 
Tegelijkertijd is preventie wel degelijk een kansrijke strategie voor betaalbare 
zorg. Los van het feit dat preventie van bijvoorbeeld mentale gezondheidspro-
blemen ook binnen het perspectief van de levensloop tot lagere zorgkosten 
leidt, speelt mee dat gezondheid de productiviteit verhoogt en het daarnaast 
een intrinsieke waarde in zichzelf vertegenwoordigt.
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Preventie is derhalve goed voor betaalbare zorg. Tegelijkertijd blijft de 
implementatie van preventiebeleid achter bij de verwachtingen die velen ervan 
hebben. Dit hangt voor een groot deel samen met politieke aspecten en de 
praktische uitvoering van preventiemaatregelen. In dit proefschrift worden 
deze aspecten onderzocht met beleidsanalyses over belastingen op ongezonde 
voeding. Dit specifieke beleid is onderzocht omdat kosteneffectiviteitsstudies 
laten zien dat er relatief veel gezondheidswinst mee geboekt kan worden tegen 
lage kosten. De analyses worden gestructureerd naar de health policy triangle 
van Buse, Mays & Walt (2012). Deze maakt onderscheid tussen de vorm van het 
beleid, relevante contextfactoren en het beleidsproces waarmee het beleid tot 
stand komt. Actoren met verschillende belangen en machtsposities proberen 
deze drie aspecten te beïnvloeden. Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de volgende vraag:
6. Welke specifieke vorm hebben recent ingevoerde belastingen op 
ongezonde voeding?
Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden werd een doelgerichte steekproef 
genomen van belastingen op ongezonde voeding welke zijn ingevoerd door 13 
overheden. Vervolgens is de (grijze) literatuur over de betreffende casussen 
verzameld en geanalyseerd. Daarna zijn de bevindingen gevalideerd bij lokale 
experts. Geïncludeerd werden de belastingen van Denemarken, Finland, 
Frankrijk, Hongarije, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Fiji, Samoa, Nauru, Frans Polynesië, 
Mexico, Zuid-Afrika en Berkeley en Philadelphia in de VS. In vrijwel al deze 13 
casussen worden frisdranken belast. Slechts in enkele gevallen lukt het 
overheden om ook andere ongezonde producten te belasten. Hieruit blijkt dat 
de uitvoerbaarheid van dergelijke maatregelen belangrijk is, waardoor er een 
duidelijke afbakening nodig is van wat wel en niet extra belast wordt. Problemen 
in de uitvoering waren bijvoorbeeld een belangrijke reden waarom de Deense 
belasting op verzadigd vet mislukte, omdat deze zich richtte op een nutriënt die 
in zeer veel verschillende producten zit, in plaats van een duidelijk af te bakenen 
productgroep zoals frisdranken. Verder werd er vaak tegelijk met de aan - 
kondiging van de belasting een investering in een specifiek doel aangekondigd, 
zoals sport op scholen in het VK. De belastingopbrengsten waren echter meestal 
niet officieel geoormerkt voor deze doelen, waarschijnlijk omdat dit indruist 
tegen begrotingsregels. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt hierover de volgende vraag 
beantwoord:
7. Welke patronen zijn zichtbaar binnen de beleidscontext van de invoering 
van belastingen op ongezonde voeding?
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Het viel op dat de behoefte aan meer overheidsinkomsten in relatief veel van de 
13 onderzochte casussen een belangrijke rol speelde. De redenen daarvoor 
waren divers: in Nauru was bijvoorbeeld een fosfaatmijn ingestort waardoor 
de overheid inkomsten misliep terwijl er in Frankrijk juist behoefte was aan 
verlaging van de belastingdruk bij boeren, wat een tekort in de overheidsfinanciën 
zou veroorzaken welke door een frisdranktaks kon worden gedicht. Gezondheid 
was niet het enige doel in het merendeel van de onderzochte casussen, wat 
zich uitte in grote verschillen in de framing van het beleid. Tevens viel op dat 
overheden die deze belasting invoerden relatief vaak een conservatief-liberale 
samenstelling hadden.  
Kort na publicatie van het artikel waarop hoofdstuk 5 is gebaseerd, werden er 
door diverse andere overheden frisdrankbelastingen ingevoerd. Tussen de VS 
en de EU ontstonden verschillen in de verspreiding van deze maatregel, welke 
worden geanalyseerd met de volgende vraag:
8. Hoe kunnen verschillen in de verspreiding van invoering van frisdrankbe-
lastingen in de VS ten opzichte van de EU worden verklaard?
Waar frisdrankbelastingen in de EU door nationale overheden worden ingevoerd, 
blijft het in de VS vooralsnog bij lokale overheden (intermezzo 2). Als gevolg 
daarvan wonen in de EU inmiddels ongeveer 170 miljoen mensen in gebieden 
met een frisdrankbelasting, ten opzichte van ongeveer 5 miljoen in de VS. 
Er kan beredeneerd worden dat het Europese interne markt beleid als een soft 
governance framework acteert, omdat vrijwel alle EU landen met een frisdrank-
belasting er één hebben die lijkt op het Britse model (welke ruim voor het Brexit 
referendum werd aangekondigd). Daarbij worden dranken hoger belast wanneer 
ze meer suiker bevatten, om producenten te stimuleren tot suikerreductie. In de 
VS geldt één tarief voor alle frisdranken. Verder valt op dat de Europese 
overheden die een frisdrankbelasting invoerden uit verschillende politieke 
kleuren bestaan, terwijl in de VS nog door geen enkele lokale Republikeinse 
overheid een frisdrankbelasting is ingevoerd.
Bovenstaande belicht de vorm en de context van belastingen op ongezonde 
voeding, maar het beleidsproces zelf wordt hiermee nog niet verklaard. Daarom 
wordt in hoofdstuk 6 een diepgaande studie gepresenteerd waarin de volgende 
vraag aan bod komt:
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9. Welke patronen zijn er in het agenderings- en besluitvormingsproces 
van frisdrankbelastingen die werden ingevoerd in drie Amerikaanse 
steden, en hoe hangen deze samen met de vorm van het beleid en de 
beleidscontext?
Voor een onderzoek naar het beleidsproces van de invoering van frisdrank-
belastingen is een vergelijkend onderzoek uitgevoerd naar het agenderings- en 
besluitvormingsproces van de frisdrankbelastingen die in Berkeley, Philadelphia 
en Cook County zijn ingevoerd. Drie Amerikaanse casussen zijn onderzocht 
mede omdat document analyse en gesprekken in de Engelse taal konden 
worden uitgevoerd. Berkeley en Philadelphia werden geïncludeerd omdat het 
de eerste twee Amerikaanse steden waren die een frisdrankbelasting invoerden, 
welke tot op heden nog steeds allebei bestaan. Cook County werd geïncludeerd 
omdat de belasting daar na twee maanden werd afgeschaft. Zodoende konden 
succesvolle en minder succesvolle pogingen vergeleken worden. Gegevens 
werden verzameld met een vragenlijstonderzoek en interviews met personen 
die betrokken waren in het beleidsproces, en met een analyse van de 
verslaggeving door lokale media.
De studie leverde zes lessen op. Allereerst werd in alle drie gevallen het beleids-
voorstel gekoppeld aan problemen die al hoog op de politieke agenda stonden. 
Die problemen waren niet per definitie gerelateerd aan gezondheid. In 
Philadelphia werd de belasting bijvoorbeeld gebruikt om middelen vrij te maken 
voor kinderdagopvang. Een tweede les was dat de framing van het beleid moest 
aansluiten bij het politieke sentiment. De campagne ‘Berkeley versus Big Soda’ 
sloot bijvoorbeeld goed aan bij een bestaande scepsis over de invloed van grote 
bedrijven op de politiek. Een derde les was dat de maatregelen nauw moesten 
voldoen aan bestaande spelregels rond belastingen en besluitvorming. Dit ging 
mis in Cook County, waar verwarring over de implementatie van de belasting 
het draagvlak schaadde. Een vierde les was dat de belastingstructuur politieke 
en pragmatische besluiten vergde. In Philadelphia werd bijvoorbeeld besloten 
om ook calorievrije frisdranken te belasten, na kritiek dat de belasting vooral 
armere mensen trof aangezien rijkere mensen meer calorievrije frisdranken 
drinken. Een vijfde les was dat voorstanders al vroeg in het beleidsproces een 
coalitie moesten smeden. Dit ging goed in Berkeley, maar voorstanders waren 
in Cook County niet georganiseerd toen de maatregel op de agenda kwam. 
Een zesde en laatste les was dat voor- en tegenstanders in staat moesten zijn 
om lokale actoren en media te beïnvloeden. De oppositie in Cook County 
mobiliseerde bijvoorbeeld lokale winkels om te demonstreren tegen de belasting 




In dit proefschrift is onderzocht hoe ‘minder bureaucratie en meer preventie’ in 
beleid kan worden omgezet. Er is gekeken naar de puzzling en powering 
aspecten die daarvoor nodig zijn. Uit het onderzoek naar ‘minder bureaucratie’ 
blijkt dat er nog veel puzzelwerk nodig is om het construct van administratieve 
kosten beter te begrijpen. In elk geval moeten administratieve kosten altijd in 
een systeemperspectief worden bezien door de interactie tussen de macro, 
meso en micro niveaus. Tegelijkertijd bestaat er weinig empirisch onderzoek 
naar die interactie, waardoor ook onduidelijk is hoe hervormingen de totale 
administratieve kosten beïnvloeden. Type zorgstelsels lijken wel een belangrijke 
factor te zijn omdat internationale verschillen in administratieve kosten op 
macro niveau correleren met verschillen in de manier waarop zorg gefinancierd 
wordt.
Om de juiste administratievoering door het vastleggen van gegevens op de 
juiste plek in het gezondheidszorgsysteem te krijgen, is bovenal robuuste en 
consistente monitoring nodig. Dit geldt met name voor de administratieve 
lasten van zorgprofessionals. Daarbij is ordentelijke data governance een 
randvoorwaarde. Hieronder vallen een beperkt aantal gegevensbeheerders en 
prikkels die gegevensuitwisseling bevorderen.
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat ‘meer preventie’ inderdaad goed is voor betaalbare 
zorg, maar dat komt niet alleen doordat preventie de zorgkosten verlaagt. 
 Productiviteitswinst en de intrinsieke waarde van gezondheidswinst zijn 
minstens even belangrijk. De vraag is derhalve waarom het preventiebeleid 
achterblijft bij de verwachtingen die velen ervan hebben. Uit de beleidsanalyses 
over belastingen op ongezonde voeding kan geconcludeerd worden dat er nog 
puzzelwerk nodig is om meer ongezonde voeding dan alleen frisdranken te 
belasten. Waar het gaat om frisdrankbelastingen spelen echter vooral powering 
aspecten.
Ten aanzien van die powering processen laat dit proefschrift zien dat het 
belangrijk is dat coalities van voorstanders zich al vroeg in het beleidsproces 
organiseren. Een goede organisatie is nodig omdat preventiebeleid complex 
is, aangezien het in veel verschillende beleidsarena’s tot stand komt. Dit houdt 
ook in dat de specifieke uitdagingen per type preventie sterk verschillen. 
Onderzoekers kunnen beleidsmakers ondersteunen door in onderzoek naar 
preventiemaatregelen nauwlettend rekening te houden met de spelregels van 
de beleidsarena waarin besloten wordt over de betreffende preventiemaatregel. 
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Een andere les is dat gezondheidsretoriek niet altijd leidend moet zijn in de 
framing. Preventiebeleid wordt immers veelal gemaakt in beleidsarena’s waar 
gezondheid niet het primaire doel is. Het feit dat frisdrankbelastingen vaak een 
antwoord waren op budgettekorten, is een sprekend voorbeeld, maar ook 
andere slimme koppelingen zijn mogelijk.
Tot slot worden enkele parallellen getrokken tussen administratieve kosten en 
preventie als beleidsvraagstukken. Er bestaat gebrek aan consensus over wat 
administratieve kosten zijn, maar preventie is zeker ook geen gemakkelijk 
begrip. Toch zijn definities omtrent preventie beter uitgewerkt en is er veel 
empirische kennis beschikbaar over risicofactoren en de (kosten)effectiviteit 
van maatregelen. De academische gemeenschap heeft namelijk decennialang 
veel aandacht gehad voor preventie, maar minder voor de administratieve 
kosten in de zorg. De ordegrootte van administratieve kosten vereist dat dit 
verandert en er meer academische aandacht komt voor zinnige administratie, 
net zoals er recent meer aandacht is gekomen voor zinnige zorg. Een belangrijke 
stip op de horizon lijkt het uitwerken van een systeem waarbij organisaties die 
data uitvragen, ook de totale kosten ervan dragen. Dit is nu slechts beperkt het 
geval omdat de administratieve lasten van zorgprofessionals verstopt zitten in 
algemene statistieken. Dit idee hinkt op dezelfde gedachte als de belastingen 
op ongezonde voeding waarbij ‘de vervuiler betaalt’.
Onderzoek naar betaalbare zorg lijkt zich tot dusver minder te richten op het 
verminderen van bureaucratie en het versterken van preventie. Dat is logisch 
omdat maatregelen zoals eigen betalingen, budgetplafonds en pakketbeper-
kingen directer samenhangen met betaalbaarheid en ook binnen één over-
heidstermijn tot besparingen kunnen leiden. Echter, dergelijke maatregelen 
zijn impopulair. ‘Minder bureaucratie en meer preventie’ zijn wel populair maar 
in dit proefschrift is de complexiteit verkend van het omzetten ervan in beleid. 
Beleidsmakers, onderzoekers en zorgprofessionals moeten deze complexiteit 
begrijpen en aanpakken zodat het gezondheidssysteem stapje voor stapje uit 





This dissertation relies on data acquired from publicly accessible repositories, 
literature reviews, surveys, focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews 
and a media analysis. The data from publicly accessible repositories were 
acquired from the OECD health expenditure database, the OECD health system 
characteristics database, the OECD fiscal decentralization database, the health 
expenditure data of Statistics Netherlands and annual reports of organizations 
involved in the governance and financing of Dutch long-term care. Our 
analyses of these data are described in chapter 2 and 3 and intermezzo 2. 
Appended to the publication in the Journal of Health Planning and Management 
on which chapter 2 was based, specifically, our use of data from the OECD 
health system characteristics database is described.
Chapter 3 describes the results of a survey held among experts in administrative 
costs in Dutch long-term care. The survey itself is appended to the publication 
in the Journal of Long-Term Care on which chapter 3 was based. To this study 
a set of powerpoint slides which contained the survey results in detail is 
appended. The results of the focus group discussions that are described in 
chapter 3 were appended as well in the form of anonymized focus group 
discussion reports.
The data that was collected in the literature review that is presented in chapter 5 
is appended to the publication in Health Policy on which chapter 5 was based. 
Also appended is the list of experts that were consulted for validation of findings 
from the 13 case studies that were included in this study.
Chapter 6 describes the results of a survey held among stakeholders involved in 
the soda tax policies of Berkeley, Cook County and Philadelphia. The survey 
items are listed in this chapter. The total survey results are not provided because 
they cannot be published non-anonymously due to the small number of 
participants and because all items generated qualitative data. The same goes for 
the interviews that were held for chapter 6. These were transcribed, but the 
transcripts are not made publicly available because they cannot be presented 
anonymously. The coding schemes that were used for analyzing the survey 
results and transcripts are provided as an appendix to the publication in Health 
Policy on which chapter 6 was based. The narratives presented in chapter 6 
present the analyzed data, in addition to table 2 which presents quotes that 
summarize the identified themes. The data that was collected and analyzed for 
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Met het schrijven van dit dankwoord eindigt voor mij een bijzonder intensieve 
periode. In 2014 zette ik mijn eerste professionele stappen in de beleidswereld 
als Rijkstrainee bij het Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, maar 
een ambitie om nog eens een proefschrift over gezondheidsbeleid te schrijven 
bleef knagen. Ik zag het echter niet zitten om voltijds aan een proefschrift te 
gaan werken over een onderwerp dat ik niet zelf had bedacht. In 2016 bedacht 
ik een mooie maar weinig voorkomende combinatie door simpelweg in mijn 
vrije tijd een proefschrift te schrijven, naast mijn reguliere baan bij het 
ministerie. Enkele levensgebeurtenissen (trouwen, huis kopen en verbouwen 
en de geboorte van mijn twee kinderen) volgden, en ik vond het ook nog 
belangrijk om fit te blijven na jaren in de kelder van de profwielrennerij. Ik had 
kortom vaak niet eens meer door hoeveel ballen er eigenlijk in de lucht hingen.
Gelukkig kon ik op de steun van een heleboel mensen rekenen om de juiste 
ballen in de lucht te houden. Allereerst wil ik Patrick Jeurissen en Niek Klazinga 
bedanken. Ik herinner me als de dag van vandaag onze eerste conversaties 
over mijn proefschriftplannen, op VWS, bij Niek thuis, ergens in Parijs en tegen 
het einde steeds vaker op Skype. Die gesprekken verliepen meestal als volgt: ik 
schoof wat los samenhangende ideeën in elkaar en gooide wat literatuur op 
tafel, Patrick voegde daar nog een reeks boeken en strakkere ideeën aan toe 
waarna Niek de omgevallen boekenkast rustig ordende en er een werkbaar idee 
uitrolde. Tussendoor bespraken we allerlei ad hoc ontwikkelingen die speelden 
bij VWS of de OECD en kwamen ook nog actuele of privézaken langs. 
Enerverend, leerzaam en bijzonder heb ik al deze gesprekken gevonden; je zou 
er een apart boek over kunnen schrijven!
Niek, helemaal aan het begin gaf je me de waardevolle tip mee om het gewoon 
een jaar te proberen. Maakte ik in dat eerste jaar stappen, dan kon ik vol 
vertrouwen verder gaan, ging het moeizamer, dan hadden we een mooi ijkpunt 
om er zonder gêne een streep onder te zetten. Door deze tip legde ik mezelf niet 
te veel druk op en zag ik in dat een proefschrift schrijven echt een etappe-
wedstrijd is. Wat erg hielp was dat het eerste ongepolijste idee (‘wat doen 
overheden met suikertaksen’) snel publicabel werd en qua citaties zelfs op een 
voltreffer uitkwam. Ik ging dan ook vol goede moed verder. Dank Niek voor het 
kanaliseren van mijn ideeën, enthousiasme en (soms) ongeduld en voor je 
oprechte interesse in de verschillende ballen die ik hooghield.
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Patrick, ik heb altijd bewonderd hoezeer je open staat voor nieuwe kennis, 
ondanks de brede en diepe kennis die je al bezit. Want laten we wel wezen: 
enige intellectuele lenigheid is nodig om serieus in te kunnen gaan op een 
beginnend beleidsmedewerker met een idee om een proefschrift te schrijven 
over ‘iets met preventie en administratieve kosten’. Je was altijd oprecht 
geïnteresseerd in mijn voortgang en ik heb de vele gesprekken over onderzoek, 
beleid en privé altijd als zeer prettig ervaren. Ik weet zeker dat je nog veel 
mensen zult blijven inspireren in de zoektocht naar echt goede kennis voor 
betaalbare zorg.
Next, I would like to thank other colleagues who have contributed to parts of 
this dissertation. David Morgan and Michael Mueller, chaps, I have enjoyed 
working with you on the administrative costs chapter of the OECD report on 
wasteful spending on healthcare, and the scientific publication that followed 
(chapter 2 of this dissertation). We were dealing with very tacky topics but 
somehow, we found a way to make it fun. That is an achievement alone when 
a Dutchman, German and a Brit are in the mix. Onno van Hilten, ik heb ervan 
genoten hoe helder jij redeneert bij het conceptualiseren van onderdelen van 
de zorguitgaven, en hoe je daar vervolgens pragmatisch acties aan koppelt. Je 
bent een echte vakman. Milica Jevdjevic, the saying “time flies when you’re 
having fun” was certainly applicable during our collaboration. I vividly 
remember our exhausting yet fun brainstorming sessions to identify themes in 
our study on SSB taxes in the USA. During these sessions I noticed your sharp 
thinking and while compiling the subsequent papers I was glad to have such a 
dedicated colleague at my side. Clemens Briels wil ik hartelijk danken voor de 
fantastische omslag. Je moet er blijkbaar echt kunstenaar voor zijn om iets 
moois maken van de taaie materie die ik in dit proefschrift bespreek. Ik ben blij 
dat je hier energie in hebt willen steken.
Anders dan een reguliere promovendus heb ik mijn proefschrift niet op een 
universiteitscampus geschreven, maar thuis in de woonkamer, slaapkamer, 
keuken, studeerkamer of waar ik ook maar even tijd en een tafel beschikbaar 
had. Desondanks boden de mensen van IQ healthcare altijd een warm welkom 
als ik ergens over wilde sparren, mijn voortgang eens wilde laten bekritiseren, 
of als ik weer eens een aspect van de wondere wereld van de academia niet 
begreep. Dank daarvoor.
Sparren over mijn proefschrift deed ik ook veelvuldig met collega’s op het 
Ministerie van VWS. De collega’s van de afdeling Algemeen Economisch 
Beleid ben ik veel dank verschuldigd. Ik geniet telkens weer van inhoudelijke 
gesprekken over betaalbare zorg met bijvoorbeeld Valentin Neevel, Hans van 
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Oers, Arne Jeninga, Martijn Klunder, Remco de Nood, Stef Beek, Rafael 
Lizanzu en Liliane de Ruiter. Henk Soorsma, Jan Derk Brilman en in de staart 
van dit proces Albert van der Horst wil ik ook bedanken voor de steun als 
leidinggevende om werk als beleidsmedewerker te combineren met promoveren. 
De mensen van de directies Publieke Gezondheid en Voeding, Gezondheids-
bescherming en Preventie en het Preventieteam wil ik nog bedanken voor de 
altijd prettige samenwerking en dat geldt voor zoveel meer kennisinstituten en 
andere relaties. Ik heb het altijd gaaf gevonden om mijn academisch opgehaalde 
kennis meteen om te kunnen zetten in beter preventiebeleid. En andersom 
werden hierdoor mijn onderzoeksresultaten beleidsrelevanter of kon ik mensen 
helpen om een heldere kennisvraag uit te werken.
Soms vond ik het fijn en was er tijd om alle ballen even aan de kant te leggen en 
te babbelen over van alles en nog wat. Die momenten werden door de jaren 
heen steeds schaarser gezien het spitsuur van het leven waar eenieder zich 
inmiddels in bevindt. En de lockdowns hielpen natuurlijk ook niet mee. Op de 
fiets of ergens anders genoot ik evengoed nog meer van de mooie verhalen of 
simpele afleiding door bijvoorbeeld Floris, Gijs, Guy, Jesper, Lodewijk, Malaya, 
Manman, Maint, Roel, Ruud, Roy en Ward.
Bovenal wil ik graag mijn lieve ouders Corrie en Kees bedanken voor jullie on-
voorwaardelijke steun en de vrijheid die jullie me altijd hebben gegund. Het is 
altijd goed zeggen jullie vaak en dat is ook echt zo. Of ik nu met beperkt fysiek 
talent een carrière als profwielrenner nastreefde, een onbekende master ging 
doen of compleet vrijwillig een proefschrift begon te schrijven terwijl ik al een 
mooie baan had. Dank daarvoor. En aan mijn lieve zussen Francien, Lonneke 
en Charlotte: dank voor jullie liefde, steun en geduld (als ik weer eens op de 
praatstoel ging zitten). Bedankt ook John, Alain, Marie-Louise, Jan, Ronald, 
Hilde, Charlotte, Robin en alle kleine en minder kleine neefjes en nichtjes voor 
het ravotten en spelen (Krijn, Isis, Zara, Eefje, Nova, Sophie, Sjef, Lily en baby 
Len).
Lieve Viola, tot slot. Hoe kan ik mijn dankbaarheid voldoende op papier zetten? 
Al die avonden, weekenden en vrije dagen wanneer ik weer eens aan het 
proefschriften was stelde jij slechts zelden ter discussie. Sterker nog, zelfs tijdens 
de bevalling en toen je hoogzwanger was speelde het proefschrift een rolletje. 
Maar ook dat vond je niet erg. Als je al eens vroeg om niet te gaan proefschriften 
was het veelal om mijn pretenties wat in toom te houden. Dank dat je in mijn 
leven verscheen alweer zo lang geleden. Nog groter is mijn dank voor Amélie 
en Louis. Ik kan me een leven zonder die twee inmiddels niet meer voorstellen 
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